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Abstract 
 
Critically examining the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject, this thesis 
explored the theoretical problems and methodological premises of a converged version 
of both theories. The central argument the present thesis seeks to demonstrate is that the 
Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic provides a more comprehensive and effective account 
of the process of the subject formation than a purely psychoanalytical or structuralist 
Marxist analysis of the term. After a critical study of the way the subject is positioned 
between language and ideology in contemporary critical theory the thesis proceeds to 
investigate the subject-object relation in the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects.   
     Conceived of as the convergence of lack and material, the Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic focuses on the close affinity between the Lacanian notion of linguistic 
alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation. The subject’s 
alienation with what is called in the thesis ‘ideological signifier’ is considered as the 
result of direct and dramatic modes of interpellation in both language acquisition 
process and the mature phase. The major theoretical premises of this model include the 
following: first, identity functions through, and because of, the ‘inter-subjective 
dialectic’ and an ‘intra-subjective lack.’ Identity is never fully constituted because of 
this antagonism, and thus remains ‘incomplete.’ Secondly, the subject is ideologically 
constituted through language. The mechanism through which both language and 
ideology construct a subject never permits the subject enjoying a state of full identity 
with ideological signifiers. Thirdly, the subject’s identity is represented in the language 
exposed to and, later, reproduced by him/her. 
    In order to demonstrate a practical reading of subjectivity formation in terms of this 
critical approach the present research applies it to James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man (1916). The process of the subject formation has been analysed through 
the subject’s alienation/interpellation by the ISAs. Also, the inter-subjective dialectic 
between different subjectivities of the subject’s identity has been investigated. The 
thesis demonstrates that identity reconstruction represented in the novel is a complicated 
and ongoing process, which begins with disillusionment, goes through materialization 
of epiphany, and ends with inventiveness in language. This process has been 
represented as a move from ideological to non-ideological subjectivity through artistic 
creativity. The exploration of the aesthetics of language is crucial to the analysis of the 
reconstruction of Stephen Dedalus’ identity in that it happens in and through language.   
 
 3
Acknowledgements 
  
I should express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Alex Murray, for his corrective 
comments, invaluable suggestions, and inspiration. I will be forever influenced by his 
persistence and clarity of thought. I also offer my sincere thanks to Dr Anthony 
Fothergill for his comments and pragmatic advice. My thanks also go to Professor 
Ashley Tauchert who I owe a debt of gratefulness. I also appreciate the friendly 
environment of English Department of the University of Exeter and I am thankful to the 
academic and administrative staff of School of Arts, Languages and Literatures. Finally, 
very special thanks go to my family whose encouragement never faded.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
Dedication 
 
I dedicate this thesis to my mother and my father, who, from a long distance, provided 
me with an effective motivation to complete this research project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract........................................................................................................................2                                  
                                                                                                                                              
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................3 
 
Dedication.....................................................................................................................4                                                                      
 
  
1 The Problem, Argument, and Framework: An Introduction.........................8                  
                                                       
1.1 General Overview.......................................................................................8 
1.2 Statement and Development of the Problem.............................................11 
1.3 Research Questions...................................................................................17 
1.4 Rationales..................................................................................................18 
1.5 Objectives..................................................................................................19 
1.6 The Organization of the thesis...................................................................20                                                    
 
 
2       Language, Ideology, and the Position of the Subject:    
         A Critical Review of Lacanian-Althusserian Models....................................24 
                                                           
2.1     Introduction...............................................................................................24 
2.2     ‘Lacanian-Althusserian Paradigm’: Applications and 
             Objections.................................................................................................25 
2.3     Frederic Jameson and Identifying a New Gap..........................................32 
2.4     Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Marxism/Psychoanalysis  
    Reconciliation...........................................................................................38 
2.5     Slavoj Žižek and the Ideological Barred O..............................................43 
2.6     Judith Butler and Hegelian Interpellation.................................................49 
2.7 Concluding Remarks................................................................................54                                                             
 
 
3 The Cartesian and Hegelian Subjects:      
   The Subject-Object Separation and Identity.................................................57                        
                                                                                             
3.1 Introduction..............................................................................................57                                                                
3.2     The Cartesian Subject as the Objectified Subject: Rationalism,  
    Centrality, and the Subject-Object Separation.........................................58           
3.2.1 “Cogito Ergo Sum:” Certainty and Centrality of the 
Rational Subject............................................................................59 
3.2.2 The Cartesian Subject Objectified: Mind/Body Opposition 
and the Subject-Object Separation................................................65                                         
3.3 The Hegelian Subject and Nature: Romantic Subjectivity and the 
    Subject-Object Identity.............................................................................71   
3.3.1    Nature and the Subject-Object Identity in German Idealism.........72 
3.3.2 The Hegelian Subject and the Incomplete Subject-Nature 
Identity.............................................................................. ............77 
3.4 Concluding Remarks.................................................................................82 
                                                                                                                           
 6
4   The Subject of Ideology: Materialization of Ideology and 
  the ‘subject/Subject’ Non-Identity...................................................................84                                    
 
4.1 Introduction...............................................................................................84 
4.2     Structuralist Marxism and the Althusserian Concept of 
             ‘the Structure’............................................................................................85 
4.3     Materialized Ideology: A Non-Ideological Definition..............................94 
4.4     Interpellation and the Subject of Ideology................................................97 
4.5     Critical Evaluation of the Althusserian Model of 
    the ‘subject/Subject’: A Hegelian Reading.............................................100 
4.6     Concluding Remarks...............................................................................105                                                  
 
 
5    The Subject of Language: The Unconscious, Otherness,  
and the Problem of ‘Lack’ in Identity..........................................................106                                               
 
5.1     Introduction.............................................................................................106 
5.2     The Unconscious: Freudian or Lacanian?...............................................107 
5.3     The Structure of the Symbolic: The Other, Identity, and 
                   the Subject of Language.........................................................................115                                           
5.3.1 Language and the Structure of the Symbolic..............................116 
5.3.2 The Other and the Subject of Language.....................................121 
5.3.3 Lack in the Identity of the subject..............................................126 
5.4 Identification of/with ‘the Other’: Self-Consciousness and 
             Lack in Lacan’s Hegel............................................................................131 
5.5     The Lacanian Subject: An Anti- Cartesian Other in the 
    Imaginary................................................................................................137 
5.6 Concluding Remarks..............................................................................140 
                                                                     
 
6       The Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic as a Critical Approach:  
         Problems and Premises..................................................................................142                                                                      
  
6.1 Introduction............................................................................................142 
6.2 The Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic: The Convergence of 
    Lack and material...................................................................................143 
6.3     Linguistic Alienation as Dramatic Interpellation...................................146 
6.4     The Subject in the Ideological Symbolic: Towards a 
    Critical Methodology.............................................................................151 
6.4.1 The Inter-Subjective Dialectic and Intra-Subjective Lack.........152 
6.4.2 Ideological Constitution of the Subject......................................158 
6.4.3 Representation of Identity in Language.....................................162 
6.5 Concluding Remarks.............................................................................167 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7        The Ideological Symbolic and Aesthetics of Language in 
          A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: A Case Study in  
          Subjectivity Formation and Representation.............................................169                                         
 
7.1 Introduction...........................................................................................169 
7.2 The Ideological Other of the Symbolic: Language and the  
             Constitution of the Subject in A Portrait……......................................170                                 
 7
7.2.1 Linguistic Alienation and Ideological Interpellation: 
                   Language, the ISAs, and the Subject Formation.......................170 
7.2.2 The Inter-Subjective Dialectic: Religion, Nationalism, 
                   and Otherness............................................................................180                                                           
7.3 Identity Reconstruction and Representation: From Ideology 
                   to Artistic Subjectivity..........................................................................188    
7.3.1 Disillusionment and Materialization of Epiphany....................188 
7.3.2 Ideology, Art, and the Aesthetics of Language.........................194               
7.4 Concluding Remarks.............................................................................203                                                  
 
 
8        Discussions and Conclusion........................................................................204                                               
 
 
Bibliography...........................................................................................................212 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8
Chapter One: 
The Problem, Argument, and Framework: 
An Introduction 
 
 
1.1 General Overview 
If we review the major developments of what is generally referred to as literary theory 
in the past few decades, we will immediately find out that there has occurred a major 
change in our attitude towards the concept of ‘the subject.’ Different approaches in 
literary theory, such as psychological and sociological, are widely concerned with the 
definition of ‘the subject.’ Having grammatical, sociological, psychoanalytical and 
political meanings, ‘the subject’ is distinctly considered in contemporary literary theory 
from myriad critical points of view. Julian Wolfreys in his Critical Keywords in Literary 
and Cultural Theory (2004) writes: 
 
Regardless of its function within particular discourses, it has to be admitted that  the idea of 
the subject is immediately complicated, irreconcilably doubled in any initial utterance, if 
one acknowledges that by this word one indicates either oneself or another (singly or 
collectively) … It is possible, for example, to speak of the psychoanalytic subject, the 
individual subject, the subject before the law (and by which laws one becomes subjected), 
or the national, supposedly collective subject.1 
 
    The definition of the subject becomes more “complicated” when we consider the 
distinguishable treatment of the term in the sub-categories of a particular discipline or 
different socio-political systems. For example, different schools of psychoanalysis 
demonstrate different definitions of the term and, hence, provide a wide range of 
examples of and approaches to ‘the psychoanalytic subject.’ Furthermore, as far as the 
political designation of the term is concerned, one can grasp the different definitions of 
the subject in that each political system has its own particular version of the subject. For 
example, the rights of an Iranian citizen in the Iranian Constitution are manifestly 
different from those of a British subject in the context of the British juridico-political 
system.  
                                                 
1
 Julian Wolfreys, Critical Keywords in Literary and Cultural Theory, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004, p. 232. 
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     A major part of the significance of the subject in critical theory goes back to Jacques 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic analysis of the term. A devoted follower of Freud, Lacan, 
however, tried to deprive Freudian psychoanalysis of any humanistic designation. The 
humanist assumptions that underpin such common phrases as “the free will of man,” 
“my independent thought” and “he has a stable character” were called into question by 
those indebted to his Structuralist reading of Freudian psychoanalysis. Lacan’s 
frequently-quoted “the unconscious is structured like a language” is often used as a 
short-hand for his re-valuation of the unconscious as a system based on and according to 
which the subject thinks, acts, and fancies in a determined way. 
   Applying an anti-Cartesian approach, Jacques Lacan further sought to develop a new 
approach towards the concept of the subject as split by the entry of the child into the 
Symbolic order by means of language. Lacan’s theoretically designed and 
experimentally based account of the ‘subject’ has proved central to critical theory. His 
idiosyncratic treatment of such terms as the unconscious, desire, and the Name-of-the-
Father has paved the way for a genuine understanding of the structure of the 
unconscious of the subject. 
   The infant, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, experiences the first recognition of itself 
when it looks at its image in the mirror. The ‘mirror stage’ in the development of the 
unconscious mind provides the infant a false conception of its self in that the infant 
imagines that the image it sees in the mirror is its other. The subject thus enters the 
Imaginary, which is a psychic phase in which the subject begins to falsify his ‘self’ 
simply because he/she identifies it only by and through the ‘other.’ Lacan writes: 
 
the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency 
to anticipation—and, for all the subject caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns 
out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented image of the body to what I will call an 
“orthopedic” form of its totality—and to the finally donned armor of an alienating identity 
that will mark his entire mental development with rigid structure.2  
 
    Therefore, the subject’s first identification of him/herself is based on an “assumption” 
that will mark his/her “entire mental development.” Such a development is later more 
determined by the Symbolic order to which the subject is exposed. Language plays the 
instrumental role in the Symbolic, and the unconscious mind becomes subjected to it.  
                                                 
2
 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed as in Psychoanalytic 
Experience,” in Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink,  New York: W. W. Norton, 2006, p. 78. 
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     On the other hand, borrowing the term ‘subject’ from Lacan, Louis Althusser 
presented a new approach towards the constitution of ‘the subject’ that was based on the 
immanent relationship between the subject and ideology.  For Louis Althusser, the 
subject was located within the framework of different ideologies that determined his/her 
identity. He presented a new definition of ideology that critically rejected our long-
believed understanding of ideology as ‘a set of abstract beliefs and ideas.’      
    In his classic essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” a frequently 
discussed chapter of his Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays [1969] (1971), he 
pointed to the concrete existence of the ideas and ideology in different economic 
systems. The economic system of a capitalist state, Althusser maintained, reproduced its 
own conditions of production, and in order to fulfill such a condition, throughout its 
produced ideologies, reproduced subjects who will ultimately participate in the 
processes of production.  
     Althusser’s essay was an attempt to explore the process in which the subject became 
subject to ideology. Human beings, in Althusser’s opinion, become repressed by 
different ideologies of the state from an early age.  Ideology, which is present 
everywhere in such a system, plays its decisive role in the formation of the subject’s 
beliefs, actions and practices. Althusser argues that where only a single subject is 
concerned, 
 
the existence of the ideas of belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions 
inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined 
by the material ideological apparatuses from which derive the ideas of that subject.3 
 
These material ideologies that dominate the subjects of a capitalist state are, according 
to Althusser, permanently produced by two main apparatuses of such a state: the ISAs, 
Ideological State Apparatuses, and the RSA, that is Repressive State Apparatus. The 
ISAs include the family, the school, the church and the media, and the RSA embodies 
such institutions as the police, the prison, and the court. The individual in a modern 
capitalist state is subjected to these two apparatuses. The subject, from this point of 
view, is constituted and reproduced by these ideological and repressive apparatuses.  
    The essay was highly influential in the development of theoretical explorations of 
both the ideologies of the modern socio-political system and the mechanisms behind the 
                                                 
3
 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001, 
p. 114. 
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constitution of subjects. Althusser’s essay, as Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle 
argue in their Literature, Criticism and Theory (2004), seeks to demonstrate that 
“ideology is bound up with the constitution of the subject.”4 Furthermore, Terry 
Eagleton, explaining the theme of Althusser’s essay in his Literary Theory: An 
Introduction (1983),  writes: “How is it, the essay asks, that human subjects very often 
come to submit themselves to the dominant ideologies of their societies – ideologies 
which Althusser sees as vital to maintain the power of a ruling class?”5  
    Offering genuine and influential investigations into the identity of the subject, both 
Lacanian and Althusserian frameworks of thought were significant developments in 
critical thought from the mid 1950s to late 1970s. Whereas the psychoanalytical theory 
of the Lacanian school is mainly concerned with the identity of the subject through the 
analysis of language and the unconscious, the structuralist Marxist theory, particularly 
in its Althusserian form, is critically involved in the question of the constitution of the 
subject by ideology. An investigation of the construction of identity through an 
exploration of the interrelationship between and among language, ideology, and the 
subject is still a major concern, and disputed problem, of contemporary critical theory.  
 
1.2 Statement and Development of the Problem 
Critically studying the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions of the subject, I will 
investigate their treatment of and relation to the major manifestations of the modern 
subject including the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects.  I will then explore the question 
of the possibility of the convergence of the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the 
subject as well as the theoretical problems involved in any unified version of the two. 
Considering the ‘Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic’ as providing a model in the analysis 
of the subject’s identity, the thesis argues that the exploration of this dialectic provides a 
more comprehensive account of the process of the subject formation than a purely 
psychoanalytic or structuralist Marxist analysis of the term.  
    The thesis approaches this dialectic as a critical perspective for the analysis of 
subjectivity construction and representation. This dialectic is, first of all, applicable to 
different phases in the development of subject including both the infantile and mature 
years. Furthermore, it investigates the subject from two different aspects that are its 
relation to both language and ideology. Also, it brings into consideration the relation of 
                                                 
4
 Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle (eds.), Literature, Criticism and Theory, 3rd ed., London: Longman 
and Pearson, 2004, p.173. 
5
 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 149. 
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the subject to both the individual and the social and, thus, focuses on language as the 
realm where they meet.  
    Apparent similarities of both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject 
constitution have led a number of scholars to simply combine them. On the contrary, 
recent studies and theories on the relation of the Symbolic to ideology, and the lack both 
language and ideology are based on, have raised some challenging questions for 
Lacanian-Althusserian approaches to the identity of the subject. Exploring examples of 
simplistic combinations of the Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity, the 
present research also evaluates those theoretical treatments that have critically 
approached the question of the convergence of both models.  
    There are frequent references to the similarity of Lacanian and Althusserian theories 
in a great deal of introductory work on literary and cultural criticism. A recent example 
is Leigh Wilson’s “Psychoanalysis in Literary and Cultural Studies” in Modern British 
and Irish Criticism and Theory (2006) in which she refers to the significance of 
language to both Lacan and Althusser: 
 
… what both Lacan and Althusser focus on their structuralist rereadings of Freud and Marx 
is the determining function of language in creation of the subject. Whereas previous cultural 
criticism from the left struggled with the notion of subjectivity, a renewed psychoanalysis 
and renewed Marxism seemed to offer a coherent theory of the relation between the 
individual and the social.6 
   
Being part of an introductory essay, the above quotation does not provide an 
investigation into the problems and concerns regarding the immanent relation of 
ideology to language. As I shall demonstrate, this is the salient limitation observable in 
most introductory guides to contemporary theory and criticism in that they simply refer 
to the similarities of both Lacanian and Althusserian theories, sometimes simply 
conflating the two, without critically investigating the problems involved in drawing 
them together. 
    In addition to the simple unification of Althusser and Lacan’s models of subjectivity 
in introductory work, there have also been more in depth attempts at classifications and 
comparisons of both models.  For example, both offered radical critiques of modern 
capitalist system. Althusser criticized the way a capitalist State makes us subject to the 
                                                 
6
 Leigh Wilson, “Psychoanalysis in Literary and Cultural Studies,” in Modern British and Irish Criticism 
and Theory, Julian Wolfreys (ed.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006, p. 170.   
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ISAs and RSAs, and Lacan had the same attitude in the sense that he was influenced by 
Kojève whose reading of Hegel was itself influenced by Marx’s materialist critiques of 
capitalism. Another manifest similarity is Althusser’s usage of the term 
‘overdeterminism,’ which is reminiscent of its Freudian designation.  This term was first 
used by Freud to describe the representation of the dream-thoughts in images in two 
different ways: condensation and displacement. Althusser, too, employed the same term 
to describe the effects of the contradictions in each practice on the social formation as a 
whole.  
    While Lacan considered the unconscious as a structure, Althusser considered social 
formation as a structure consisting of a number of other structures. The structuralist 
foundations of both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity have caused 
reductionist comparisons. Moreover, both Lacan and Althusser presented their model of 
the subject as not only different from but also in direct opposition to the Cartesian 
subject. Whereas the Cartesian subject was centred, coherent, and certain, Lacan and 
Althusser provided an account of the subject that considered it de-centred and 
fragmented. The subject, in Lacan and Althusser, is no longer an autonomous decision 
maker as it was believed to be in Descartes.   
     However, these apparent similarities are misleading in that they give birth to 
problematic critical responses and may make the scholar ignore the essentially different 
bases on which they are established. Some scholars have consequently interpreted both 
Lacan and Althusser’s critical perspectives in parallel lines. These scholars have 
actually presented an oversimplified version of the problem mainly because their aim 
has been merely the classification of critical perspectives. These works, though 
seemingly helpful for new readers, are really generalizing and oversimplifying the 
problem.  
     A good example of such treatment is that provided by Mary Klages’ Literary 
Theory: A Guide for the Perplexed (2006). She believes that the “acquisition of 
language is the process of becoming a subject, for both Althusser and Lacan.”7 
Furthermore, whereas Klages considers Lacan as a Post-Structuralist, Andrew Bennett 
and Nicholas Royle in their edited Literature, Criticism and Theory (2004) classify 
Althusser as a Post-Structuralist, too.8 In contrast, Leigh Wilson, as seen above, regards 
the works of both of Althusser and Lacan as “structuralist rereadings.” The easy 
conflation of Althusser and Lacan is symptomatic of a broader attempt to divide 
                                                 
7
 Mary Klages, Literary Theory: A Guide for the Perplexed, London: Continuum, 2006, p. 134.  
8
 Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle (eds.), Literature, Criticism and Theory, p. 172. 
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theoretical positions into neat compartments, often with a limited exploration of the 
foundations and structures of competing positions. Althusser, for example, is variously 
categorised as a Structuralist Marxist,9 a revisionist Marxist,10 a Post-Structuralist,11 and 
a Neo-Marxist. These competing classifications allow critics to make analogies between 
theorists, yet in doing so produce radically compromised accounts of each theoretical 
position.12 While many have been happy to conflate these two theoretical positions, 
other critics have been more circumspect in their analysis. In an interview with David 
McInerney on her book, Caroline Williams refers to Althusser’s relation to Lacan and 
Lacanianism as a “complex matter.” She states: 
 
Althusser clearly recognised a certain affinity between Lacan's own project to read Freud 
and his own symptomatic reading of Marx, as well as the former's own intellectual 
marginalization and his own. His published correspondence with Lacan (1963-1966) is 
certainly indicative of this. Althusser even offered a seminar on Lacan in 1963-4 and was 
actively involved in Lacan's arrival at the Ecole Normale. He was deeply interested in the 
latter's work at this time.13 
  
As Williams goes on to say, “Althusser’s distance from Lacan” was to be “strongly 
marked” in the latter phase of their intellectual life. Apart from this later ‘distance,’ 
Althusser’s framework of thought was epistemologically different from Lacanian theory 
in that while Lacan was influenced by Hegel, Althusser attempted to purify Marx from 
all Hegelian colours.  
    As I shall demonstrate later in the thesis, a number of critics attempted to employ 
both theories in their analysis of the subject. Early applications include the readings 
presented by Terry Eagleton, Stephen Heath, and Colin MacCabe. Whereas they have 
                                                 
9
 Mary Klages, Literary Theory: A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 131. 
10
 Peter Barry, Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory, 2nd ed., Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002, p. 165.   
11
 See Madan Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, 2nd ed., Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1993. Chapter Three. 
12
 Another example of approaching Althusser and Lacan in the same vein happens in Hans Bertens’ 
Literary Theory: The Basics (2003). Here he not only argues that there is a similar methodology followed 
by both Lacan and Althusser but also attempts to read one of them based on and by the help of the other. 
Attempting to solve the questions posed in Althusser’s attitude towards the origin and ‘influence’ of 
ideology, Bertens simply refers to the Lacanian idea that “the processes that we go through when we 
grow up leave us forever incomplete.” More interestingly, while elaborating on ‘Lacan’s psychoanalytic 
model’ in another part of his book, he refers to Althusser’s view that “ideology gives us the illusion that it 
makes us whole.” Hans Bertens, Literary Theory: The Basics, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 163.      
13
 Caroline Williams, “Althusser and the Persistence of the Subject,” Borderlands, Vol. 4, No. 2, (Spring 
2005). Available from: http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol4no2_2005/williams_interview.htm [Accessed 
14 January 2009] 
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pointed to the impact of both Lacan’s and Althusser’s theories and the similarities of 
both theories, they have not particularly focused on the possibility of a unified adoption 
of both theories and their accounts hardly unified. For example, whereas Terry Eagleton 
appears much influenced by the Althusserian theory of ideological subjection, Stephen 
Heath and Colin MacCabe, though focusing on ideology, are more concerned with the 
Lacanian premises in their references to the Symbolic and the Imaginary. However, it 
should be mentioned that discussing the similarities of Lacan and Althusser’s theories 
on the subject is different from presenting a unified theoretical approach based on the 
two. Terry Eagleton, for example, merely points to the parallel lines of these two 
theories and is not concerned with a new approach based on them: 
 
The relation of an individual “subject” to society as a whole in Althusser’s theory is rather 
like the relation of the small child to his or her mirror image in Lacan’s. In both cases, the 
human subject is supplied with a satisfyingly unified image of selfhood by identifying with 
an object which reflects this image back to it in a closed, narcissistic circle. In both cases, 
too, this image involves a misrecognition, since it idealizes the subject’s real situation.14 
 
    On the other hand, Stephen Heath and Colin MacCabe have been calling for a 
Lacanian-Althusserian approach in their studies on literary and, especially, film theory 
since the 1970s. This led to a theoretical debate over the legitimacy of such an approach 
between them and their critics, notably Carroll Noel and David Bordwell. As I shall 
demonstrate in the next chapter, ‘LAP,’ that is ‘Lacanian-Althusserian Paradigm,’ was 
radically criticized particularly in the field of film theory.15  
    Although this problem has not been explicitly discussed in contemporary literary 
theory, one can observe its manifestation in a number of recent critical works. There are 
more sophisticated models of drawing Lacanian and Althusserian theories together 
which I will critically engage in the next chapter. I shall thus discuss the work of Fredric 
Jameson, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Žižek, and Judith Butler as far as their 
parallel employment of both theories is concerned.    
    There are certain differences in Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject that 
need more attention. For example, a major criticism of the philosophical validity of 
Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is that the Lacanian and Althusserian accounts cannot 
be presented in the form of a unified theory since they are dealing with two essentially 
                                                 
14
 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, pp. 172-3. 
15
 See, David Bordwell, On the History of Film Style, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
Chapter Five: Prospects for Progress: Recent Research Programs. 
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different objects of study. Whereas Lacan was concerned with the unconscious and 
language as based on ‘lack’, Althusser considered ideology as having a ‘material’ 
existence.  Therefore, in order to argue for Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic one should 
also demonstrate the conditions of the convergence of ‘lack’ and ‘material.’ Moreover, 
while Althusser related the subject to ideology and the social, Lacan contemplated on its 
relation to the unconscious and the individual. In addition, each one of these theories is 
concerned with a particular stage of the development of the subject; whereas Lacan 
dealt with the formation of the subject’s unconscious through language acquisition in 
the oedipal period, Althusser worked on the role of ideologies in the latter life of the 
subject.  
    The problem here is not a matter of ‘simple combination.’ There emerge a number of 
theoretical problems not only because both were of different disciplines but because 
each is concerned with a particular aspect and period in the development of the subject. 
On the other hand, a theoretical approach that is based on two accounts will be 
illuminating in that it provides new insights in the identity and construction of the 
subject. My analysis thus contributes to the theoretical studies on identity construction 
in several ways. First, in attempting to bring together both Lacan and Althusser’s 
theories on the subject, a more comprehensive theoretical approach for the analysis of 
the subject is provided. However, if simplistically developed, as demonstrated above, 
the similarities of both accounts will result in misunderstanding and misclassification. 
Moreover, if applied without a critical investigation of the incongruity between the two 
theories, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic will suffer from certain theoretical weak 
points, some of which were highlighted above. Secondly, this thesis critically addresses 
this gap in the available literature by presenting an analysis of the theoretical problems 
and premises of a unified version of these two theories of subjectivity.     
    Finally, in order to demonstrate a practical reading of the formation of the subject in 
terms of a Lacanian-Althusserian critical approach, the present research proceeds to 
apply it to James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916). I shall explore 
the ideological languages that both alienate and interpellate the subject; in addition, I 
focus on the inter-subjective dialectics involved in the process of identity construction 
and reconstruction with reference to otherness in the subject’s identity. I shall also 
demonstrate the way subjectivity, in both its ideological and non-ideological forms, is 
represented in the novel by examining the ideological Symbolic exposed to the 
protagonist.  My analysis of the novel thus demonstrates how the subject goes on a 
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process of identity reconstruction through the materialization of the spiritual experience 
of epiphany and his obsession with the aesthetics of language. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Research questions, developed throughout the thesis, are divided into two major groups: 
preliminary and central. The preliminary questions are concerned with how modern 
conceptions (Hegel and Descartes) of the subject are related to each other and paved the 
ground for the emergence of Lacan’s and Althusser’s highly critical treatment of them. 
What the Cartesian subject was and in what ways German Idealism constructed a new 
concept of the subject are thus examined. They also include questions concerning the 
way the Lacanian and Althusserian models of the subject, while anti-Cartesian and 
critical of its rationalism, tended to be in congruity with Hegelian theorization of the 
Romantic subject.     
    Likewise, the central questions of this thesis focus on the problems and premises 
involved in a combination of the psychoanalytic and structuralist Marxist approaches to 
the subject. The central questions, each developed in a separate chapter, include the 
following: 
 
1. How is the subject positioned between language and ideology in recent critical 
theory? 
2. How did the Lacanian perception of the subject ultimately consider it as the 
subject of language whose identity is based on lack?   
3. How is the subject ideologically constituted in the Althusserian account and what 
are its limitations? 
4. What are the salient features of the methodology and the theoretical lapses and 
premises of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic? 
5. In its application to a literary text, how does the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic 
demonstrate the process of subject formation and the representation of 
subjectivity? 
 
    As observed, the central questions are concerned with the hypothesis of the present 
thesis that there can be not only a convergence of both Lacan and Althusser’s theories 
of the subject and that this allows for a more comprehensive means of analysing the 
subject that each position can provide alone.   
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1.4 Rationales  
Two sets of rationales should be discussed concerning the employment of the term 
‘Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic’ and the selection of James Joyce’s A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man as the novel to be read from this critical perspective. First, I have 
not used the term ‘Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm,’ which is used by a number of 
critics, mostly in the area of film studies. The rationale for this is that while the 
Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm designates a simply coherent approach without any 
critical attempt to show the theoretical problems involved in combining them, the 
Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic points to the gap between the Lacanian and the 
Althusserian conceptions of the subject.  
   Furthermore, based on Hegel’s dialectical mode of thought, the Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic considers the Lacanian as the thesis, the Althusserian as the antithesis, and the 
Lacanian-Althusserian as the synthesis. Earlier I briefly pointed to the opposition 
between the Lacanian concept of the unconscious as based on lack and the Althusserian 
perception of ideology as having a material existence. The synthesis, thus, remains itself 
part of a dialectical process and not an already-constructed paradigm.  
    Secondly, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic in the analysis of the construction of 
the subject provides a critical approach that finds its best manifestation when applied to 
a bildungsroman for the following reasons. First, the text under the examination of a 
Lacanian-Althusserian approach should be a work that represents different 
subjectivities. In other words, the familiar Bakhtinian concept of the ‘polyphonic’ is 
considered here as a novel of multi-subjectivity. However, there are two significant 
differences between Bakhtin’s methodology and the present approach. While in Bakhtin 
the ‘voice’ signifies the identity of the subject, this approach does not take subjectivity 
as demonstrative of the whole identity of the subject. For example, three different 
‘voices’ of The Brothers Karamazov (1880) are really expressive of, and have been 
considered as, three independent manifestations of the identity of the subject. That is to 
say that whereas each ‘voice is taken as an identity, it is and should be regarded as only 
one constituent subjectivity of the identity of the subject. Considering the ‘voice’ as 
‘identity’ sounds similar to the common view that a particular subjectivity becomes so 
dominant that it would define and determine the whole identity of the subject.  
    Whereas in the Bakhtinian account of the polyphonic novel each phone/subjectivity 
has equal significance and finds equal expression, there is a presiding voice in any 
autobiographical novel that comments on other subjectivities. While the author’s voice 
is only a constituent voice of the polyphonic novel, in an autobiographical-
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developmental novel there is one dominant voice/subjectivity in the process of 
construction. As for James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916), there 
are not only different ideologies and subjectivities in the novel but also different 
languages. What is of significance is that the particular language of each one of these 
ideologies is represented to the reader by Joyce’s stylistics. Furthermore, this novel 
includes a number of motifs with which the modern subject has been obsessed.  
    The second major reason for choosing A Portrait is that an educational novel 
demonstrates the process of the development of the protagonist. A bildungsroman, A 
Portrait shows the subjective formation of the identity of Stephen Dedalus. The 
protagonist in A Portrait is first a small child whose process of identity construction 
and, later, re-constitution is observed in the novel. Likewise, apart from being a 
bildungsroman that is concerned with the formation of the subjectivity of the 
protagonist, A Portrait is the novel where there is a correspondence between 
subjectivity and language. It is a collection of not only subjectivities but also of 
languages. This is manifestly observed in Stephen’s obsession with words and language. 
The last, but not least, rationale is that there is an interesting relationship between this 
novel and the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic: the stylistic treatment of language in this 
novel is not only in parallel with the mental development of the subject but also 
expressive of the ideological subjectivities of the context in which the protagonist grows 
up. Moreover, the ultimate re-constructed form of the identity of the subject is 
represented in the language of the last chapter of the novel.  
 
1.5 Objectives  
The Objectives of the present research are twofold. First, this thesis aims to demonstrate 
the possibility of the convergence of the Lacanian and Althusserian models of 
subjectivity. The thesis thus elaborates a significant problem in critical theory that is, as 
Frederic Jameson calls it, the position of the subject in both psychoanalytical and 
Structuralist Marxist approaches. However, theoretical problems involved in this 
dialectic also go back to the distinguishable treatment of identity in Hegel and Marx. I 
shall explore this part of the problem by providing a Hegelian reading of the 
Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject.’  
    Demonstrating a model for subjectivity construction provided by the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic does not merely mean arguing for a simple matter of comparison 
or casual relationship. It becomes more significant when one considers the large number 
of disciplines – literary and cultural theory and criticism, gender studies, semiotics, and 
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film theory, to name only a few – that have been influenced by Lacanian and 
Althusserian theories.  Therefore, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic critically 
approaches the simplifications, generalizations, and classifications of similarities in both 
Althusser and Lacan.  
    A parallel evaluation of these two theories of subject formation leads to the 
consideration of the identity of the subject from a one to one relationship between the 
subject and the other to a more complicated dialectic between constituent subjectivities 
of the identity of the subject. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic demonstrates that 
subjectivity plays the role of the other for other subjectivities within the identity of the 
subject. Apart from this inter-subjective dialectic, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic 
brings into consideration the intra-subjective lack over which subjectivity is based. 
Therefore, the discussion of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic results in the re-
conceptualization of the process of identity construction.   
    The second major objective of the present research is to show how the application of 
this critical perspective to reading a work of art is illuminating in a better understanding 
of the construction and representation of identity. How do interpellation and alienation 
operate in the subject formation? How are ideological subjectivities represented? Is it 
possible for the subject to undergo a process of reconstructing his/her identity? How 
does language function in both the construction and reconstruction of identity? The 
application of Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a critical approach to Joyce’s novel 
will provide these questions with illustrated answers. 
  
1.6 The Organization of the Thesis 
The present thesis consists of eight chapters. The next chapter provides a critical review 
of the Lacanian-Althusserian models of subjectivity in contemporary theory and 
criticism. It first presents an account of early examples of a parallel application of 
Lacanian and Althusserian theories to the analysis of the subject in the area of film 
theory and cultural studies. Then, it provides an exploration of more recent theoretical 
treatments that have either offered a critical reading of both theories or attempted to 
develop one by utilising elements of the other. Thus, I will explore Frederic Jameson’s 
treatment of the position of the subject in psychoanalysis and Marxism. I shall focus on 
the gap he identifies in the moment of transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic 
and his claims that the inexpressible character of History in Althusser is analogous to 
the Lacanian Real. I shall also study Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s attempt to 
reconcile Marxism and psychoanalysis. Next, I seek to investigate Žižek’s contribution 
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when he provides the Lacanian perception of the subject with Althusserian designations. 
Finally, I shall examine Judith Butler’s attempts to combine elements of these two 
positions in order to provide an inclusive perspective for the analysis of the subject.  
    Chapter Three, providing an investigation of the construction and consequences of 
the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects, is concerned with the way the subject-object 
relation is treated in both early modern Rationalism and German Idealism. The chapter 
first argues that the Cartesian notion of the subject provided it with an ‘objectified’ 
character in a way that it ultimately changed from its apparent form of the subject of 
knowing into the object of knowing. Then, the Cartesian subject’s contribution to the 
subject-object separation is examined. As I shall demonstrate later in the thesis, a close 
study of the Cartesian subject is illuminating in exploring the Lacanian and Althusserian 
conceptions of subjectivity in that both were anti-Cartesian in their critique of the 
autonomous, rationalist, and centred character of the Cartesian subject.  
    As for the Hegelian subject, I seek to present a study of German Idealist treatment of 
the subject and its close affinity with nature. I shall demonstrate that Hegel’s perception 
of the subject, while regarded as a theorization of the Romantic subject’s obsession with 
nature and arguing for the subject-Spirit identity, ultimately resulted in an ongoing 
incomplete subject-object identity. The Hegelian subject is thus marked by an 
incompleteness that I shall later bring into consideration in my analysis of the subject’s 
incompleteness in both Lacan and Althusser. This study proves to be central to the 
present thesis in that, on one hand, the Lacanian theory of the subject was highly 
influenced by the Hegelian concept of the subject and, on the other hand, I seek to 
investigate critically the Althusserian model of subjectivity in the coming chapter 
through a Hegelian approach to the subject’s identity. 
    In Chapter Four, my analysis of the Althusserian reading of modern subjectivity and 
the construction of ‘the subject of ideology’ is in parallel to the following chapter where 
I shall deal with the Lacanian perception of ‘the subject of language.’ Addressing the 
process of the materialization of ideology, this chapter re-examines the Althusserian 
model of the ‘subject/Subject’ based on the condition of non-identity between them. I 
shall also explore the Althusserian approach to ideological interpellation in order to 
evaluate it later through a dialogue with the Lacanian concept of linguistic alienation. 
Identifying a theoretical problem in the Althusserian ‘the subject/the Subject’ model, 
this chapter argues that a Hegelian reading of this theory solves the problem of non-
identity of the subject and the Subject.  
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   Chapter Five demonstrates that Lacan’s conception of the subject is based around the 
idea of being ‘the subject of language’ the identity of which is constructed over lack. 
The chapter thus investigates the significant role played by the unconscious, language, 
and the Other in the process through which the subject is formed. Lacan’s parallel 
employment of both Jacobson’s linguistic theories and Hegel’s philosophical doctrines 
are also examined in the present account of ‘the structure of the Symbolic.’ Then, I shall 
investigate the two modes of alienation, imaginary and linguistic, that effect the 
emerging subject in the mirror stage and language acquisition process. The problem of 
‘lack’ in Lacan’s approach to the subject’s identity will be examined with reference to 
Hegel’s concept of self-consciousness and the lack that always exists in the condition of 
the subject-other identity. The last section of the chapter, while presenting the definition 
of the Lacanian subject, considers it as an ‘Anti-Cartesian Other in the Imaginary.’ 
   Chapter Six presents the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a more inclusive critical 
perspective for the analysis of subjectivity and the exploration of the subject’s identity 
than a strictly Lacanian and Althusserian approach can provide. There is, despite certain 
theoretical problems, a dialectic between language and ideology in identity construction 
process that is manifested in both interpellation and alienation of the subject. Referring 
to the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as the convergence of lack and material, the 
chapter presents a discussion on the Lacanian concept of ‘alienation’ as a dramatic 
mode of the Althusserian interpellation. I shall attempt to draw into dialogue the 
Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation with the Lacanian concept of 
linguistic alienation. The chapter then proceeds to explore the premises of the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of the subject through focusing on the 
‘inter-subjective dialectic’ and ‘intra-subjective lack’ in the subject’s identity, ‘the 
ideological constitution of the subject,’ and ‘the representation of identity in language.’      
   Chapter seven, the practical analysis of the thesis, presents a reading of James Joyce’s 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man according to the critical perspective offered in 
its preceding chapter. Elaborating on ‘ideological languages’ of the ISAs and how they 
interpellate and alienate the subject, the chapter also concentrates on the way both 
modes of constructive and destructive inter-subjective dialectics operate in the 
construction of identity with reference to otherness in the subject’s identity. Also, the 
ideological subjectivities of the identity of the subject are studied as representations of 
the ideological Symbolic to which the subject is exposed. Subsequently, an analysis of 
identity re-construction and representation in the novel will be presented with reference 
to the protagonist’s disillusionment with ideology and obsession with artistic language; 
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the protagonist, as I shall demonstrate, undergoes a process of identity reconstruction 
through the materialization of spiritual and aesthetic experiences.     
    The last chapter, while summarizing the findings of this study, provides a concluding 
discussion of the analyses presented in the thesis. This chapter, focusing more on the 
problems and premises of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the 
analysis of subjectivity, demonstrates the advantages of applying this approach to 
reading a work of art.    
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Chapter Two:  
Language, Ideology, and the Position of the Subject: 
A Critical Review of Lacanian-Althusserian Models  
  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to address the question of the position of the subject in relation to 
language and ideology as examined in contemporary critical theory and practical 
readings. My analysis first focuses on those works that have applied both Lacanian and 
Althusserian theories of the subject to the same work of art. Then, I will study major 
theoretical treatments that have offered a critical reading of both theories and have 
presented a reconciled version of them. I shall also examine how recent criticism has 
attempted to develop the Lacanian theory of the subject through Althusserian insights.  
    The application together of Lacanian and Althusserian theories on subjectivity first 
began in Britain in the 1970s and there were, afterwards, a number of harsh criticisms of 
such parallel employment. A few major contemporary critics have examined the 
problems that emerge in a possible convergence of both theoretical models of 
subjectivity. I shall thus investigate the way Frederic Jameson, Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Žižek, and Judith Butler have dealt with the problem of 
positioning the subject either between both language and ideology or within a Lacanian-
Althusserian understanding of the term. More precisely, they are the critics who are 
particularly involved in a parallel employment of both the Lacanian and Althusserian 
readings of the subject and have theoretically responded to it. Although they have not 
explicitly argued for such a problem in their works, their treatments of both Lacanian 
and Althusserian theories of the subject provide an illuminating perspective for the 
potential difficulties in creating a convergence between the two.  
    This chapter includes the following main sections: first, I shall demonstrate the early 
examples of the parallel application of Lacanian and Althusserian theories to the 
analysis of the subject in the area of film theory and cultural studies. This section will 
also examine examples of those works that were highly critical of such application. 
Then, I will study Fredric Jameson’s work on the problem of the position of the subject 
in psychoanalysis and Marxism. Focusing on the gap he identifies in the moment of 
transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, this chapter seeks to discuss his approach 
to the analysis of the inexpressible character of both the Lacanian concept of the Real 
and Althusser’s notion of History.  Next, I explore Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
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Mouffe’s attempts at reconciling Marxism with psychoanalysis. I will then turn to 
Žižek’s use of both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity and his 
development of the Lacanian perception of the subject through the Althusserian 
conception of ideology. I will conclude the chapter with a study of Judith Butler’s 
Hegelian interpretation of the Althusserian concept of interpellation as well as her 
employment of different theories in order to provide an inclusive perspective for the 
analysis of the subject.  
    In exploring these critical efforts I seek to outline how the subject is positioned 
between language and ideology and how its identity is analysed in contemporary theory 
and criticism with reference to Lacanian and Althusserian approaches. None of these 
models, however, achieve a synthesis of the two models, or arguably set out to do so. In 
outlining the various models this chapter presents a literature review of the most well 
known theoretical positions that draw on both the Lacanian and Althusserian 
theorisation of the subject. In doing so it seeks to highlight the various difficulties in 
drawing the two approaches together, difficulties this project seeks to overcome.   
 
2.2 ‘Lacanian-Althusserian Paradigm’: 
      Applications and Objections 
A noticeable battlefield for the opponents and proponents of following a ‘Lacanian-
Althusserian model’ has been the area of film theory and criticism. Although there have 
emerged a number of harsh criticisms of this model in recent literary and film theory, 
there are also a number of critics that have argued for the possibility of such a 
convergence and applied it to the reading of literary texts and films. A famous example 
is the conflict that appeared on both sides of the Atlantic between British experts in 
literary and film theory and a number of American Film critics. 
The first examples of the Althusserian readings in film studies appeared in the early 
1970s in France as a response to serious political issues surrounding the events of May 
1968 and the struggles in Vietnam and China. This was a time when, instead of a merely 
structuralist outlook, the direction of critical readings of film changed, developing 
explicitly political preoccupations. The articles of Cahiers du Cinema reveal how 
dominant Althusserian ideas were during this period. The major concern was with 
identifying which films were in the service of the transmission and reproduction of the 
dominant ideology and which films served to demonstrate the mechanism behind the 
transmission of ideology. Another influence on the reading of films was that of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially in its exposition of the subject’s unconscious 
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desires and conflicts. A Lacanian-Althusserian model for the analysis of subjectivity 
emerged in this time in France. This influence spread to Britain and the result was the 
publication of Screen, a journal clearly influenced by Cahiers du Cinema.  
    A Lacanian-Althusserian approach towards film studies was employed in Britain 
from the 1970s onwards. It was most evident in the works of Stephen Heath and Colin 
MacCabe, with Stephen Heath’s Questions of Cinema (1981) in particular a pioneering 
study. As mentioned in the preface to his book, most of the articles of the book are those 
of Screen in the early 1970s. The first chapter, “On Screen, in Frame: Film and 
Ideology,” makes use of both Althusserian and psychoanalytic approaches towards the 
“construction of the subject.” Heath’s concept of “cinematic apparatus” is manifestly 
Althusserian in that it considers cinematography as an ideological apparatus. Moreover, 
his idea of “the structure of the subject” with reference to ‘the symbolic’ is based on his 
readings of Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan’s most original disciple.16  In the concluding 
remarks of his “Language, Literature, Materialism,” Heath argues that the formulation 
of “a sociology of literature” is instrumental in further investigations of “the problem of 
language.”  He writes: 
 
The point is not to add linguistics to literature but to arrive at a linguistics capable of 
including the specific-material-effects of (literary) texts and extending the historical and 
political implications of those effects. It’s here that I’d come back to the importance of 
psychoanalysis again, to the way in which Lacan has developed Freudian theory in the 
direction of ‘a materialist theory of language’; a theory that poses just that question of the 
construction of the individual as subject in the symbolic.17 
 
    The ‘linguistics’ Heath argues for paves the way for a further development of a 
materialist theory of language, one that explores both the construction of the individual 
psyche and the formulation of ideology. As far as the development of the ‘individual 
psyche’ is concerned, Heath considers the Lacanian notion of the triplet orders of 
subjectivity to be of high merit, and, for the formulation of ideology, Heath refers to 
both classical Marxist doctrines and Althusser’s conception of ideology as present 
everywhere. On the other hand, Colin MacCabe’s work in reconsidering the ideological 
functions of cinema was also among the first attempts to develop film theory and 
criticism. Influenced by the cultural and literary theories of the 1960s and 1970s, 
MacCabe attempted to read film according to Althusser’s Lacanian-coloured definition 
                                                 
16
 Stephen Heath, Questions of Cinema, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981, p. 14. 
17
 Stephen Heath, “Language, Literature, Materialism,” SubStance, Vol. 6, No. 17 (Autumn 1977), p. 74. 
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of ideology as the ‘imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence.’ MacCabe 
argued the consideration of film as a representation of contradictory discourses and not 
as a window that opens up to the real. In his “Theory and Film: Principles of Realism 
and Pleasure” (1976) MacCabe dealt with the relationship between ‘contradiction’ and 
‘the real’:  
 
… I argue that film does not reveal the real in a moment of transparency, but rather that film 
is constituted by a set of discourses which (in the positions allowed to subject and object) 
produce a certain reality. The emphasis on production must be accompanied by one on 
another crucial Marxist term, that of contradiction.18  
 
Thus, for MacCabe, film’s paradoxical relation to the representation of the real, a 
Lacanian term, should be considered through contradiction, a manifestly Althusserian 
concept. Later in the same article MacCabe talks of the relation of the Symbolic to the 
Imaginary. Here however, he seems to solve the problem by referring to Lacan’s idea of 
the dominance of the phallus. He also interprets Lacan’s theory and contends that the 
lack is filled by phallus. He writes: 
   
As speaking subjects we constantly oscillate between the symbolic and the imaginary – 
constantly imagining ourselves granting some full meaning to the words we speak, and 
constantly being surprised to find them determined by relations outside our control. But if it 
is the phallus which is the determining factor for the entry into difference, difference has 
already troubled the full world of the infant … The phallus becomes the dominating 
metaphor for all these previous lacks.19   
 
MacCabe’s approach to the Althusserian subject is that it is one without an unconscious 
because it is not being subject to the signifier. MacCabe, though referring to the 
essential differences between Lacan and Althusser, applies a Lacanian-Althusserian 
pattern in his criticism of film and made this method a dominant trend in Screen.20  
    Dealing with the problems involved in any critical attempt that seeks to bring 
Althusser and Lacan’s theories together, Celia Britton focuses on, like other critics, the 
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 Colin MacCabe, “Theory and Film: Principles of Realism and Pleasure,” Screen, Vol. 17, No. 3 
(Autumn 1976), p. 11.  
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 Ibid., p. 14. 
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 For MacCabe’s account of the politico-psychoanalytical backgrounds of Screen and its engagement 
with Althusser and Lacan’s thought see Colin MacCabe,  Theoretical Essays: Film, Linguistics, 
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Althusserian concept of interpellation and argues that it happens when the subject is 
already a subject in Lacan. As Britton states: 
 
In practice, critics who have worked on the basis of a conjuncture of Althusser and Lacan 
have tended to ignore the specifically specular features of interpellation. The closeness of 
the two theories on a more global level has meant that a great many Althusserian critics 
have incorporated some Lacanian ideas into their work… in Britain this project has been 
carried on above all in the pages of Screen, in the mid- to late seventies, while its impact on 
literary studies has been rather less.21 
 
Britton considers the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject as two theories 
that were most significantly influential in the transition of structuralism to post-
structuralism. She contends that both theories challenged the idealist perception of the 
subject as free, decision maker, ad autonomous, and, hence, they presented an anti-
humanist notion of the subject. For her, the affinity between the theoretical 
developments that Lacan introduced into psychoanalysis and Althusser into Marxism is 
categorized only in the realm of their incredible criticism of structuralism. As for the 
impact of Screen that sought to deal with the closeness of these two theories, Britton 
believes that this critical effort had a rather little influence on literary studies. 
    Both Heath and MacCabe’s intellectual contribution to Screen and their evaluations 
of film studies according to Lacanian and Althusserian theories on the subject aroused a 
number of critical responses. David Bordwell and Carroll Noel were among those who 
responded critically to this theoretical orientation and criticized its consequences for 
film studies. ‘LAP,’ as Bordwell christened the Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm, was 
charged with being a “monolithic theoretical entity” that was attractive to critics 
because of its claims of “systematicity and comprehensive.” He also argued that the 
proponents of LAP later “began purging their shelves of Althusser and Lacan” and, 
then, turned to “cultural studies.”22 Bordwell’s views concerning LAP and his 
perspectives on film studies later motivated severe replies.23 
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    Stephen Heath’s Questions of Cinema (1981) gave birth to a heated debate between 
Heath and Noel Carroll. Among his criticisms of Heath, Carroll pointed to the 
foundation to Heath’s program as being “too Althusserian.”24 Carroll’s criticism of 
Heath goes back to his long paper entitled “Address the Heathen” (1982) and followed 
by a number of books such as Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary 
Film Theory (1988) and Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory (1988). 
Heath/Carroll debates in October and other journals such as Post-Theory gained a 
significant attention in the period 1982-3. In his later works, Carroll particularly 
criticised the theoretical formulations of the “Parisian” traditions in general and Lacan 
and Althusser in particular. He harshly criticised the preoccupation of British critics 
with these theories, and, finally, renounced the post-structuralist theories in film studies. 
Criticising Kaja Silverman’s The Subject of Semiotics (1984) mainly because of her 
concern with a Lacanian-Althusserian model in her book, Carroll wrote: 
 
       … there is a presumption among Althusserian-Lacanians that if human actions have certain 
structural conditions, they constrain human action in a way inimitable to autonomy. 
Languages have both syntactical rules and semantical rules. But it is strange to think of 
these as constraints that preclude autonomy. For these very features of language are what 
enable the speaker to speak—to, for example, denounce capitalism. If the language lacked 
these structural conditions, nothing could be said, which would in fact be a real blow to the 
possibility of human autonomy.25  
 
      Noel Carroll’s criticisms of Lacanian-Althusserian model merely focuses on the 
mechanical applications of these theories in the area of film studies. He does not present 
a critical investigation into the nature of these two theories or their limitations. His 
responses are general in the sense that he joins the mainstream criticism against post-
structuralism and attempts to link Althusser and Lacanian thought to the now dominant 
post-structuralist criticism in the States. Moreover, he does not provide his readers with 
a thorough philosophical reading of the limitations any attempt to converge these two 
theories might face. Instead of presenting a detailed reading of Lacan, he simply 
expresses his uneasiness with and scepticism towards psychoanalysis. Carroll is thus 
mostly critical of a mechanical application of these theories to film studies. As Vernon 
Shelty writes in his review of Bordwell and Carroll’s Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film 
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Studies (1996), “read Lacan on the Mirror Stage and Althusser on Ideological State 
Apparatuses, and the theoretical foundations of mainstream film study were yours in an 
afternoon.”26 
    Apart from film studies, Althusser’s idea of the relation of ideology to subjectivity 
has been also re-examined in the area of cultural studies. Stuart Hall is a renowned 
example of such critics. Commenting on the relation of ideology to subjectivity, Hall 
refers to those moments that the subjects are located in new ideological “positions” in 
the following way: 
 
People with identities and relations to language already secured nevertheless can find 
themselves repositioned in new ideological configurations … ideologies have to struggle to 
recruit the same lived individuals for quite contradictory subject places in their discourses. I 
want to ask how people who already have an orientation to language nevertheless are 
constantly placed and replaced in relation to particular ideological discourses that hail and 
recruit them for a variety of positions.27 
 
He critically reads Althusser’s theory of subjectivity arguing that the subjection to 
ideology may also have an opposite direction; this happens when the subject may 
influence the ideology. Therefore, the subjection to ideology has a twofold designation: 
although ideology hails the subject, the subject is consciously aware of being hailed by 
ideology. Moreover, there is always an internal dialectical process at work that is in 
parallel to what happens outside. As for these two external and internal processes, Hall 
seems to ‘reconcile’ Lacan with Foucault. In his response to the theoretical limitation 
posed in Althusser he finds a solution by combining an “external” discursive realm and 
“psychic” acts of identification. For Hall, identity is “the meeting point” between 
 
on one hand, the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail 
us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the 
processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be 
‘spoken’. Identities are thus points of temporary attachments to the subject positions which 
discursive practices construct for us.28  
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Hall also criticizes Althusser for providing a theory of subjectivity that has resulted in 
the “two sides of the problem of ideology.”29 A similar treatment regarding theoretical 
limitations in Althusser can be observed in Michele Barrett’s The Politics of Truth: 
From Marx to Foucault (1991). She criticises Althusser’s attempt to develop Marxism 
through Lacanian terminology. She writes: “Althusser’s substantive contribution to the 
theorisation of subjectivity – his development of the concept of ‘interpellation’ – 
attempts the impossible task of integrating Marx and Lacan.”30 
    However, the contribution of Althusser’s thought not only to Marxism but also to 
cultural studies should not be underestimated. Althusser also enjoys a wide popularity 
among media and film studies. His concept of Ideological State Apparatus has been far 
influential and subject to further theorizations. For example, Michael Sprinker names “a 
number of distinctively Althusserian themes that have achieved general currency” and 
have been later “subject to development and refinement.”31 A quick look at the eight 
Althusserian theses mentioned by Sprinker in his paper would be illuminating in 
reconsidering Althusser’s influence in other areas of the human sciences such as 
aesthetics and politics.32 
    There are also a number of works that have argued against any convergence of Lacan 
and Althusser. These objections have a long history that first began with attempts to 
reconcile Freud and Marx. With this dissertation, the reconciliation further complicated 
in that it goes back to the debates over whether Marx and Hegel can be unified, largely 
as a result of Lacan’s obvious Hegelianism and Althusser’s insistence on Marx’s rupture 
with Hegel. This dissertation’s focus then is not simply on a twentieth-century problem; 
it originally goes back to the nineteenth-century sharp epistemological division that 
happened between Hegel and Marx.33  
    Althusserian Marxism and Lacanian Psychoanalysis have had a long history of 
incongruity that not only originated from Freud’s inventive method at the beginning of 
twentieth century but also began with Marx’s criticism of the German idealist tradition 
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in the mid nineteenth century. I shall return to this theoretical problem fully in the next 
chapter, but now I shall examine how some recent major critics have responded to it. As 
discussed in this section, although there are attempts in the areas of film and cultural 
studies to bring Lacan and Althusser together, they rarely explore the theoretical 
problems that emerge in such combination. Although all of the figures I will analyse are 
critical of both Lacan and Althusser, none of their works present a unified version of 
both theories. Whereas the present thesis aims at presenting a Lacanian-Althusserian 
model for the analysis of the subject, these critical attempts apply the Lacanian and 
Althusserian theories to reading the texts as discrete approaches. In addition, they 
investigate neither the close affinity between the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions 
nor the theoretical problems that emerge in such convergence.     
 
2.3 Fredric Jameson and Identifying a New Gap  
A major critical investigation into the problem of the subject in both psychoanalysis and 
Marxism is Fredric Jameson’s “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, 
Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject.” This paper was first 
contributed to one of the volumes of Yale French Studies on ‘Literature and 
Psychoanalysis’ (1977). Exploring Jameson’s identification of the gap in the transition 
from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, I shall also consider the way Jameson considers 
Althusser’s reference to “the absent cause” as equivalent to Lacan’s conception of the 
Real in his The Political Unconscious.  
     In the beginning of his article Jameson considers the major problem in the 
coordination of Marxist and psychoanalytic criticism as the dilemma of “the insertion of 
the subject:” 
 
The attempt to coordinate a Marxist and a Freudian criticism confronts—but as it were 
explicitly, thematically articulated in the form of a problem—a dilemma that is reality 
inherent in all psychoanalytic criticism as such: that of the insertion of the subject, or, in a 
different terminology, the difficulty of providing mediations between social phenomena and 
what must be called private, rather than merely individual, facts.34   
 
Mentioning that this problem was first keenly observed by Freud, Jameson points to 
some Freudian-Marxist attempts including the “psychobiographical method” of the 
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latter Jean-Paul Sartre and the “mechanical” character of Frankfurt school thinkers in 
general and Theodore Adorno in particular. Jameson’s argument focuses on “whether 
the hypothesis of a dialectically distinct status for each of these registers or sectors of 
experience [i.e. Lacanian triad others] can be maintained within the unity of a single 
system.”35 He first begins with an elaboration of the relation of the Imaginary to the 
Symbolic, and, then, focuses on the different aspects of alienation. A major section of 
his article is dedicated to the problem of the convergence between the Imaginary and 
Symbolic, and, accordingly, he returns to the Real in the last part.  
    Language and the Other, Jameson maintains, are major factors in Lacan’s view of the 
alienation of the subject upon its entry into the Symbolic, while it is already in the 
Imaginary. He mostly focuses on the transition of the Imaginary to the Symbolic. He 
comes to the primary conclusion that although the Imaginary and the Symbolic are not 
fully separated or matched, this hypothesis “has the merit of allowing us to conceive the 
possibility of transforming the topological distinction between Imaginary and Symbolic 
into a genuine methodology.” 36 Moreover, he regards Lacan’s “Kant avec Sade” as 
another manifestation of this transition. He believes that here we can see the 
transformation of “the very project of a moral philosophy into an insoluble intellectual 
paradox by rotating it in such a way that the implicit gap in it between subject and law 
catches the light.”37 He studies this gap in the rest of his article in the realm of aesthetic 
theory and literary criticism in order to examine “a similar use of the distinction 
between Imaginary and Symbolic.” 
    Jameson argues that Lacan, in his discussions concerning the affinity between the 
Imaginary and the symbolic, is not merely “substituting linguistic for classical 
psychoanalytic concepts;” he is rather “mediating between them.”38 Here we are 
reminded of his famous concept of the ‘mediator,’ which is of great importance here. 
Formulated in his other works, a mediator is a concept, or context, that exists between 
two opposing ideas when there is a transition between them. In Hegelian dialectics the 
mediator between thesis and antithesis vanishes because of the emergence of a new 
entity that is the synthesis. But in the transitional point of both the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic the mediator never vanishes since there is here no synthesis emerging out of 
the transition of the first to the second.  
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    Jameson shows that Lacan’s “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” is a good example 
of a literary criticism in which the Symbolic, the signifier, becomes manifested in a 
dominant way and, accordingly, the imaginary is marginalized. Referring to Derrida’s 
criticism of Lacan’s reading of Poe’s short story, Jameson, too, believes that it is the 
“work” of the text itself that transforms “Imaginary elements into the closed Symbolic 
circuit.” Mentioning that Lacan’s reading of Poe’s short story is not a model for a 
criticism in which both imaginary and Symbolic are investigated without a gap between 
them, Jameson writes: 
 
The distinction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, and the requirement that a given 
analysis be able to do justice to the qualitative gap between them, may prove to be an 
invaluable instrument for measuring the range or the limits of a particular way of thinking.39 
 
A highly illuminating work that Jameson refers to in his paper is one that talks of an 
“excellent formula” regarding the imaginary and symbolic characters of a given object. 
This doctrine was first presented by Edmond Ortigues in his Le discours et le symbole 
(1962). According to this formula, the same term may be considered “imaginary if taken 
absolutely and symbolic if taken as a differential value correlative of other terms which 
limit it reciprocally.”40 Jameson goes further to examine the question of the possibility 
of the full identity between Imaginary and Symbolic in the area of art and aesthetics 
maintaining that “this is not simply a question of method or theory but has implications 
for aesthetic productions.”41 The example he points to is Brecht’s anti-Aristotelian 
theatre, where there is a refusal of an empathy or full identification between the 
spectator and the character in the play, or between the actor and the role he/she is 
playing.  
    Towards the end of his paper Jameson focuses on the Real. But what is interesting 
here is that Jameson’s discussion of the Real is in the service of the major thesis of his 
paper that is “the problem of the insertion of the subject.” Jameson refers to the Real as 
History, and because the Real is, in Lacan’s words, “what resists symbolization 
absolutely,” language, too, cannot be fully identified to it. History thus is that cannot be 
expressed in language. There is always a gap between History and its narration. History, 
for Jameson, is an “absent cause” since it remains, in its totality, inexpressible. History 
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exists but cannot be fully expressed. The Real, too, exists, but cannot be expressed. The 
inexpressibility of the Real in its totality, in Jameson’s view, is another reason for the 
lack of a full identity between Imaginary and Symbolic. Language may rebuild the 
‘imaginary relation’ of the subject to the ‘real conditions of existence;’ the problem, 
however, is that these ‘real conditions of existence’ cannot be experienced and even 
understood since they happen to be outside of language.  
    Considering the Lacanian concept of the Real as equivalent to Althusser’s notion of 
History, Jameson turns to the Althusserian theory of ideology. On one hand, he employs 
Althusser’s definition of ideology and, on the other hand, criticises Althusser’s specific 
use of Lacan. He argues that Lacanian theory does not seem to be profitable to 
Althusser’s reading of Marxism. It is a matter of surprise for Jameson that Althusser, 
while involving in the “outmoded antimony of that opposition between ideology and 
science,” makes use of Lacan’s scheme: 
 
It is all the more surprising the he [Althusser] should not have profited from a scheme 
[Lacan’s] in which knowledge and science, the subject and his or her individual truth, the 
place of the Master, the ec-centric relationship both to the Symbolic and to the Real, are all 
relationally mapped.42 
  
Jameson is not dealing with combining Marxism and psychoanalysis; what he seeks to 
accomplish is to make use of psychoanalysis for his version of Marxism. Jameson’s 
argument regarding Lacan’s theory of the triad orders arrives at a point where he calls 
for further investigations into the problem over the subject in both psychoanalysis and 
Marxism. A formula or methodology that simultaneously emphasizes the two different 
aspects of the subject is what Jameson seeks to expand.  
    Referring to this question in his other works, Jameson has attempted to present a 
methodology that is a “reconciliation” of apparently dissimilar approaches. The 
Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (1981) approaches the 
problem of the convergence of both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity in 
two ways. First, Jameson here returns to his earlier argument that Althusser’s 
employment of the term the “absent cause” for the analysis of History can be regarded 
as equivalent to Lacan’s consideration of the Real in that both History and the Real 
cannot be fully expressed and comprehended in language. Althusser employed the term 
when he expressed his anti-teleological criticism of Hegel’s notion of history in order to 
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present his critique of the ‘expressive causality.’ There is always something lacking in 
History, an absent cause, which avoids any complete account of it. Jameson states: 
 
[The] analysis of the function of expressive causality suggests a provisional qualification of 
Althusser’s antiteleological formula for history (neither a subject nor a telos), based as it is 
on Lacan’s notion of the Real as that which “resists symbolization absolutely” and on 
Spinoza’s idea of the “absent cause.”43 
 
Jameson’s consideration of the Althusserian adaptation of Spinoza’s term of the “absent 
cause” is followed by his reference to the misleading results that might be caused by the 
“sweeping negativity of the Althusserian formula.” Jameson argues that this formula 
might lead to the consideration of History as “a text among others” in contemporary 
post-structuralism. Hence, he presents a revised from of the formula in this way: 
 
that history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that, as an absent cause, it 
is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our approach to it and to the Real itself 
necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the political 
unconscious.44  
 
    Secondly, The Political Unconscious can be considered as an attempt in bringing 
together the individual subjectivity and collective history.  The Real as inherent in the 
individual subjectivity and the absent cause in History are both inexpressible in their 
totality and do not allow for a complete expressible and comprehensible account of both 
the Real and History. As Jerry Aline Flieger in his review of Jameson’s book maintains, 
“the whole of Jameson’s critical project…may be considered an example of 
“transcoding” the “twin, apparently incommensurable demands” of individual 
subjectivity and collective history.”45       
    However, although the exploration of the gap in the Lacanian concept of the Real 
appears to be similar to Althusser’s exploitation of the “absent cause,” Althusser 
employed the term in his discussion of History and did not consider it in his theory of 
the interpellation of the subject. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, whereas Lacan 
explored the gap in his analysis of the Real, Althusser approached it in his reading of 
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History and its inexpressible character in language and, hence, the Symbolic. 
Althusser’s concept of the absent cause in History bears similarities with Lacan’s idea 
of the lost desire in the unconscious in that both cannot be completely experienced by 
the subject. If there is an absent cause that gives rise to the incomplete nature of the 
expression of History, there is also a desire lost in the unconscious and thus never 
fulfilled by the subject.   
     The gap Jameson identifies in the moment of transition from the Imaginary to the 
Symbolic is actually a matter of epistemology and not of methodology. I agree with 
Jameson that the real conditions of existence cannot be expressed in their totality; I also 
agree that this proposition can serve as a rationale for the impossibility of a full identity 
between the Imaginary and the Symbolic since the real conditions of existence are 
symbolically presented in language. What makes my analysis different from that of 
Jameson can be outlined in the following points:  
     First, I consider the rise of this gap not only between the Imaginary and Symbolic 
but also between language and ideology, which are two constituent parts of the 
Symbolic. That is to say that there is a gap within the Symbolic itself. This gap is 
distinguishable from the Lacanian argument that the Symbolic includes a lack in that it 
is constituted by language that is itself based on lack. As I demonstrate later in the 
thesis, the negating feature of language, however, both creates and covers this lack. I 
shall also discuss Jacques-Alain Miller’s consideration of ‘suture’ as both creating and 
filling in the lack between the Subject and the Other. Jameson’s discussion of the gap 
between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, though original and thought provoking, does 
not directly concentrate on the gap between language and ideology and the ideological 
dimensions of language. 
    The Symbolic includes a gap that emerges because of the essentially distinct 
character of language and ideology, both constitutive of the Symbolic. Based on their 
opposition in substance, language is abstract and ideology, in the Althusserian sense, 
has a material existence. Moreover, while psychoanalysis is dealing with the lack in 
language and the ‘lost desire’ in the unconscious, structural Marxism is concerned with 
the material representation of ‘the structure’ and the concrete existence of ideology.  
    Secondly, there exists a moment in which the subject may be analyzed from both 
Lacanian and Althusserian perspectives. This moment happens when ideology transits 
into language and, subsequently, when language becomes ideological. Furthermore, 
focusing on the moments and ways psychoanalysis and structural Marxism meet, one 
can consider language as both the medium and the converging point of individual and 
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social features of the subject. The subject, because of both acquiring and producing 
language, thus embodies both the individual and the social in that language includes 
both the particular and the universal. Language, from this view, is the site where both 
psychoanalytical and structural Marxist insights on the subject come together. 
 
2.4 Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and  
      Marxism/Psychoanalysis Reconciliation  
A key attempt to bring together Psychoanalysis and Marxism that demonstrates the 
possibility of a theoretical reconciliation between them is found in the work of Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Their publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (1985) marked a considerable development in 
the history of Marxism as a result of its explicit turn to psychoanalysis and post-
structuralism.46 
    Laclau and Mouffe first begin to apply the psychoanalytical concept of ‘suture’ to the 
field of politics. Referring to Jacques-Alain Miller’s discussion of the double role 
played by ‘suture’ in creating a lack and standing in between the subject and the Other, 
they argued that void appears in the form of a dualism: “its founding discourse does not 
seek to determine differential degrees efficacity within a topography of the social, but to 
set limits on the embracing and determining capacity of every topographical 
structuration.”47 Their conception of “the hegemonic suture” thus brings into 
consideration “the double void” that emerged in the essentialist discourse of the Second 
International. They argue that this dualism should be observed within the context of the 
limits it offers. In other words, this dualism is a relation of frontiers in that “entities 
which escape structural determination are understood as he negative reverse of the 
latter.”48 
    Later Laclau and Mouffe seek to elaborate two “very different problems” of the 
subject, which are “the discursive or pre-discursive character of the category of subject” 
and “the relationship among different subject positions.”  As for the first problem, they 
briefly refer to three classical critiques of the subject by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
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Freud that radically criticised the conception of the subject as “an agent both rational 
and transparent to itself”, “as origin and basis for social relations,” and “the supposed 
unity and homogeneity of the ensemble of its positions” respectively. However, 
concerning the second problem they present a developed discussion where they first 
state that by the category of the subject they always mean “subject positions within a 
discursive structure.” They closely examine two examples of the subject of ‘Man,’ as 
defined in humanism, and the subject of feminism. After demonstrating how they are 
discursively constructed subject positions, they come to this conclusion that 
 
the specificity of the category of subject cannot be established either through the 
absolutization of a dispersion of ‘subject position’, or through the equally absolutist 
unification of these around a ‘transcendental subject’. The category of subject is penetrated 
by the same ambiguous, incomplete and polysemical character which overdetermination 
assigns to every discursive identity.49 
 
The “incomplete” and “polysemical” character of the subject mentioned above is in 
close affinity to Laclau’s later analysis of the impossibility of a full identity both in and 
within itself. His reference to ‘dislocation’ of identity and his concept of ‘empty 
signifier’ are among his major contributions to the understanding of the impossibility of 
a full identification of and within ideology. Laclau relates the antagonism of identity to 
not only its negativity and dislocationism but also to the function of what he calls 
‘empty signifier.’ Elaborating on the universal incompleteness of emancipatory projects, 
Laclau writes: 
 
…any identity is ambiguous insofar as it is unable to constitute itself as a precise difference 
within a closed totality. As such, it becomes a floating signifier whose degree of emptiness 
depends on the distance that separates it from its fixedness to a specific signified.”50  
 
Laclau’s reference to the empty signifier is reminiscent of the significance of the term in 
structuralist linguistics as well as Lacan’s consideration of the relation between the 
signifiers in the unconscious. However, what makes his argument salient is that the idea 
of emptiness in the signifier further causes the incompleteness of identity and, thus, 
ideological claims. Laclau’s consideration of the empty signifier as “a signifier without 
a signified” in his Emancipation(s) (1996) is Lacanian in that the signifiers in the 
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unconscious are without signified and it is only the floating of signifiers in the 
unconscious that produces a dream-work.  
    On the other hand, while demonstrating the relation of empty signifiers to politics, 
Laclau mentions the Saussurean perception of language and other signifying systems as 
a system of differences and then concludes that “the totality of language is involved in 
each single act of signification.” He argues that if the system was not constituted by the 
differences, there would no possibility of any signification. Declaring that the very 
possibility of the signification is the possibility of its limits, he employs the Hegelian 
notion that to think of the limits of something is the same as thinking of what is beyond 
those limits. Laclau thus comes to the conclusion that “what constitutes the condition 
possibility of a signifying system – its limits – is also what constitutes its condition of 
impossibility – a blockage of the continuous expansion of the process of 
signification.”51 Later in the same passage Laclau argues that to signify the limits of 
signification is like facing the Lacanian concept of the Real in that in both instances 
there is a subversion of the process of signification. The subversion of the differential 
nature of the signifying units is, however, in parallel to the process where the signifiers 
empty themselves of their attachment to signifieds. The system can signify itself as 
totality only if the signifiers are regarded as emptying of their differential and relational 
nature.  
    Laclau’s philosophical expansion of the relation of psychoanalysis to Marxism is 
observed in the context of the ‘post-Marxism’ he is advocating.52 Laclau is aware of the 
different bases and concerns of both psychoanalysis and classical Marxism; hence in the 
beginning part of one of his papers called “Psychoanalysis and Marxism” (1987) he thus 
refers to these “different theoretical fields”: 
 
To think the relationships which exist between Marxism and psychoanalysis obliges one to 
reflect upon the intersections between two theoretical fields, each composed independently 
of the other and whose possible forms of mutual reference do not merge into any obvious 
system of translation… no simple model of supplement or articulation is of the slightest use. 
The problem is rather that of finding an index of comparison between twp different 
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theoretical fields, but that, in turn, implies the construction of a new field, within which the 
comparison would make sense.53 
 
This “new field” Laclau is talking of is post-Marxism, which is, in his view, “the result 
of a multitude of theoretico-political interventions.” Later in the paper he refers to the 
Lacanian theory on the subject and argues that “the hegemonic subject is the subject of 
the signifier.” Laclau acknowledges his debt to Lacanian psychoanalytic thought when 
he argues that it is “only from this logic of the signifier that the hegemonic relationship 
as such may be conceived.” Marxism in the present time, in Laclau’s opinion, must 
bring into consideration a number of psychoanalytic doctrines. Laclau argues for a 
reconsideration of Marxism’s relation to psychoanalysis in that the latter provides the 
logic for questions concerning identity in different levels. On the other hand, 
psychoanalytic theory’s emphasis on language should be also followed in Marxism. 
Laclau believes that “a confluence of (post-)Marxism and psychoanalysis” does not 
merely mean “the addition of a supplement to the former by the latter” or the 
introduction of “the unconscious instead of economy.” He argues that the coincidence 
of Marxism and Psychoanalysis is “grounded on the fact that the latter is the logic 
which presides over the possibility/impossibility of the constitution of any subject.”54  
    The impossibility of a full constitution of identity and, also, of a full identification in 
different subject positions is further investigated in Laclau’s conception of the subject of 
politics. Politics always embodies a number of terms and claims which it never 
accomplishes. These ideological terms are established by antagonistic political forces 
and continue to operate through political means. Terms such as the ‘freedom of the 
people’ and ‘welfare of the country’ are empty signifiers in that they are permanently 
detached from what they really signify. These terms, as Laclau and Zac argue in their 
“Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics”, need to be “empty in order to constitute the 
aims of a political competition.” They write: “a series of signifiers of the lack, of the 
absent fullness, have to be constantly produced if politics – as different from sedimented 
social forms – is going to be possible.”55 
    The gap between politics and what it calls for is the very reason for the continuity 
within that politics. The subject of politics is, first of all, the subject of incompleteness 
not only because of its constitutive lack but because the subject is always wanted by the 
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corresponding political system to meet what that system wants it to meet. The 
interesting point is that the system itself cannot reach a state of totality and full 
identification. Furthermore, the subject of politics, Laclau and Zac argue, cannot 
experience a state of full identification with what that political system manifests. 
Demonstrating the relation of the identity of the subject in a politically managed society 
to different forms of identification, Laclau and Zac believe that any identification 
always fails to achieve a fully fledged identity.  
    The subject of politics is analysed in Laclau’s further investigations of his concept of 
dislocationism, which focuses on the constitutive lack of the identity of the subject. His 
analysis is influenced by the Lacanian perception of the subject’s identity in that it 
brings into consideration Lacan’s approach to subjectivity as constituted by language. 
The negativity of language and its consequent constitutive lack are central to Laclau’s 
notion of dislocationism.   
    However, there have emerged a number of critiques of Laclau’s idea of making 
psychoanalysis vital to Marxism. The major question moves around the relation of the 
subject to ideology: Does a political psychoanalysis exist? The question originally goes 
back to the inability of psychoanalysis to thoroughly elaborate those moments in which, 
on one hand, ideology becomes psychic and, on the other hand, the unconscious 
becomes subjected to ideology. Elizabeth J. Bellamy, commenting on the conditions in 
which psychoanalysis becomes political, criticises the lack of a minute analysis on the 
relation of the social to the individual in Laclau ad Mouffe’s work: 
 
… Laclau and Mouffe would need to be more specific about the precise nature of the 
intersection between the social (as that which has no “essence”) and the psychic, which 
however fragmented, alienated, and deconstructed, is surely a major factor in the 
implementing of political actions … [they] would have to pursue further the ideological 
implications of what it means, in an “antagonistic” society, for the (political) subject to 
receive no response from the Other of ideology except a signifier that represents that subject 
for another signifier.56  
  
    Some parts of the above criticism may be approached based on the proposition that 
language always includes ideology and this is the linking point between the social and 
the psychic. If language includes ideology, the psychic should have thus been 
ideological too. What brings together the social and the psychic and what makes the 
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psychic “a major factor in the implementing of political actions” is language that has 
already embodied ideology. Hence, a theoretical solution to the problem of the link 
between language and ideology is provided if one considers the formation of an 
‘ideological unconscious.’ Laclau’s concept of the ‘empty signifier,’ though original in 
its formulation, emphasises the political connotations of the subject’s identity rather 
than bringing into consideration the ways language converges with ideology. I shall 
later examine how ideology enters language and how language itself becomes 
ideological  
    Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s reconciliation of Marxism and psychoanalysis 
is considered as a development of Marxism and not as an approach for the analysis of 
the subject that brings together both models. Furthermore, this theoretical effort is a 
development of Althusser’s model of ‘the subject/the Subject.’ As I shall fully discuss 
in Chapter Four, Althusser proposed a model according to which the subject is always 
determined by ideology to meet the potentialities of the Subject. However, Althusser did 
not contemplate on the gap this model creates for the subject; accordingly, Laclau’s 
exploration of the gap within the subject can be taken as a development of the 
Althusserian model.  
  
2.5 Slavoj Žižek and the Ideological Barred O 
A major theme in Slavoj Žižek’s theoretical project has been an investigation into the 
philosophical validity of a critical theory that attempts to intertwine both Marx and 
Hegel. Lacan provided an influence on Žižek and it is through his sophisticated reading 
of Lacan that he has succeeded, arguably, in presenting a reconciliation between Hegel 
and Marx. Although most secondary works seek to relocate Žižek within a Lacanian 
framework, the present study is mostly interested in his treatment of Althusser in his 
Lacanian readings. This section thus evaluates Žižek’s implicit and explicit references 
to Althusserian notions in his manifestly Lacanian approach to the analysis of the 
subject and concentrates on Žižek’s concepts of the ‘ideological fantasy’ and 
‘ideological barred O’ that include manifest Althusserian-Lacanian designations.   
    Considered as a Lacanian scholar significantly influenced by Hegel, Žižek is also 
referred to as a Marxist. For example, Glyn Daly considers Žižek as one of the true 
contemporary Marxists and evaluates his contributions as a “return to Marx.”57   It is 
interesting to note that Althusser’s theories, too, signalled a ‘return to Marx.’ However, 
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the difference between Althusser and Žižek in their return to Marx should be explored 
in the context of their relation to Hegel. Whereas Althusser attempted to remove from 
Marx all Hegelian traces, Žižek has particularly focused on the virtues of Hegel’s 
philosophy.   
    Žižek’s concern with Althusser, a Marxist whose version of Marxism was completely 
anti-Hegelian, is an interesting question to focus. It might first appear that Althusser has 
no relation with Hegel, Lacan, and even Žižek because whereas they were involved in 
the analysis of the Real, Althusser was mostly concerned with the Symbolic. In other 
words, while Hegel, Žižek, and even Lacan, as philosophers, are obsessed with the Real, 
Althusser was a Marxist whose main interest was on the formulation of what he called 
the social complex. Althusser thus had little to say on the Real. Instead, he explored the 
mechanism of the changes in all levels of practice in what he called the ‘social 
complex.’ 
    Whereas Žižek is mostly interested in Lacan’s shift of concern from the Symbolic to 
the Real in the last phase of his intellectual career, Althusser might be said to be one 
who was mostly concerned with the Symbolic. However, as I shall demonstrate in 
Chapter Four, the only place he appeared to face the Real is the last part of his famous 
essay on the Ideological State Apparatus where he discusses the dialogue between 
Moses and God. Here, as in other places, Althusser employs the situation in order to 
express his perception of ideology and the subject. Thus, Althusser’s concept of 
ideology is in affinity with Lacan’s the Symbolic and not the Real.   
    A decisive point in any attempt to bring together Althusser and Lacan is their 
contrary treatment of Hegel. Žižek is Hegelian because, as a philosopher, he is 
concerned with “interrogating the real.” The term the Real, though of Lacanian origin, 
may also be, in a Hegelian sense, the subject of philosophy. As I shall fully explore in 
the next chapter, Hegel believed that the subject of philosophy was the Absolute Spirit, 
which could be, in a Lacanian sense, located in the realm of the Real. Thus, if I want to 
present a very short interpretation of Hegel in Lacanian terms, I should say that for 
Hegel the identity of the subject and the Spirit is ‘the real’ in that it is either a rare 
moment or a non-experienced one because of the lack of perception in it. As Žižek 
maintains, we should not think of Lacan as Hegelian only because of the influence of 
Kojève’s seminars on Hegel that provided an intellectual background for Lacan. On the 
contrary, Lacan is Hegelian in those places that even he himself did not recognize.  The 
second chapter of Žižek’s Interrogating the Real (2005) is entitled “Lacan – At What 
Point Is He Hegelian?” He writes: 
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Lacan is fundamentally Hegelian, but without knowing it. His Hegelianism is certainly not 
where one expects it – that is to say, in his explicit references to Hegel – but precisely in the 
last stage of his teaching, in his logic of the not-all, in the emphasis placed on the Real, and 
the lack in the Other.58 
 
Žižek also discusses the three stages of subjectivisation of the subject when s/he is a 
child; these three stages happen when the child is exposed to speech, language, and the 
barred Other.59  
    Another example of Žižek’s twofold relation to Althusser can be observed in his 
references to Althusser in Interrogating the Real (2005). Commenting on Lacan’s 
position in western academia, Žižek employs the term “Theoretical State Apparatuses.” 
This phrase is a clear allusion to Althusser. An ideological State apparatus such as a 
university becomes, for Žižek, a theoretical apparatus. Žižek argues that universities, 
though apparently an open place for discussions, display a resistance to Lacanianism in 
favour of cognitivism. This resistance also goes back to Lacan’s discourse of the 
universality; Lacan’s theories, like other structuralist treatments, are based on and, 
hence, call for universalist claims.  
    Žižek has also referred to Althusser’s ISA in his discussion of contemporary 
approaches on theories on ideology in Mapping Ideology (1994). Establishing his idea 
on ideologies based on Hegelian three axes – doctrine, belief and ritual, Žižek classifies 
them into three groups. They are:  
 
ideology as a complex of ideas (theories, convictions, beliefs, argumentative procedures); 
ideology in externality, that is, the materiality of ideology, Ideological State Apparatus; and 
finally, the most elusive domain, the ‘spontaneous’ ideology at work at the heart of social 
‘reality’ itself.60 
 
As observed, Žižek’s consideration of Ideological Sate Apparatuses as the ideology in 
externality already shows his affirmation of Althusser. But what is interesting is that he 
critically engages Althusser while exploring the concept of fantasy. A significant 
concept in Lacanian psychoanalysis, fantasy has been thoroughly analysed by Žižek 
through discussing its different designations. In one of his elaborations on the term 
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Žižek considers fantasy within the Althusserian framework of ideological interpellation. 
He talks of ‘social fantasy’ and considers it to exist before the Althusserian process of 
interpellation: 
  
Fantasy is then to be conceived as an imaginary scenario the function of which is to provide 
a kind of positive support filling out the subject’s constitutive void. And the same goes, 
mutatis mutandis, for social fantasy: it is a necessary counterpart to the concept of 
antagonism, a scenario filling out the voids of the social structure, masking its constitutive 
antagonism by the fullness of enjoyment (racist enjoyment, for example). This is the 
dimension overlooked in the Althusser’s account of interpellation: before being caught in 
identification, in symbolic (mis)recognition, the subject is trapped by the Other through a 
paradoxical object-cause of desire.61    
 
Žižek, though agreeing with the process of ideological interpellation, criticises 
Althusser’s ignorance of considering the social fantasy as “filling out the voids of the 
social structure,” which is the factor behind the permanent function of the interpellation. 
That is to say, interpellation operates through fantasy. Moreover, Žižek criticises the 
Althusserian concept of interpellation because the subject in Althusser, even before the 
moment of interpellation, is already a subject by being “trapped by the Other.” Žižek’s 
criticism of Althusserian interpellation has been also mentioned by a number of other 
critics such as Anthony Elliot.62  
    A clear example of Žižek’s conspicuous and acknowledged use of the Althusserian 
term of interpellation is observed in his definition of the ‘ideological fantasy.’ Here 
fantasy, the term Lacan exploited to describe the subject’s imaginary story when he/she 
wants to meet his/her desire, is provided with the Althusserian designation of ideology, 
that which exists everywhere and includes most of our acts. Žižek’s discussion of 
ideological fantasy in The Sublime Object of Ideology is illuminating here in that it 
demonstrates his development of both Lacanian and Althusserian terms. Dealing with 
the classical Marxian formula that ‘they do not know it, but they are doing it,’ Žižek 
explores the “place of ideological illusion” in the acts of ‘knowing’ and ‘doing.’ He 
argues that ‘what they overlook, what they misrecognise, is not the reality but the 
illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity.” He states: 
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They know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they do not know. 
The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring 
our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is what 
may be called the ideological fantasy.63  
 
Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, too, in their glossary to Žižek’s Interrogating the Real 
(2005) define fantasy as: “that which covers up inconsistencies within the symbolic 
order and that by which ideological interpellation works today in our seemingly ‘post-
ideological’ times.”64 The above examples clearly show Žižek’s attempt to apply 
Lacanian conceptualizations to Althusserian terms.  
    However, Žižek’s achievements in this regard have been considered by many as 
going ‘beyond Althusser.’ For instance, the editors of Žižek’s Interrogating the Real 
write that Žižek, in his “decisive innovations” concerning fantasy, “moves beyond 
someone like Althusser.”65 Although this proposition is true as far as Žižek’s idea on the 
function of ideology is concerned, one should not consider Žižek’s relation to Althusser 
merely as thus. Žižek’s work in going ‘beyond Althusser’ also reminds us of his concept 
of ‘beyond interpellation,’ which first appeared in The Sublime Object of Ideology. It 
was in this book that Žižek talked of the psychic and ideological outcomes that emerge 
“beyond interpellation.” He wrote: 
 
Althusser speaks only of the process of ideological interpellation through which the 
symbolic machine of ideology is “internalized” into the ideological experiences of Meaning 
and Truth: … this “internalization,” by structural necessity, never fully succeeds … there is 
always a residue, a leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality and senselessness sticking to 
it.66 
 
    Later in the same work Žižek proceeds to talk of the always already barred Big Other 
of the Symbolic. What is of the most interest here is that Žižek regards the barred O as 
ideology. It is “a fundamental impossibility, structured around an impossible/traumatic 
kernel, around a central lack.”67 For Žižek, this ‘central lack’ is what ideology 
embodies. But the crucial point to make here is that while Žižek identifies the barred O 
of the symbolic as ideology, he does not acknowledge his debt to Althusser in that it 
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was Althusser who referred to almost every activity of the Symbolic, unless real art, as 
ideology. This example is clear enough to demonstrate that Žižek’s manifest debt to 
Althusser has been mostly neglected in the studies of the former.  
   Apart from Žižek’s attempt to read interpellation through a psychoanalytic lens, there 
is another clear convergence of Lacan and Althusser in his works. In the remarks above 
Žižek brings together three critical concepts and, through developing all three, presents 
his thesis on the function of social fantasy. These three concepts are interpellation, 
fantasy, and antagonism. More precisely, Žižek approaches Althusserian interpellation 
through considering it within the Lacanian sense of fantasy. Žižek has developed Lacan 
in that he talks of social fantasy instead of the simple Lacanian fantasy’ also, he has 
developed Althusser since he is talking of the function of ideology in regulating itself 
and covering up the inconsistencies within the Symbolic order instead of merely using 
the Althusserian concept of interpellation.   
    Although this marks the point where Žižek may seem congenial to a Lacanian-
Althusserian framework, it is a rare instance in Žižek’s works. Žižek’s twofold response 
to Althusser as well as his development of the “Lacanian-Althusserian framework” has 
been thus described by Anthony Eliot: 
 
Reconceptualizing the Lacanian-Althusserian framework, Žižek looks at the ambiguous 
realm of unconscious fantasy as manifested in the social and ideological forms of modern 
culture. For Žižek, as for Althusser, ideology is an imaginary field which always implies a 
shared relationship to socio-political form, such as class, race, gender, and the like. In 
contrast to Althusser, however, Žižek contends that ideology can never be reduced to the 
cultural reproduction of meaning as such – to the signifying network of language alone.68 
 
Žižek, according to Eliot, agrees with and develops Althusser at the level that fantasy is 
connected to the ideological. That is to say, fantasy can also be a scenario produced in, 
and after, ideological interpellation. What makes Žižek different from Althusser is the 
former’s concern with the pre-ideological lack of ideology that provides its character of 
permanent functioning. Moreover, what Žižek adds to both Althusser and Lacan is the 
connection fantasy has to the pre-ideological. That is to say, Žižek considers fantasy in a 
pre-ideological form too, where it operates before or away from interpellation. In a 
categorization provided at the end of his chapter on “Poststructuralist Anxiety” Elliott 
demonstrates Žižek’s development of both Lacan and Althusser. Accordingly, while 
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Lacan was dealing with “self as narcissistic misrecognition, represented through 
symbolic order of language” and Althusser was concerned with “individual as subject of 
ideological misrecognition,” Žižek comes up with a thesis that considers the “self 
decentred through pre-ideological lack of desire.”69    
    What I want to add to Elliott’s elaboration of Žižek’s thought is that the latter’s thesis 
can be examined from two more angles: first, Žižek’s argument focuses on the phase 
before the subject’s entry into the Symbolic, or during the process of the entry of the 
subject into it in which s/he has not still become ideological and, hence, desire at this 
level is not ideological either; secondly, the same thesis also includes the phase before 
and even after interpellation; that is to say that somewhere between the Lacanian 
symbolic order and Althusserian ideological interpellation a pre-ideological desire 
operates at the level of subjective enjoyment through filling out the desire’s pre-
ideological lack. This pre-ideological desire is in charge of the subject’s enjoyment in 
fulfilling its void always everywhere in the life of the subject. 
    What Žižek has achieved is a major contribution to philosophic thought by critically 
developing and genuinely combining thoughts from different areas of study, from 
Marxism and psychoanalysis to film and popular culture. He is manifestly politicising 
psychoanalysis, on one hand, and offering ideology a psychoanalytic designation, on the 
other. As demonstrated above, he has attempted to explore the identity of the subject 
through both Althusserian and Lacanian insights; however, what is lacking in his 
account of the subject is the theoretical incongruity between the Lacanian unconscious 
as the site of the lost desire and Althusserian ideology as a concrete entity that is 
tangibly found everywhere in the life of the subject. Again here this is the significant 
role of language that should be more elaborated. I shall study the mediating role of 
language in Chapter Six; however, another recent critical effort in this area should be 
first studied that is Judith Butler’s attempt in providing a Hegelian reading of the 
Althusserian concept of interpellation.  
 
2.6 Judith Butler and Hegelian Interpellation  
Another major recent critical voice that has critically responded to the Lacanian-
Althusserian framework of thought is Judith Butler. Early in her intellectual career, she 
explored Hegel’s thought and his influence in the intellectual discourses of the mid-
twentieth century in her first book, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in 
Twentieth-Century France (1987). This Hegelian influence continued to be developed 
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in her later works. As she later wrote in the introduction to a reprint of the same book, 
“all of my work remains within the orbit of a certain set of Hegelian questions.”70  
    Butler’s position, most famous for her concept of ‘performativity,’ should be studied 
in relation to the context of Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida. However, a close reading of 
the concept of performativity reveals that it is also in affinity with, and influenced by, 
the Althusserian version of ideology. In Althusser, it is the performance of our relation 
to others and especially to ideological institutions that permanently reproduces the 
condition of subjecthood. Butler’s evaluation of Althusser’s theory on ideological 
interpellation is observed in Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative and, 
particularly, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection both published in 1997. 
    Butler, like Žižek, is critically engaged in the Althusserian concept of interpellation. 
But what makes the present thesis closer to Butler’s reading than that of Žižek is that 
she introduces Althusser’s theory while at the same time providing an account of 
language. In Excitable Speech Butler is interested in the power language exerts on the 
subject. She begins her book with an investigation into those moments in which the 
subject is “injured by language.” “When we claim to have been injured by language,” 
she asks, “what kind of claim do we make?”71 Believing that we all ascribe an agency to 
language and become “its injurious trajectory,” Butler argues that not only there is a 
close relation between language and power but also language is itself the power we are 
speaking of. That is why she presents her argument of the ‘“linguistification” of the 
political field’ with references to both Althusser and Foucault. 
    In her evaluation of the Althusserian “scene” of interpellation she employs key 
Hegelian insights.  Hegel’s discussion of the emergence of self-consciousness in the 
identity of the slave implied an inter-subjective opposition. That is to say, the 
master/slave dialectic always includes a struggle in the slave’s identity between two 
subjectivities before and after the rise of the self-consciousness. Therefore, ideological 
interpellation does not necessarily need two people to be manifested. It could be a self-
reflexive phenomenon.  
    The same treatment of Althusserian theory is also observed in The Psychic Life of 
Power, where she dedicates a chapter to ‘Althusser’s subjection.’ In the beginning of 
her discussion Butler mentions that the Althusserian concept of interpellation, albeit 
with “objections,” is a doctrine that “continues to survive its critique.” Butler focuses on 
the Althusserian moment of interpellation, in which the individual turns his/her head to 
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the call of the police. Her treatment, however, is different in that she considers the 
Althusserian scene to be “exemplary and allegorical.” She presents an analysis of the 
different aspects of the act of “turning round,” and even connects it to Nietzsche’s 
perception of ‘conscience’ and the question of ‘guilt.’ Believing that “the mention of 
conscience in Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” has received 
little critical attention,” Butler contends that “the theory of ideology is supported by a 
complicated set of theological metaphors.” Butler writes that the example Althusser 
brings of the constitution of the subject by God in the story of Peter clearly shows the 
‘power’ of ideology in Althusser’s account. Thus, 
 
the divine power of naming structures the theory of interpellation that accounts for the 
ideological constitution of the subject. Baptism exemplifies the linguistic means by which 
the subject is compelled into social being. God names “Peter,” and this address establishes 
God as the origin of Peter.72 
 
In the Althusserian scene of interpellation, however, we face a different narration 
because there are already a police and an addressee present in the scene. We cannot say 
that the addressee, before being addressed by the police, was not a subject. The act of 
submission to the police call, the ‘turning round’ itself, presupposes a grammatical 
subject. Consequently, Butler writes: 
 
If that submission brings the subject into being, then the narrative that seeks to tell the story 
of that submission can proceed only by exploiting grammar for its fictional effects. The 
narrative that seeks to account for how the subject comes into being presumes the 
grammatical “subject” prior to the account of its genesis.73  
   
She argues that there should also be a grammatical subject that first “turns back on 
itself” and then on the call from the police. “Considered grammatically,” Butler 
contends, “it will seem that there must first be a subject who turns back on itself, yet I 
will argue that there is no subject except as a consequence of this very reflexivity.”74 
This is the moment when interpellation finds an inter-subjective form. That is to say, 
interpellation happens, but first in the identity of the subject and then as a response to 
the call from the police. This Butlerian notion is illuminating in that it provides the 
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Althusserian term with a Hegelian inflection. Butler’s Hegelian reading of Althusser 
appears to be innovative if one reviews Althusser’s denunciation of Hegel in the 
former’s whole critical project. 
    Butler demonstrates her difference from Althusser in that she argues that language 
should not be confined to speech as it is understood in Althusser’s example of hailing. 
In Excitable Speech Butler believes that language should not be thought of merely in the 
form of language. Although “the inauguration of the subject” according to most theories 
of subjection, and also that of Butler, is “linguistic,” we should also note that “the 
constitutive modality of ‘language’ need not be confined to speech as Althusser 
implies.”75  What is of central interest is that Butler, too, believes that the subordination 
of the subject takes place through language. That is to say, language is not only the 
medium but also the context in which ideological interpellation happens.  
    In her development of the ‘iterability’ of the subject, a concept coined by Derrida and 
later developed throughout his intellectual career,76 Butler is directly involved in the 
expansion of a number of other concepts from Althusser, Lacan, and Foucault. Though 
influenced by Derrida, Butler is actually dealing with what is unrealized in Foucauldian 
account of the discursive constitution of the subject by Foucault. Hence, although she 
has been widely referred to as a critic working within a Foucauldian paradigm, Butler’s 
position should be assessed as a critical development of Foucault by using, among other 
influences, Lacanian psychoanalysis. In other words, she first considers identity as a 
politically oriented question and, then, interprets it through psychoanalysis. Believing 
that there is a connection between power and the psyche, Butler is explicitly combining 
Foucault and Lacan.  
    However, Butler’s emphasis on a radical constructivism separates her from that 
branch of contemporary critical theory that calls for linguistic determinism. Here she 
seems to be also different from Lacan whose emphasis on language, as a major 
constituent part of the Symbolic, allows no space for the autonomous acts of the subject. 
Butler’s ‘agent’ seems to more freely act in the context s/he is located whereas there is 
almost no chance for the Lacanian subject to come out of the framework language has 
created for him/her. This is where Butler distances herself from the essentially 
determinist character of structuralist theories, and comes close to a post-structuralist 
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standpoint where, particularly in Derrida, the subject has the ability to deconstruct. 
However, Butler’s favourite term in this regard is ‘de-institutionalize,’ which is 
arguably of Foucauldian origin.  
    Of all the critics examined in the present chapter Butler, along with Laclau and 
Mouffe, are the only figures that do not seem to be highly critical of post-structuralism. 
In Bodies That Matter (1993) Butler considers the possibility of agency in a consistent 
process of reiteration. For her, recitation can be re-signification as well. The process of 
reiteration can be both reinforcing and undermining signifying conventions. Veronica 
Vasterling points to Butler’s view on the relation of the subject to language, stating: 
    
The trouble with Butler's account of the relation between language and subject is … that 
almost invariably the subject is cast as being constructed and reconstructed by the signifying 
chains of language. The subject is not completely passive, for its activity of citing is a 
necessary condition of its (re)construction. Therefore, Butler legitimately can claim that the 
subject does not simply undergo the process of (re)construction.77  
 
The subject always already finds itself in a language with more or less established 
signifying conventions. Yet, there is room for inventiveness here: we can, intentionally, 
try to redirect the signifying conventions we are already positioned in.  The subject, in 
Butler, can aim to re-signify the conventional form and content of the language he/she 
has been already constituted by. 
    Butler’s consideration of the subject is like the Aristotelian idea of the soul, one that 
forms and frames the body. As I shall explore later in the thesis, Edmund Ortigues in his 
Le discourse et le symbole (1962) sharply differentiated the ear from the eye and related 
them to the different realms of the Symbolic and the Imaginary. We encounter and enter 
the Imaginary through our eyes and become aware of the Symbolic through our ears. 
Thus, the person we see is nothing but an entity, a body, whereas what we speak to is 
the subject.      
    The present thesis bears similarity to Butler’s critical project for two major reasons. 
First, whereas she reads the Foucauldian concept of power using Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, the present study has attempted to approach the Althusserian concept of 
ideology through a Lacanian emphasis on language. Butler does not specifically talk of 
a Lacanian-Althusserian framework; however, her argument on ‘the linguistification of 
the political field’ is following a Lacanian-Foucauldian framework; her concept of the 
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Performative is based on approaching the Foucauldian concept of power through 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. Foucault’s concept of discourse functions on the way 
ideology, in its Althusserian sense, creates subjects out of individuals. What links 
ideology to discourse is Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’ that bears similarities to the 
Althusserian concept of the Ideological State Apparatuses. The discursive constitution 
of the subject can be thus examined also in the context of the ISAs.   
    Secondly, what appears to be highly important for Butler, that is the relation of the 
agent to language, is of central interest here. Butler’s approach to language is one of the 
rare examples of contemporary critical thought that bears resemblance to the way 
language is exposed in my analysis. Moreover, her exploration of the struggle between 
the individual agent and institutionalization is reminiscent of the conflict between 
Lacanian emphasis on the subject’s language and Althusserian focus on the ideologies 
interpellating the subject. Butler’s discussion of the relation of the agent to language, 
which is either undermining or reinforcing the conventions, is instrumental to my 
reading of inter-subjective dialectic between the subjects in a novel especially when a 
character faces the other languages exposed to him/her.   
 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has examined those critical and theoretical works that have attempted to 
make a parallel use of both the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject and to 
discuss the position of the subject between language and ideology. In its early 
applications, the ‘Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm’ was both employed and harshly 
criticised in the area of film theory and criticism. Lacanian and Althusserian theories of 
the subject were also applied in cultural studies without a deep investigation of the 
problems that emerge in such convergence.  
    I also demonstrated that Fredric Jameson developed the problem in the Lacanian 
model of subjectivity by referring to the gap emerging in the transmission from the 
Imaginary to the Symbolic. He also commented on Althusser’s relation to Lacan by 
relating the Althusserian ‘the absent cause’ to the Lacanian ‘the Real.’ Though original 
in his findings, Jameson’s response to a Lacanian-Althusserian framework needs two 
reconsiderations: first, although he analyzes the Althusserian concept of ‘the absent 
cause’ in History, he does not consider it as instrumental in the Althusserian analysis of 
subjectivity constitution through ideological interpellation; secondly, although he 
concentrates on the gap that is formed in the transition of the subject from the Imaginary 
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to the Symbolic, he does not directly focus on a Lacanian-Althusserian critical 
perspective. 
    Laclau and Mouffe’s critical project, which brings together both Marxism and 
Psychoanalysis, has provided an ingenious notion of the subject of politics with 
reference to the Lacanian insights concerning the constitutive lack of the subject and its 
identity. Laclau’s concept of ‘empty signifier’ is innovative in that it explores how the 
impossibility of society and other signifying systems continue to exist through the 
impossibility of a full identification within both identity and ideology. Laclau’s concept 
of ‘empty signifier’ tends to bring both Lacan’s emphasis on language as constructing 
the subject’s identity and Althusser’s perception of the impossibility of the Subject. 
However, as I shall demonstrate later in the thesis, the Lacanian and Althusserian 
theories of the subject can be also evaluated though the exploration of what is called in 
the thesis as ‘ideological signifier’ that demonstrates the close association between the 
Lacanian concept of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological 
interpellation. 
    As for Žižek, I showed how he provides a twofold response to Althusser.  Žižek 
criticises Althusser’s overlooking of seeing the social fantasy as “filling out the voids of 
the social structure.” Moreover, he criticises the Althusserian concept of interpellation 
because the subject in Althusser, even before the moment of interpellation, is already a 
subject by being “trapped” by the Other. However, Žižek’s concept of ‘the ideological 
Barred O’ appears to be an explicit affirmative response to the Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic in that it brings together both the Althusserian definition of ideology as present 
everywhere and the Lacanian perception of the barred Other as constitutive of the 
Symbolic. However, as I will explore in the thesis, language-ideology relation creates 
challenging problems particularly as far as it is considered as the convergence of lack 
(language) and material (ideology). 
    Judith Butler, though not explicitly considering the problem, has critically confronted 
Althusser’s concept of interpellation while still remaining loyal to him. Her reference to 
interpellation as happening within the subject’s identity and, thus, having an inter-
subjective character, proves to be of close affinity to what the present thesis aims at 
demonstrating. Interpellation does not always need two persons to happen; it can take 
place within the identity of the subject. If we consider language as the battlefield of 
ideologies and the context in which the subject is interpellated, then, Butler’ concept of 
‘the agent’ and its relation to language provides a relative freedom for the agent in 
reconstructing his/her identity. Butler’s idea of the agent, as distinguishable from the 
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Lacanian concept of the subject, is crucial to my argument concerning Stephen Dedalus’ 
act of reconstructing his identity in the penultimate chapter of the present thesis.   
    Employing both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject in their works, the 
above critics have not focused on the problems and principles of the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic as a model for understanding subjectivity. As demonstrated in the 
chapter, none of these critical efforts achieve a synthesis of the two models. As I shall 
discuss later in the thesis, language/ideology, lack/material, and alienation/interpellation 
relations as well as other ways in which these two theories directly come across each 
other should be investigated more thoroughly. I shall first study the subject-object 
relations in rationalism and romanticism, which provided two distinguishable 
conceptions of the subject for both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity. In 
the following chapter I will present a study of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects and 
will examine both the identity and non-identity of the subject-object dual pair. I shall 
focus on the incompleteness and alienation of the Hegelian subject in order to further 
investigate the subject’s identity in both Lacanian and Althusserian theories. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Cartesian and Hegelian Subjects: 
The Subject-Object Separation and Identity 
  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Demonstrating the salient features of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects, this chapter 
concentrates on their approach to the subject-object relation and its affinity with the 
subject’s identity. As I shall argue in Chapters Four and Five, a close study of the 
Cartesian subject is illuminating in exploring the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions 
of subjectivity in that both were anti-Cartesian in their critique of the autonomous, 
rationalist, and centred character of the Cartesian subject. Furthermore, a study of the 
Hegelian perception of the subject-object identity proves to be illuminating in a further 
exploration of Lacan’s perception of the subject as well as in developing the 
Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject.’  
    This chapter thus attempts to categorize the classical modern treatments of the subject 
into two major groups of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects. I shall closely study these 
two conceptions of the subject in that they provided a major philosophical background 
for both the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject. As far as the early 
modern rationalist perception of the subject is concerned, I shall outline major features 
of the Cartesian subject as well as the consequences of the Cartesian perception of the 
subject that played a major role in the theorisation of the subject prior to German 
Idealist philosophy. As for Romantic doctrines of the subject and its identity, I seek to 
present a study of German Idealist treatment of the subject and its close affinity with 
nature. This study proves to be central to the present thesis in that, on one hand, the 
Lacanian theory of the subject was highly influenced by the Hegelian concept of the 
subject and, on the other hand, I seek to critically investigate the Althusserian model of 
subjectivity in the coming chapter through a Hegelian approach to the subject’s identity. 
    This chapter consists of two major sections: first I study the Cartesian subject as both 
rationalist and objectified. Following this, I will outline the mind/body dualism that 
resulted in the further establishment of the subject-object separation and the rise of other 
binary oppositions. The study of the Cartesian subject is vital in a further exploration of 
the subject/object binary opposition that was later criticised not only in the Hegelian 
perception of the subject but also in both Lacanian and Althusserian models of 
subjectivity.   
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    Secondly, a discussion will be presented on the Hegelian subject with reference to the 
significance of Nature in German Idealism. I shall explore how the subject-object 
relation in German Idealism was treated in the context of the subject-nature identity. 
Accordingly, I shall also discuss Hegel’s perception of the subject-nature identity with 
reference to the Romantic signification of the concept of Nature. The Hegelian subject 
is marked by an incompleteness that I shall later bring into consideration in my analysis 
of the subject’s incompleteness in both Lacan and Althusser. Finally, I shall outline the 
major key points in my analysis of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects that are 
important to my later discussion of both Lacanian and Althusserian concepts of the 
subject.    
 
3.2 The Cartesian Subject as the Objectified Subject: 
      Rationalism, Centrality, and the Subject-Object Separation  
Descartes’ approach to the ‘subject’ is regarded as a decisive shift in the prehistory of 
the term. Descartes’ famous cogito argument is considered as his most significant 
contribution to the definition of the ‘subject.’ The Cartesian subject is also widely 
referred to in modern criticism and theory particularly when the aim is to trace the 
origins of the modern subject. However, the term owes a major part of its significance 
to Descartes’ involvement and inventions in natural philosophy, which, in the 
seventeenth-century context, was the familiar term for what we now call “science.”78 
    Arguing that the Cartesian notion of the subject provided it with an ‘objectified’ 
character in a way that it ultimately changed from its apparent form of the subject of 
knowing into the object of knowing, the present section seeks to demonstrate how the 
centrality of the rational subject in Descartes resulted in the further establishment of the 
Cartesian binary oppositions. Hence, an analysis of the certainty and centrality of the 
Cartesian subject will be presented, which I shall later refer to in my discussion of the 
Lacanian and Althusserian anti-humanist perception of the subject as not a free and 
decision maker individual.  
    My analysis of ‘the Cartesian subject as the object of knowing’ includes a discussion 
of the mind/body pair as the major binary opposition in Descartes. Descartes’ idea of 
the independence of mind and the consequent subject-object separation was later 
criticised in both the Hegelian and twentieth-century theories of subjectivity. Therefore, 
drawing out the major features of the Cartesian subject is necessary in my analysis of 
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the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of subjectivity in that both sought to reverse the 
strict foundations of the Cartesian concept of the subject.  
 
3.2.1 “Cogito ergo sum”: 
         Certainty and Centrality of the Rational Subject 
The Cartesian cogito argument brings into consideration the certainty of the subject’s 
existence. Descartes first referred to this argument in A Discourse on the Method. 
Elaborating on the errors of those who “make mistakes in reasoning, even about the 
simplest elements of geometry” and considering the thoughts in our dreams as 
“illusions,” he wrote: 
 
 I noted that, while I was trying to think of all things being in this way, it was necessarily 
the case that I, who was thinking them, had to be something; and observing this truth: I am 
thinking therefore I exist, was so secure and certain that it could not be shaken by any of the 
most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics, I judged that I could accept it without scruple, 
as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.79 
 
The frequently-quoted proposition “I think, therefore I am,” was first expressed by 
Descartes in French as “je pense donc je suis.” Its Latin equivalent, “cogito ergo sum,” 
however, has come to be universalized because Descartes used it in Latin later in both 
his Principles of Philosophy and the Latin version of A Discourse on the Method. The 
cogito argument is the first modern philosophical argument concerning the subject’s 
certainty of his existence and consciousness, one that was later radically criticised in 
German Idealism and both the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject. 
    Although both the English “subject” and French “sujet” refer to the grammatical 
function of the “I” used in the above proposition, the term has come to denote in 
Descartes a person who, by the means of his/her reasoning mind, overcomes his/her 
doubts. The first doubt that is resolved for the Cartesian subject is thus its own 
existence. This state of certainty, according to Descartes, is and should be met in facing 
other philosophical questions. Certainty, regarded as one of the major characteristics of 
the Cartesian subject, is in close affinity to the subject’s self-consciousness.   
   Descartes’ criticism of the subjectivity provided by scholastic philosophy is clearly 
observed in his attitude towards the subject and its abilities. While the human being was 
thought of as a determined ‘microcosm’ in scholasticism, for Descartes s/he was 
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considered as free and capable of autonomous decision-making. The human being, by 
which it is meant here the mind of human being, was regarded in Descartes as a 
‘macrocosm’ that was both free and truth-seeking. A major part of the Cartesian 
philosophy, especially in Meditations on First Philosophy, was dedicated to arguments 
on the human being’s search for truth through the help of her/his independent and free 
thinking mind. The famous first lines of his Meditations clarify such a view: 
 
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in 
my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently 
based on them. ... it is necessary ... to demolish everything completely and start again right 
from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable 
and likely to last.80 
 
   While man’s ability in coming up with a clear independent understanding of himself 
was degraded and even sometimes rejected in Scholasticism, Descartes believed in the 
power of man’s mind in finding answers for the still unanswered, or forbidden, 
philosophical questions. Descartes’ philosophical career was, in essence, contradictory 
to one of the premises of scholasticism, which was the belief in the microcosmic 
character of man. However, any attempt to violate the understanding of mankind based 
on Christian teachings provided by such ‘Schoolmen’ as Thomas Aquinas and Duns 
Scotus was formally condemned by the Church.  
    The scholastic philosophy, the philosophy of the ‘Schoolmen,’ was officially taught 
in the early seventeenth century. Descartes became acquainted with the scholastic 
philosophy when he was a student in the Jesuit College of La Fleche in Anjou. Later in 
his A Discourse on the Method (1637) he criticized the foundations of scholastic 
philosophy. Reviewing all the materials he had been taught at college, Descartes wrote 
of the philosophy courses he attended: 
 
I shall not say anything about philosophy except that, when I realized that it had been 
cultivated by the best minds for many centuries, and that nevertheless there is nothing in it 
that is not disputed and consequently is not subject to doubt, I was not so presumptuous as 
to hope to succeed better than others… As for the other disciplines, in so far as they borrow 
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their principles from philosophy, I concluded that nothing solid could have been built on 
such shaky foundations.81 
 
Clearly expressing his critical view on the scholastic philosophy, Descartes here argues 
that “nothing solid can have been built on such shaky foundations” of the philosophy 
that everything in it is “disputed” and “subject to doubt.” Descartes continued to 
criticize different aspects of scholasticism in his other works. As Roger Ariew has 
observed, almost every subject related to scholastic thought was criticized by Descartes. 
“He rejected the four elements,” Ariew states, “and held that there was only one kind of 
matter, and that all its varieties could be explained as modifications of extension.”82 
Descartes was also highly critical of Aristotle’s idea of the triad principles of matter, 
form, and privation. Scholastic philosophy was also criticised by Descartes particularly 
when he rejected the Aristotelian doctrine of the substantial forms that was dominant in 
the middle Ages.   
   Descartes’ insistence on reaching the state of certainty in natural philosophy highly 
influenced the scientific developments of modern times. Descartes’ aim, as mentioned 
in A Discourse on the Method, was to make use of the certainty of mathematics, which 
he largely contributed to, in other fields of study in order to promote them: 
 
I was most keen on mathematics, because of its certainty and the incontrovertibility of its 
proof; but I did not yet see its true use. Believing as I did that its only application was to the 
mechanical arts, I was astonished that nothing more exalted had been built on such sure and 
solid foundations.83  
 
As observed, Descartes here focuses on the necessity of scientific developments in his 
own time as compared to that of the “ancient,” later on referred to in the same passage. 
The characteristic feature of Cartesian philosophy is its close association with Cartesian 
mathematics and logic. Such a relation between philosophy and science paved the way 
for the contribution of Cartesian philosophy to the scientific developments of modern 
times. Consequently, we can propose that Descartes attempted to resolve the doubts 
existing in the natural sciences based on the method of arriving at truth in mathematical 
sciences. As Anthony Kenny writes: 
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The pursuit thus far of the method of doubt would lead to the conclusion that the natural 
sciences are doubtful, while the mathematical sciences have an element of indubitable 
certainty. For example, astronomy, and medicine deal with composite objects, while 
arithmetic and geometry treat of very simple and very general objects without worrying 
whether these objects exist in nature or not.84 
  
Descartes was so certain of the truth of his philosophical project that he refused to 
consider his cogito argument as being influenced by classical logic. He believed that the 
cogito argument was intuitively felt and not deduced from two other elementary 
sentences, as it was the case in the syllogistic logic of Scholasticism. For example, 
 
Everything having large extremities is strong                             (all B is A) 
All lions have large extremities                                                   (all C is B) 
 
 
All lions are strong                                                                       (all C is A) 
 
Based on this syllogistic logic the cogito argument might have been deduced as follows: 
 
Whatever is thinking exists 
I am thinking 
   
Therefore I exist 
 
Relying on the above proposition in his philosophical career, Descartes refused to 
accept that it was deduced from such a logic, which was followed in scholastic 
philosophy. He rather argued that the proposition “I am thinking therefore I exist” was 
so self-evident that needed no such logic behind it. This, however, is a demonstrative 
example of Descartes’ firm belief in his cogito argument as well as the truth behind it.    
   The Cartesian subject resolves the doubts and arrives at the state of certainty by his 
rational thinking. Descartes was one of the first modern philosophers that emphasized 
the significance and functionality of man’s reason. He ironically mentions at the 
beginning of A Discourse on the Method that everyone thinks that he has what is called 
“good sense,” which has come to be the equivalent of reason: 
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Good sense is the most evenly distributed thing in the world; for everyone believes himself 
to be so well provided with it that even those who are the hardest to please in every other 
way do not usually want more of it than they already have. Nor is it likely that everyone is 
wrong about this; rather, what this shows is that the power of judging correctly and of 
distinguishing the true from the false (which is what is properly called good sense or reason) 
is naturally equal in all men.85 
 
    The question of the presence of “reason” in human subjectivity is not important for 
Descartes merely because he argues that, as it is the case, everyone is endowed with it. 
The real question, as later developed by Descartes in the same work, is that one should 
be aware of how he is to educate and employ his own reason. Man’s reason should be 
critical in self-overcoming and the resolving of doubts in order to arrive at truth. 
Reason, “the power of judging correctly and distinguishing the true from the false” was 
the most significant and spectacular feature of the Cartesian subject. Descartes argued 
for the distinguishing power of reason that was not observed in imagination and the five 
senses: 
 
For after all, whether we are awake or asleep, we ought never to let ourselves be convinced 
except on the evidence of our reason. And it is to be noted that I say ‘our reason’, and not 
‘our imagination’ or ‘our senses.’… for reason does not dictate us that what we see or 
imagine in this way is true. But it does certainly dictate that all our ideas or notions must 
have some foundations in truth.86 
 
Descartes’ frequent references to the significance and capabilities of reason and his 
emphasis on the role played by rationality in the establishment of a new framework of 
thought was, to a large extent, influential in the emergence of rationalism in the latter 
part of the seventeenth century.   
   The certainty of the Cartesian subject is in parallel to its centrality.  The cogito 
argument provides the rational ‘I’ of the proposition with a centralized position where it 
is viewed as the opposite of the emotional ‘I.’ The certainty and rationality of the 
Cartesian subject separate it from its emotions, illusions, doubts, and, as later discussed, 
body and nature. The ego of the Cartesian subject is thus consciously aware of itself and 
becomes a centred part of the subject; whatever in opposition to it is regarded as 
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supplementary and marginal. This is where the first example of the subject-object 
opposition emerges in Descartes.  
    The Cartesian subject required a state of certainty in order to resolve his doubts and 
arrive at truth. In mathematics, too, certainty is a fundamental principle that provides a 
basis for the other practices. This principle, followed in both mathematics and 
Descartes’ concept of man, endows the Cartesian subject with a ‘centred’ characteristic. 
The idea of the centrality of the Cartesian subject can be interpreted in two ways: first, 
the rational mind is the centre of the Cartesian subject, and, second, the Cartesian 
subject has a centralist tendency in its projects. Both, however, can also be seen in the 
context of Descartes’ affinity with humanism, according to which man became the 
centre.  
    The centrality of the Cartesian subject should be also viewed in relation to nature and 
other subjects. The Cartesian subject is centred and foregrounded in comparison to its 
surroundings. Whereas man was conceived of as the micro-cosmos in scholastic 
philosophy, it was the macro-cosmos itself in both humanism and Cartesian philosophy. 
The Cartesian conception of the subject did not consider it as the micro-cosmos subject; 
on the contrary, the subject was here provided with an autonomous and rational feature. 
Hence the idea of the subject as independent decision maker originality goes back to the 
centred position of both the reason, in opposition to emotions, and the rational subject, 
in contrast to nature.   
    Exploring the Cartesian subject’s character of certainty and centrality is instrumental 
in my later analysis of both Lacanian and Althusserian concepts of the subject in that 
they were both fundamentally critical of these characteristics of the subject. As I shall 
return to this in Chapters Four and Five, the Althusserian theory of the subject criticised 
the certainty of the subject in that it was not free and autonomous because of its ongoing 
subjection of/to ideology; also, the Lacanian perception of the subject deprived it of its 
certainty because of the inevitable consequences of the constant presence of the Other. 
Moreover, as I later demonstrate, the Althusserian concept of the subject considered it 
as de-centred when positioned in the levels and practices of the social formation; the 
Lacanian perception, too, approached the subject as de-centred in that it is was not only 
subject to the Other but also to its own unconscious.   
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3.2.2 The Cartesian Subject Objectified: 
         Mind/Body Opposition and the Subject-Object Separation 
The Cartesian subject, by which I mean not only the subject as manifested in Cartesian 
philosophy but also the modern subject that was characteristically Cartesian in view, 
was an anti-sceptical and truth seeking subject who attempted to understand all objects 
and phenomena by the power of his/her reasoning mind. Descartes emphasized the 
major role of the rational mind in arriving at truth throughout his entire philosophical 
career. What I want to demonstrate is that the Cartesian subject, considered as the 
knowing subject, transmitted to a stage of objectification caused by the mind/body 
opposition.  
    The knowing of the mind of the subject by the mind itself resulted in a double attitude 
towards the mind as both the subject and the object. By mind Descartes meant the 
reasoning mind, that which embodies the ‘intellect’. As it is observed in the above 
extracts from his works, Descartes believed that our mind might sometimes provide us 
with a false understanding of the world around us. For example, he argued that while we 
are asleep, we do not have true distinguishing reason. Moreover, he maintained that our 
true reasoning mind is not found in what we perceive by our senses. 
    In Descartes’ philosophy the body and mind were considered to be of two different 
essences. Accordingly, one should also differentiate between the mind and brain. The 
mind, in Cartesian philosophy, was attributed a characteristic that made it come close to 
soul. Descartes thus argued the distinguishable feature of mind: 
 
What else am I? … I am not the structure of limbs which is called a human body. I am not 
even some thin vapour which permeates the limbs – a wind, fire, air, breath, or whatever I 
depict in my imagination; … I know that I exist; the question is, what is this ‘I’ that I know? 
If the ‘I’ is understood strictly as we have been taking it, then it is quite certain that 
knowledge of it does not depend on things of whose existence I am as yet unaware… The 
mind must therefore be most carefully diverted from such things if it is to perceive its 
own nature as distinctly as possible.87  
 
   Whereas the significance of the reasoning mind is always repeated in Descartes’ 
works, he renounced the body of the subject, which, he believed, was the mind’s 
counterpart. Hence, the mind/body dualism is one of the conspicuous characteristics of 
Cartesian philosophy. Subsequently, the Cartesian subject is a mind-directed subject 
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that seems to neglect his body. The Cartesian subject relies on the power of his 
reasoning mind firmly and without any doubts common to the sceptics.   
    A major point here is that the Cartesian subject’s trust in his rational mind was in a 
way that he contemplated all aspects of his life by the help of the power of his reason. 
Descartes was so certain of both the necessity and truth of such a practice that he called 
man’s mind a “thinking thing.” He wrote:  
 
At present, I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the 
strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or 
reason – words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a 
thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said – a 
thinking thing.88 
 
 Considering the mind as a “thinking thing” can be interpreted as Descartes’ method of, 
and contribution to, the idea of ‘objectifying the mind.’ By this phrase I mean two 
apparently distinct views on the mind: first, the mind is here considered as an object, a 
“thing,” and not an object of study. That is to say the mind is an object per se, a thing in 
itself. The immediate consequence of such a view is the concretization and 
materialization of the mind. On the other hand, as mentioned above the subject is 
thought of in Cartesian philosophy as nothing but “the mind, or intelligence, or intellect, 
or reason”. As a result, objectifying the mind virtually means objectifying the subject. In 
consequence, the subject is objectified in the philosophy of Descartes. 
    Secondly, objectifying the mind can also be interpreted as considering the mind as an 
object for study, something man wants to explore and ultimately take control of. The 
objectified subject thus means the subject that is objectified by his own rational mind. 
That is to say that the rational and thinking Cartesian subject takes control of not only 
his own body but also mind. The mind, as well as all the other objects around us, 
becomes the object of study in Cartesian philosophy.  
    My approach to the objectified mind of the Cartesian subject is distinguishable from 
other accounts of Descartes that have discussed the idea of objectivity in his philosophy. 
Descartes. For example, Hiram Caton, in his The Origin of Subjectivity: An Essay on 
Descartes (1973), has elaborated on the concept of objectivity in Cartesian philosophy 
based on Descartes’ theory of sensation. Dealing with the differences between the 
Aristotelian and Cartesian theories of vision, Caton points to Descartes’ attempts in 
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considering the mind as a machine. He believes that Descartes ultimately came up with 
a “mechanistic theory on sensation,” and his theory on vision led to “remarkable 
discoveries” that are all standardized in “contemporary physiological optics.”89  
    Reviewing the present analysis of the Cartesian subject, one can come to the 
conclusion that Descartes’ knowledge of natural philosophy on one hand and his belief 
in the unshakeable foundations of mathematics on the other hand had inevitably 
coloured his views on subjectivity. The development of science, as Descartes called for, 
was a process in parallel to the development of man. The principles of the process of 
scientific development should be followed in the process of man’s development too. 
Presenting the project of Rules for the Direction of the Mind in 1628, Descartes 
attempted to establish a new set of rules for the development of science and the 
emergence of a new subject  
    The Cartesian subject owns a rational and ‘ordered’ mind according to which he 
thinks, acts, and arrives at truth. As it is explicitly seen in the three maxims of A 
Discourse on the Method and the order of the rules in his Rules for the Direction of the 
Mind, the Cartesian subject is supposed to go through different ordered rules in order to 
grasp a scientific or philosophical truth.90 The Cartesian subject was supposed to follow 
and rely on mathematical principles, which include certainty, rationality, centrality, and 
order. The Cartesian subject was an objectified subject in that it was not only considered 
as a “thinking thing” but also was both taught and made to follow these principles.  
    Cartesian philosophy, in its emphasis on the rational and detached character of the 
mind, tends to consider it as an object, a thing. In addition, the mind/body dual pair 
presupposes a centred position for the mind and a marginal role for the body. The mind 
is to be examined by reason that constitutes the mind itself. The Cartesian subject, in its 
transformation into the object of knowing and through its emphasis on the centred 
position of the mind resulted in the establishment of the separation of the subject from 
the objects including both its body and the surroundings.  
    The subject-object separation, in parallel to other Cartesian binary oppositions that 
played a major role in the direction of modern philosophy, was one of the first 
consequences of the original mind/body dualism discussed above. The subject/object 
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split was fundamentally emphasized in Cartesian philosophy and it caused the subject to 
objectify its self by the rational mind.  
    The centred position of the Cartesian subject’s mind in comparison to both the body 
and nature considered them as material and inanimate. The subject/nature diversity in 
Descartes led to a complete the subject-object non-identity which ultimately made the 
subject the master and observer of nature. The subject-object separation in Descartes is 
in close affinity to his doctrine of the mind/body duality. Apart from this, this duality is 
also based on the distinction Descartes made between thought and extension. Whereas 
mind is what generates thoughts, body is considered in the realm of the physical 
extension. Dedicating the most part of the Fifth Meditation to an argument concerning 
the existence and attributes of God, he first demonstrated that ‘quantity’ was the essence 
of material things. He wrote: 
 
I distinctly imagine the extension of the quantity (or rather the thing which is quantified) in 
length, breadth and depth. I also enumerate various parts of the thing, and to these parts I 
assign various sizes, shapes, positions and local motions; and to the motions I assign various 
durations.91  
 
    Thought/extension dualism was influential in that it ultimately led to a new 
relationship between man and nature. “The result of Descartes’ dualistic separation of 
mind and matter,” John Cottingham argues, “led to a twofold alienation of man from the 
natural world.”92 Nature was to undergo changes as a result of man’s alienation from it. 
Considering man as subject and nature as object of study for the rational mind of man 
resulted in man’s complete separation of nature, which was later to be manifested as 
man’s domination over nature. According to Descartes’ proposition in the last part of A 
Discourse on the Method human beings were supposed to become the “masters and 
possessors of nature”:   
 
It is possible to attain knowledge which is useful in life, … it can be turned into a practice 
by which, knowing the power and action of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all the 
other bodies that are around us as distinctly as we know the different trades of our 
craftsmen, we could put them to all the uses for which they are suited and thus make 
ourselves as it were the masters and possessors of nature.93 
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This relation between man and nature along the idea of centrality of man, discussed 
earlier in the present section, led to the emergence of a group of binary oppositions in 
the philosophy, literature, arts, and even politics of modernity. The characteristics of the 
Cartesian subject constituted the centred part of these binary oppositions. The phrase 
‘rational self of the thinking man,’ which sums up all the major characteristics of the 
Cartesian subject, produced the following binary oppositions respectively: the 
subject/object, reason/emotion, self/other, thinking/imagining, centre/margin, and 
man/woman.  
    If we review the history of modernity, we will see that the first part of the above 
binary oppositions has been considered prior to the second part. The two parts of these 
Cartesian binary oppositions are ‘the other’ to each other not only in their designation 
but also because of the contradictory function each one conveys. One part of these dual 
pairs is always considered as the centred while the other one is conceived of as having a 
supplementary and marginal role. The centred part is the privileged while the marginal 
part is generally overlooked in ego-oriented philosophical positions.   
    Whereas contemporary theories of subjectivity follow Hegel in his emphasis on the 
role of the other in the rise of the self-consciousness of the subject, in Descartes it is the 
subject itself that is conceived as constructive of itself. The rational ego of the Cartesian 
subject, being the centre, defines and investigates the subject and its others including 
nature and other subjects. Thus, in Descartes, unlike what we observe in contemporary 
theory, it is the subject that determines the other. The Cartesian subject is autonomous, 
free, coherent, and decision maker. It is the cause and not the effect of the other.  
    Further establishment of these binary oppositions is better illustrated if we refer to the 
significance of Descartes’ concept of mankind that was highly influential in the 
development of modern philosophy and science. His contribution to most of the 
scientific fields was based on a new practice of mathematics, often called the Cartesian 
mathematics, in which a new logical method for arriving at truth was introduced. 
Likewise, the Cartesian philosophy was influential even in other areas such as 
linguistics. Analysing the influence of Descartes’ rationalist philosophy, Noam 
Chomsky writes in his Cartesian Linguistics (1966):  
 
It seems to me that there is a coherent and fruitful development of ideas and 
conclusions regarding the nature of language in association with a certain theory on 
 70
mind and that this development can be regarded as an outgrowth of the Cartesian 
revolution.94 
 
The idea of the Cartesian subject was so influential in modernity that we can think of 
this proposition that all major characteristics of the Cartesian subject are those usually 
mentioned whenever we want to talk about the principles of modernity. The Cartesian 
subject was influential in modernity’s focus on centralisation, rationalism, logicality, 
order, and scientific development. More significantly, the Cartesian perception of 
subjectivity established and developed a number of binary oppositions in modern 
philosophy. What is interesting is that the hierarchy in the Cartesian binary oppositions 
remained the same for a long period of time until it was radically criticised by the critics 
of modernity. 
    The subject-object separation in Descartes gave birth to a number of challenging 
questions the most significant of which were posed by German Idealist tradition of 
philosophy. Whereas nature was completely objectified and controlled by the Cartesian 
subject and remained objectively external to it, in Hegel it is not only part of the 
subject’s consciousness but also that which determines its identity.   
    The objectification of the subject in Descartes is essentially distinguishable from the 
analysis of the subject in both Lacan and Althusser. Whereas Descartes contended that 
the subject could succeed in knowing and overcoming his mind as an object of study, I 
shall deal with the Althusserian and Lacanian considerations of the subject’s acts as 
determined and governed by ideology and the Other.  The Cartesian treatment in this 
regard is also considered as positivistic and simplistic in that human subjectivity, as 
both Lacanian and Althusserian models suggest, is conceived of as constructed and 
functioning through a complicated process that I shall discuss later in the thesis. 
    Although the Cartesian concepts of mastery and progress were widely influential in 
later periods,95 the subject/nature relationship was reconsidered in Hegel and 
Romanticism. Whereas the subject is always considered to be in a state of non-identity 
with object, German Idealism approached the subject through its identity with object 
that was nature in its Romantic sense. Also, both Lacanian and Althusserian theories 
analysed the subject in an anti-Cartesian way through emphasizing the role of the Other 
and ideology respectively. Investigating key characteristics of the Cartesian subject 
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discussed above is central to my thesis of bringing the Althusserian and Lacanian 
theories of subjectivity together in that they were, as I shall return to them in the coming 
chapters, highly critical of the Cartesian subject and radically reversed its standpoints 
and features.  
  
3.3 The Hegelian Subject and Nature:  
      Romantic Subjectivity and the Subject-Object Identity  
Hegel’s idea of the rise of self-consciousness in facing ‘the other’ has been commonly 
emphasized in discussing his influence on Lacan.96 However, the study of the subject-
object relation in German Idealist philosophy also proves to be illuminating in 
evaluating the Lacanian perceptions of the subject. This study is also crucial in 
investigating the Althusserian theory of subjectivity that I shall analyse in my Hegelian 
reading of the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ in the following chapter.  
   The Hegelian concept of the subject provided it with a feature of incompleteness. I 
shall return to this in Chapters Four and Five where I present an analysis of the ongoing 
identity of the subject in Althusser and Lacan respectively. The present account of the 
key points in the subject-object relation as conceived of in German Idealism plays a 
central role in moving into my coming analyses of both Lacanian and Althusserian 
notions of the subject’s identity. For example, the Lacanian reference to the lack in the 
subject’s identity, to be discussed in Chapter Five, can be further explored through the 
employment of the Hegelian idea of the internal dialectic within the subject’s identity; 
also, the limitations in the Althusserian theory of subjectivity, to be discussed in 
Chapter Four, will be removed when applying a Hegelian approach to the subject-nature 
non-identity. 
    This section consists of two sub-sections: first, a study of the subject-object relation 
in German Idealist philosophy is presented that concentrates on the analysis of the 
subject according to the role played by Nature in its Romantic sense. Secondly, 
demonstrating that the Hegelian perception of the subject-nature identity can be 
regarded as a theorization of Romantic subjectivity’s obsession with Nature, I seek to 
demonstrate that the Hegelian conception of the subject-nature non-identity provided 
the Hegelian subject with an incomplete identity, one that always undergoes an ongoing 
process of identity construction. 
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3.3.1 Nature and the Subject-Object Identity in German Idealism 
German Idealism offered a view of the subject that was in manifest opposition to its 
treatment in rationalism. Whereas the Cartesian subject followed a dualist vision that 
ultimately resulted in the subject-nature separation, German idealist philosophy, 
particularly in Schelling, Novalis, and Hegel, approached the subject based on its 
relation to and identity with Nature. What I want to demonstrate here is that the German 
Idealist philosophy, influenced by the Romantic conception of nature, ultimately 
approached the subject-object relation in the form of the subject-Nature identity. As it 
will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, the exploration of subjectivity in German 
Idealism provided the philosophical foundation of the Lacanian theory of the subject. 
Also, as I shall demonstrate in the following chapter, reading the Althusserian concept 
of the subject through this approach proves to be illuminating in removing the 
limitations in the Althusserian theory. Therefore, an investigation into Romantic 
subjectivity as theorised by Hegel is central in bringing the Lacanian and Althusserian 
theories together in that both can be examined and developed through the Hegelian 
concept of the subject. 
    German idealist philosophy shared with literary Romanticism similar features such as 
emphasizing the spiritual aspect of Nature and a criticism of pure rationalism. This 
proximity is particularly observable in the philosophy of both Schelling and Novalis. 
Schelling’s references to Schlegel, a Romantic poet, and Novalis’ lyrical poems are 
manifestly in parallel to the Romantic spirit of the period.  As Frederick Beiser suggests, 
Hegel’s philosophy and his “basic values” will not be understood unless we see him as 
influenced by Romanticism. He goes further to claim that early German Romanticism 
provided the most elements for Hegel’s early ideals: 
  
Hegel’s early ideals grew out of early German romanticism, the period sometimes called 
Fruhromantik. This intellectual movement flourished from 1797 to 1802 in Jena and Berlin 
… it is a mistake to treat Hegel as a figure apart, as if we can understand him without the 
romantics, or as if he were fundamentally opposed to them. This would be anachronistic for 
the early Hegel; but it would also be inaccurate about the later Hegel, who never entirely 
freed himself from romantic influence.97 
 
    Apart from this “romantic influence,” the idea of Nature proves to be central to 
Romantic movements in both literature and philosophy of the late eighteenth and early 
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nineteenth century. A major part of the subject-object relation in Romantic subjectivity 
originally goes back to the treatment of Nature as primal, spiritual, and inspirational in 
the literature and philosophy of the period. Romanticism provided the subject with a 
special relation to Nature that was in manifest contradiction with the Cartesian subject’s 
rationalist treatment that sharply separated the subject from the surrounding objects. On 
the contrary, Nature in its Romantic sense is conceived of as that which the subject 
moves towards in order to reach a state of unity.     
   Nature, as a major Romantic keyword, was conceived of in the literature and 
philosophy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century as untameable and 
untouched by the rational intellect of the civilised man. Primal and powerful, Nature 
was not that observed in a city park and the garden of a palace; it was rather the 
original, not corrupted, and pure nature that stood against the artificial nature of the 
cities and domestic life. The elements of nature in its romantic sense were spiritual and 
inspirational. One can conveniently observe several references to the names of different 
geographical locations, old buildings now left in nature, flowers, clouds, the sea and 
rivers, and the birds in Romantic poetry. John Laughland thus refers to this designation 
of nature in Romanticism: 
 
Romantics in Germany and England from Schlegel and Goethe to Keats and Wordsworth 
were notorious for communing with nature and having intimations of the sublime in the 
process. They admired in nature that sense of organic unity which, they felt, Enlightenment 
mechanism had stifled: they preferred apparently untamed English gardens to geometrical 
French ones – or, better still, a forest.98  
  
    German idealist philosophy, too, approached the subject-object identity with especial 
reference to the high significance of Nature in forming the subject’s identity. Schelling 
and Novalis, as discussed below, were obsessed with spiritual character of Nature and 
its inevitable influences on the subject.  
    The German Idealist critique of the subject began with a criticism of British 
empiricism and its perception of the subject. Kant’s idea of transcendental idealism was 
a departure from George Berkeley’s subjective idealism and, particularly, David 
Hume’s bundle theory. Objects in Hume’s theory merely consist of their properties and 
they are nothing more than collections of our sensual perceptions. Accordingly, Hume 
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considered the self as nothing but a unified collection of sensual perceptions functioning 
through similarity and causal relations.99   
    Kant developed this doctrine when he emphasized a distinction between the things as 
they appear to an observer and the things in themselves. The basis of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism is the distinction between phenomenon, the thing as appearance, 
and noumenon, the thing in itself. “I call all knowledge transcendental,” Kant wrote in 
the introductory chapter of his Critique of Pure Reason (1771), “which is occupied not 
so much with objects, as with our a priori concepts of objects.”100 A priori concepts of 
objects which are apprehended through human sensibility are transcendentally ideal 
while the objects outside this mode of cognition are things in themselves, what Kant 
called transcendentally real. Subsequently, the thinking subject in Descartes became the 
transcendental subject of thought in Kant, one that thinks through thoughts that are 
predicates. Later in the chapter on ‘The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements’ Kant 
wrote: 
 
Objects are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions. 
These intuitions become thought through the understanding, and hence raise conceptions. All 
thought therefore must, directly or indirectly, go back to intuitions, i.e. to our sensibility, 
because in no other way can objects be given to us.101  
 
Believing that our conceptions are originally based on the first ‘intuition’ we have of the 
objects, Kant goes further to consider space and time as “two purely forms of sensuous 
intuition.”  They are neither things in themselves nor empirically mediated appearances. 
They are subjective preconditions of any object when conceived of as appearance and 
not as a thing in itself. Human consciousness deals with objects only when located in 
time and space and this is a necessary condition to cognize an object.   
   This transcendental trend of German Idealist philosophy was developed by Johann 
Fichte who sharply rejected the Kantian dualistic treatment of the subject and object. 
Criticising Kant’s pure and rigid distinction of noumenon and phenomenon, Fichte 
argued that there exists no noumenal world and, consequently, consciousness is not 
grounded in anything outside of itself. Hegel thus referred to Fichte’s thought: “The 
foundation of the Fichtean system is intellectual intuition pure thinking of itself, pure 
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self-consciousness, “I = I, I am.” The Absolute is Subject-Object, and the I is this 
identity of the subject and object.”102 Examining this statement under the light of both 
ordinary and empirical consciousness, Hegel proceeds to explore Fichte’s third’s axiom 
of his Wissenschaftslehre, “I posits in the I a separable not-I over against the separable 
I.” Hegel wrote: 
 
In this synthesis, the objective I is not equivalent to the subjective I. The subjective is I, the 
objective is I + not-I, and the primordial identity does not present itself in this. The pure 
consciousness I = I and the empirical consciousness I = I + not-I, along with all the forms 
into which this is constructed, remains opposed.103  
 
    The identity of the subject and object in Fichte in both its pure and empirical forms 
constituted the foundation of Schelling’s nature philosophy. Schelling sought to 
approach the subject-object identity through his elaborations on the object, which was 
for him nothing but nature. Emphasizing the role of nature in the subject construction, 
Schelling finally argued that the Fichtean distinction between subject and object (I and 
not-I) is a distinction that can be made only by and within subjectivity itself.  
    A good way to grasp Fichte and Schelling’s treatment of the subject-object relation is 
to refer to Hegel’s work on the differences between Fichte and Schelling’s philosophical 
systems. Hegel argued that the principle of identity was the absolute principle of 
Schelling’s entire system. Hegel believed that philosophy and system shall coincide and 
the absolute identity, while becoming the principle of an entire system, should posit 
both the subject and object as Subject-Object. As a result, the Schellingian conception 
of identity constitution considered it as a subjective Subject-Object, which in order to 
become complete needed an objective Subject-Object. As far as the subject-object 
relation is concerned, Hegel argues that one can find both concepts of separation and 
identity in any given the subject-object relation. However, one should not overlook the 
fact that, on one hand, abandoning separation is conditional and, on the other, identity is 
relative. Hegel thus stated: 
 
The separation must be asserted just as much as identity is asserted. To the extent that the 
identity and the separation are opposed to one another, both are absolute; and if diremption is 
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negated, they remain opposed to one another...the Absolute itself is therefore the identity of 
identity and non-identity; op-positing and being-one are in it equally. 104 
 
    The German idealism’s consideration of nature in relation to Spirit and the divine 
found its climax in Schelling’s nature philosophy. For Schelling, nature and the spirit 
were like two sides of a coin; they were considered by him as the complementary parts 
of the whole: “Nature is visible Spirit; Spirit is invisible Nature.” This famous 
announcement in Schelling’s first book, Ideen, refers to Schelling’s later division of the 
Absolute into both Nature and Spirit. However, Schelling’s approach to Nature should 
be also observed in the context of the Romantic movement he was part of and through 
his belief in the Christian metaphysics he sought to reconcile with his nature 
philosophy.105 
     Apart from Schelling’s critique of Fichte, there simultaneously appeared another 
critique of the latter’s notion of the subject-object identity by German mystic, poet and 
philosopher, Novalis (Georg von Hardenberg). A major figure of romanticism, Novalis 
significantly contributed to the idealist tradition of philosophy through his Fichte-
Studien [Fichte Studies] (1802). He criticised Fichte’s perception of I as the subject-
object and of consciousness as including both the subjective and objective I. In the fifth 
remarks on Fichte, Novalis asked: “Has not Fichte too arbitrarily packed everything into 
the I? ... Can I posit itself as I, without another I or Not-I -/How are I and Not-I 
opposable/”106 Mentioning that there has to be a Not-I for the I’s act of positing I as I, 
Novalis wrote: 
 
“The act by which the I posits itself as I must be connected with the antithesis of an 
independent Not-I and of the relationship to a sphere that encompasses them – this sphere 
can be called God, and I.”107 
 
Novalis thus expresses his idea of the existence of an independent Not-I, one that is not 
only entirely outside I but also determining it through the sphere it inevitably causes 
along with I. Novalis’ emphasis of the divinity of nature makes him further distinct 
from Fichte and closer to Schelling. In addition, unlike Fichte, he believed that art was 
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superior to philosophy and it was only the poetic imagination that could explore the 
realm of the absolute. Hence, a major point of criticism in Novalis’ reading of Fichte is 
the significant position he gives to feeling. Although Fichte, too, agreed that feeling 
marked the limits of all philosophy and it was undeducible, Novalis argued that feeling 
exists in self-consciousness itself. It means that we cannot think of feeling without 
presupposing it.108  
    Novalis’ concept of nature should be considered in parallel to Schelling’s nature 
philosophy. Novalis presented a new approach to nature that was different from both 
Fichte and Schelling’s conception of it.  Whereas nature in Schelling had been “treated 
as a self-sufficient realm,” Novalis argued that nature was not a self-sufficient whole. In 
Novalis nature was nothing but “an emanation of the divine.”109 Although this approach 
is manifestly under the influence of the pantheist tradition of late eighteenth century, it 
is distinguishable from it in that Novalis made a distinction between the natural and the 
divine. Originally descended from Neo-Platonic philosophy and later developed in 
Islamic mysticism, pantheism was concerned with the idea that the divine exists in 
nature.  Pantheism, in its highly developed form, believes in the unity of the Creator, 
God, and the Created, that is either nature or mankind. This complete identity of the 
subject-nature and the subject-spirit is what is referred to in the Hegelian perception of 
the subject-object full identity as the Absolute. 
 
3.3.2 The Hegelian Subject and Incomplete Subject-Nature Identity  
The Hegelian idea of the subject can be considered as a major attempt in the 
theorization of Romantic subjectivity, also explored in the post-Kantian tradition of 
German Idealist philosophy. Briefly demonstrating the affinity between Hegel’s 
philosophy and Romantic ideals, this section argues that the subject-object identity in 
Hegel, which was ultimately manifested for him in the form of the subject-Nature non-
identity, provided the subject’s identity with a feature of incompleteness. Although 
Hegel’s philosophical system has been referred to as a major influence on Lacan as far 
as the significance of ‘the other’ in the rise of self-consciousness is concerned, I will 
concentrate here on how his notion of the subject-object identity can be also regarded as 
illuminating in a further investigation of the subject’s identity.  
    Hegel’s profound responses to his contemporary ‘spirit of the age’ can be argued to 
be in parallel to the Romantic ideal of freedom.  Highly influenced by the French 
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Revolution, Hegel founded a major part of his philosophical system based on his 
contemplations on the Romantic ‘spirit’ after the Revolution. As far as the question of 
the relation of freedom to the French Revolution is concerned, Hegel believes that the 
Revolution was the phase in which the subject realised himself because he was then 
self-conscious of his freedom. Going back to the role played by Martin Luther in the 
realization of freedom, Hegel considered the Reformation as one of the major phases in 
the history of the west. Reformation was the freedom from the authority of the Church 
and the late eighteenth-century struggle for freedom had its origins in the Reformation. 
Hegel thus wrote of the significant role of the Reformation in the freedom of the spirit:  
 
Each has to accomplish the work of reconciliation on his own self. With this, is unfurled the 
new, the last standard around which the peoples rally—the banner of free spirit …  Time, 
since has had, and has now, no other work to do than the imbuing of the world with this 
principle … This is the essential content of the Reformation: man is destined through 
himself to be free.110 
 
   Hegel’s focus on the Reformation was not merely because of its relation to the 
freedom of the spirit but to the role it played as an antithesis to ancient Greece, taken by 
Hegel as the thesis. The French Revolution, which was, in Hegel’s idea, the consequent 
synthesis of the two, regarded freedom as its central ideal.   
    Furthermore, Hegel’s view of art is indicative of the parallel lines of his philosophy 
to its contemporary Romanticism. Although Hegel also dealt with different 
manifestations of ‘the work of art’ towards the end of Phenomenology of Spirit, his 
significant work in art criticism is Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. Refusing the 
“false position … that art has to serve as a means for moral ends,” Hegel believed that a 
work of art should not be regarded merely as an instrument in the realisation of an end. 
This definition includes whatever end is presupposed for a work of art. Thus against 
such perception of art he wrote: 
 
It is necessary to maintain that art has the vocation of revealing the truth in the form of 
sensuous artistic shape … and, therefore, has its purpose in itself, in this representation and 
revelation. For other objects, such as instruction, purification, improvement, pecuniary gain, 
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endeavour after fame and honour, have nothing to do with the work of art as such, and do 
not determine its conception.111   
 
Art is not considered as a means for expressing the truth. It is the end in-itself; that is to 
say that art is itself a mode of truth. Hegel’s notion of art reminds us of Keats’s 
definition of beauty in his “Ode on a Grecian Urn” where beauty is regarded as the 
truth.112  
    As far as the Hegelian treatment of the subject-object identity is concerned, one 
should notice that it was under the influence of Schelling who was not only a major 
philosopher in German Idealist tradition but also involved in the Romantic movement in 
art and literature. As discussed above, Schelling tended to approach the subject-object 
relation based on the determining feature of nature. Hegel’s ultimate estimate of the 
possibility of the subject-object identity was also influenced by the spiritual power of 
nature represented in the pantheist principle of Romanticism. Whereas pantheism was 
concerned with a state of complete unification between God and Nature and, also, 
Nature and the subject, German ‘absolute idealism’ movement believed in oneness of 
the opposing elements. The I/Not-I identity in Fichte, the subject/nature identity in 
Schelling, and the divine/the natural identity in Novalis all happened to be posited in the 
realm of the absolute.  
    The Hegelian concept of the Absolute brings together the subject and object in an 
identical sense. The subject-object identity, if we think of the object as nature and of the 
subject as human being, is possible only in the realm of the absolute. Although Hegel 
talked of the existence of a state in which there might be a subject-object identity, he 
also argued that this state, only if identical with its opposite that is subject-object non-
identity, could constitute part of the realm of the absolute. The subject was able to 
experience this state only if there was also a non-identity at work. In other words, there 
is no single complete manifestation of the subject-object identity in that it is, even in the 
realm of the absolute, accompanied with the subject-object separation. 
    The object in these formulations was considered to be Nature, which included, apart 
from the Kantian concepts of space and time, a spiritual aspect maintained by Schelling 
and Novalis. Hegel’s obsession with the spiritual aspect of Nature was influenced by 
Schelling’s nature philosophy. Subsequently, Hegel dedicated the second part of his 
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project, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, to the Philosophy of Nature. 
Reading Hegel’s notion of the Philosophy of Nature, we come to this conclusion that his 
discussions of nature are philosophical elaborations on the same doctrines one may 
come across in religion. Hegel’s philosophy of nature is a philosophical contemplation 
on the common saying “nature is the manifestation of God.” The spiritual power 
assigned to nature by Hegel refers to his evaluation of nature as a scene where the 
“Spirit,” or, according to religion, “God,” is manifested: 
 
If God is all-sufficient and lacks nothing, why does He disclose Himself in a sheer Other of 
Himself? … The Philosophy of Nature itself belongs to this path of return; for it is that 
which overcomes the division between Nature and Spirit and assures to Spirit the 
knowledge of its essence in Nature.113  
 
    Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not only a theorization of the Romantic notion of 
nature but also an explanation of the pantheist view towards nature. Hegel believed that 
religion and philosophy are similar to each other because the subject matter of the two is 
God, the Absolute Spirit. Nature, for Hegel, is the realm where the Absolute Spirit 
dwells. Investigating the characteristics of the Spirit, Hegel stated that the Spirit “shapes 
itself to the forms of Nature.” He wrote:  
 
In the immediate, first diremption of self-knowing absolute Spirit its ‘shape’ has the 
determination which belongs to immediate consciousness or to sense-certainty. Spirit 
beholds itself in the form of being, though not of the non-spiritual being that is filled with 
the contingent determination of sensation…the difference which it gives itself does, it is 
true, proliferate unchecked in the substance of existence and shapes itself to the forms of 
Nature.114 
  
The Spirit gives shape to itself in the form of Nature. Also, Nature becomes spiritual 
because of the presence of the Spirit. It should be mentioned that the term spiritual, 
besides its common designation in spiritualism, also means that which is in relation to 
the spirit.  Hence, the Hegelian perception of the subject relates it to the spiritual in two 
senses: first, the subject is spiritual because of the Romantics’ concern with spiritualism 
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that included concepts of freedom, purity, and innocence; also, most significantly, the 
subject is spiritual because of the determination of its identity by the Spirit.  
    The significance of Nature in Hegel’s notion of the subject-object identity is directly 
related to his idea of negativity in self-consciousness. The awareness of the self arises 
from the awareness of two modes of negativity: the negation of another object and of 
the objective mode of self-consciousness itself. Hegel wrote: 
 
The presentation of itself, however, in the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in 
showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached 
to any specific existence.115 
 
As for the negation of the object, Hegel believed that self-consciousness “exists only if 
being acknowledged.”116 In other words, self-consciousness negates the object in its 
self-affirmation. However, “if its [self-consciousness’s] self-affirmation demands the 
negation of the object, Quentin Lauer writes, “then the object must negate itself.”117 The 
only kind of object which can negate itself is another consciousness. Therefore, self-
consciousness in affirming itself should be related only to another consciousness. This 
can be considered as the emergence of alienation in the process of the construction of 
subject’s identity.   
   Nature is not negatively related to the subject in that its consciousness, particularly 
when conceived of as the Spirit, is unknown and absent to the subject. Nature is not 
only negated but also always present to the subject. However, although nature is not 
negated, the subject cannot be in identity with it either. Hegel believed that no subject 
could enjoy the state of complete unification with nature as the absolute. The subject-
object identity is possible only in the realm of the absolute. Hence, there always remains 
a gap between the subject and nature albeit the intense spiritual correspondence between 
Man and Nature in Romanticism.  
    The subject is thus left with a lack of that identity. Hegel’s notion of the subject-
nature non-identity provided his conception of the subject with two lacks: the lack of a 
complete state of unity with nature and the lack caused by the gap between it and 
nature. These two manifestations of lack provided the Hegelian concept of the subject 
with an incomplete character.  
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    The frequent and intense representation of nature in Romantic literature demonstrates 
the subject’s unconscious desire to reach a state of unity with nature caused by the 
subject-nature non-identity. However, the subject never can be in a state of full identity 
with nature and this is what causes the ongoing function of the desire for unity. The 
subject functions through, and is based on, these two modes of lack in its identity. The 
first lack is what the subject desires to ultimately arrive at, and the second is what 
makes the subject desire. However, as I shall refer to in my discussion of Lacan, the 
desire of unity is never fulfilled by the subject, and desire, thus, continues to be.  
    The Hegelian concept of the subject roves to be central to the exploration of the 
Althusserian and Lacanian theories of subjectivity in that both argue for the incomplete 
nature of the subject’s identity. Lacan has also been interested in the lack the subject’s 
identity is constructed over. As I shall later demonstrate, Lacan explored the problem 
through emphasizing the negativity of language. However, as for Althusser, his anti-
Hegelianism caused a limitation for his theory in that he overlooked the function of this 
lack in the ongoing subjection of the subject by ideology. Also, the alienation of the 
subject because of the determining role of the other in Hegel shall be further examined 
in my analysis of the Lacanian concepts of imaginary and linguistic alienations later in 
the thesis. 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has discussed the major features of the Cartesian and Hegelian conceptions 
of the subject with emphasis on the subject-object relation in both rationalism and 
romanticism. Considering the Cartesian subject as an objectified subject, I explored the 
certainty and centrality of Descartes’ rationalist treatment of the subject. The mind/body 
dualism in Descartes resulted in the construction of a number of modern binary 
opposition such as the subject/nature, the subject/object, and centre/margin. The 
subject-object separation as well as the superiority and centrality of the subject 
established the hierarchy of these binary oppositions in a way that the first part of them 
was considered to be superior to the ‘other.’  
    On the other hand, the Hegelian perception of the subject is based on the treatment of 
the subject-Nature identity in German Idealist philosophy. Romantic subjectivity was 
explored in German Idealist philosophy through references to the inspirational and 
spiritual character of Nature. I also demonstrated the way Schelling and Novalis’ nature 
philosophy were in congruity to the pantheist principle of Romanticism.  
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    In Hegel, however, the subject-object identity ultimately became the subject-nature 
non-identity. This non-identity with nature causes two lacks in the subject’s identity that 
are the lack of a state of complete subject-nature  identity and the lack caused by the gap 
between the subject and nature. Also, the construction of the subject based on the other 
resulted in the alienation of the subject that was later further investigated in the 
Lacanian concepts of imaginary and linguistic alienations. The Hegelian subject was 
thus provided with a feature of incompleteness because of these lacks and the 
consequent alienation. 
    As I shall outline later in the thesis, both Lacanian and Althusserian concepts of the 
subject radically criticised the humanist designations of the Cartesian subject’s 
characteristic features of certainty and centrality that resulted in the consideration of the 
subject as free and autonomous. I shall also demonstrate that the exploration of the 
subject in the identity philosophy of German idealism provided a philosophical 
background for the Lacanian notion of the subject-language identity. This approach can 
be also employed if we analyse the Althusserian model of the subject/Subject according 
to the Hegelian notion of the subject-Nature identity. Furthermore, the incompleteness 
of the subject in both Lacanian and Althusserian accounts of the term can be further 
understood through the lack that is an essential feature of the Hegelian subject. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Subject of Ideology: 
Materialization of Ideology and the ‘subject/Subject’ Non-Identity  
  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The present chapter, while examining the Althusserian reading of modern subjectivity 
and considering it as a theory on ‘the subject of ideology,’ seeks to explore the close 
affinity of the concept of ‘the structure’ with ideology. Addressing the process of the 
materialization of ideology, this chapter re-examines the Althusserian model of the 
‘subject/Subject’ based on the condition of non-identity between them. Identifying a 
theoretical problem in the Althusserian ‘the subject/the Subject’ model, this chapter thus 
argues that a Hegelian reading of this theory provides further investigation into the 
problem of the non-identity of the subject and the Subject in the Althusserian model.     
    Althusser’s academic influence reached its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s. In the past 
two decades, however, Althusser’s theoretical works have diminished in popularity and 
influence in most fields of academic debate. As Fredric Jameson mentions in the 
introduction to a recent edition of Althusser’s Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays 
(1970) [2001], “the Althusser we reread today is no longer the centre of those heated 
polemics and ideological battles that characterized the Marxisms of the 1960s and 
1970s.”118 Both the fortunes and misfortunes of Althusser’s thought should be 
considered in the context of the specific version of Marxism he sought to theorize: 
Structuralist Marxism. As I shall demonstrate in this chapter, his redefinition of the 
concept of ideology was based on a model that had close affinity with the structuralist 
wave of the middle part of the twentieth century in France.  
    The sections of the present chapter cover the following: first, I will outline 
Althusser’s conception of ‘the structure’ as a central theme in structuralist Marxism. 
This section is vital to the thesis in that it is in parallel to my discussion of Lacan’s 
structuralist approach to the analysis of the unconscious that will be presented in the 
next chapter. Secondly, studying Althusser’s efforts in redefining the concept of 
ideology, the chapter seeks to examine his viewpoints on the way the State, through its 
ideological apparatuses, constructs the subjects of/to ideology. Then, an exploration of 
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the Althusserian theory of ‘the subject of ideology’ is presented, which is in parallel to 
the Lacanian theory of ‘the subject of language.’  
    Moreover, I shall explore the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation in this 
chapter since I will attempt to draw it into dialogue with the Lacanian concept of 
linguistic alienation in the following chapter. Finally, a Hegelian analysis of the 
Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ is presented that seeks to further investigate 
the impossibility of the transition of the subject into the Subject. A Hegelian reading of 
Althusser is of high importance to the present thesis in that it could be regarded as a step 
in approaching the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic.  
 
4.2 Structuralist Marxism and the Althusserian Concept of ‘the Structure’ 
Althusser dedicated a major part of his work to rejecting the early ‘Humanist’ Marx. His 
reading of Marxism was thus dominated by an analysis of Marx’s mature works. The 
reading Althusser provided, however, included a model that had similarities with the 
structural model of the nature and mechanism of system as a structuralistic concept. 
Although major developments had already happened within Marxism by, for instance, 
the radical reworking of Marxism by members of the Frankfurt School,119 it was 
Althusser who successfully introduced a more sustained version of what is now called 
structuralist Marxism. 
    A notable study that has minutely analysed the structuralistic characteristic of 
Althusser’s work is Miriam Glucksmann’s Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary 
Social Thought: a Comparison of the Theories of Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis 
Althusser (1974). If the work of Claude Levi-Strauss is to be taken as a touchstone for a 
structuralist study, Althusserian Marxism is structuralist in that it includes resemblances 
to Levi-Strauss’s. Analyzing different cultural phenomena including mythology, kinship 
between the members of a community, and serving rituals in different cultures, Levi-
Strauss argued that culture is a self-contained system of signification the constituent 
parts of it are in direct relationship with each other. This approach to culture has 
analogies with the structuralist consideration of language that regards it as a self-
referential and self-reflective system. Glucksmann has pointed to similarities treatments 
between the theoretical views of Levi-Strauss and those of Althusser. However, as 
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Glucksmann argues, the works of these two social thinkers are different from each other 
as far as their account of history and the structure of thought is concerned.120 
    Althusser’s structural approach to Marxism was one of the most disputed discussions 
for the New Left thinkers of the 1960s. The main conflict centred on Althusser’s call for 
a re-reading of Marx based on the differences between two major phases in Marx’s 
oeuvre. This new interpretive reading, Althusser maintained, would free Marxism from 
not only its idealist origins but also from political dogmatism and humanistic 
interpretations. Accordingly, a major aspect of his work should be seen as an attempt to 
reject any Hegelian influence in Marx. Althusser sought to provide Marxism with a 
truly ‘scientific’ basis. It was Althusser’s interpretation of this aspect of Marxism that 
made him a forerunner of Marxist thought. As Simon Clarke argues, Althusserian 
interpretation became so dominant that it was no longer considered as an interpretation 
of Marxism and but as Marxism itself: 
 
At the time, it seemed that Althusserianism was merely a passing phase, a stop on the way 
to Marx himself. However the Althusserian enthusiasm has lasted just long enough to leave 
a generation who had come to read Marx through Althusser, to Substitute For Marx for 
Marx, Reading Capital for Capital.121    
 
    Marxism, in an Althusserian sense, was regarded as science and not as ideology. He 
believed that historical materialism was a science of history. He demonstrated that 
Marx’s thought had been fundamentally misunderstood in this regard. Althusser’s 
reading of Capital, Marx’s most important work according to Althusser, gave birth to a 
number of structuralist readings and redefinitions of the concepts generally used in 
Marxism. The first English translation of Reading Capital (1965) [1970] included 
essays by Althusser and his student, Étienne Balibar. This work is an inventive re-
reading of Marx’s most influential work. Althusser argued that Capital was the outcome 
of Marx’s mature thought that was markedly different from that of young ideological 
Marx. Marxism was not for Althusser an ideology or world-view but a revolutionary 
science, ultimately the science of society. Althusser believed in Marxist philosophy as 
one the three major scientific revolutions human beings have ever achieved; in the 
introduction to the English translation of For Marx (1965) [1969] he wrote: 
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I should add that, just as the foundation of mathematics by Thales ‘induced’ the birth of the 
Platonic philosophy, just as the foundation of physics by Galileo ‘induced’ the birth of 
Cartesian philosophy, etc., so the foundation of the science of history by Marx has ‘induced’ 
the birth of a new, theoretically and practically revolutionary philosophy, Marxist 
philosophy or dialectical materialism.122 
 
Althusser’s Marx was not influenced by Hegel and Feuerbach. Likewise, Marx, for 
Althusser, was not a philosopher in the tradition of German Idealism. The mature Marx, 
as Althusser argued, came out of an epistemological break that happened for Marx in 
1844-5 when he was writing his The German Idealism, a work that critically 
investigated the works of the young Hegelians, and the nature and outcomes of the long 
philosophical tradition of German Idealism. Therefore, Althusser’s Marxism was not in 
parallel to the dominant trends of Marxism of the first half of the twentieth century. 
These trends were vulgar Marxism, which included a number of young revolutionary 
poets, writers, critics, and intellectuals, and the orthodox tradition in Marxist 
philosophy. The “orthodox” tradition, as Ted Benton demonstrates in The Rise and Fall 
of Structural Marxism: Althusser and His Influence (1984), allowed only three basic 
options for philosophy that were: 
 
first, to take Marx and Engels in the German Ideology at their word, and abandon 
philosophy in favour of the science of history. A second alternative, given that historical 
materialism presents itself as science, is to abstract from the great scientific works of the 
tradition, especially Capital, their distinctive logic and methodology … third, to continue 
the tradition established in Engels’s later work on philosophy and the natural sciences.123    
    
    One of the reasons behind Althusser’s distance from the “orthodox” tradition and 
intellectual discourses of the 1970s goes back to the publication of a number of books 
that severely criticized him. The argument common to some of these books was that 
Althusser had violated the main ideas in classical Marxism and had led it towards a new 
direction that was different from its origins. A good example of these critiques is E.P. 
Thompson’s Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (1978). Thompson sought to argue for 
the following propositions: 
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     1) Althusser's epistemology is derivative from a limited kind of academic learning-process, 
and has no general validity; 2) As a result he has no category (or way of handling) 
‘experience’ (or social being's impingement upon social consciousness); ... 3) In particular he 
confuses the necessary empirical dialogue with empiricism, and consistently misrepresents 
(in the most naive ways) the practice of historical materialism (including Marx's own 
practice); 4) The resultant critique of ‘historicism’ is at certain points identical to the 
specifically anti-Marxist critique of historicism...124 
  
Thompson thus recalled for the significance of ‘socialist humanism.’ ‘historicism,’ 
‘empiricism,’ and ‘moralism’ as followed in classical Marxism. Later he proceeded to 
demonstrate that the Althusserian model was nothing less than the wildest form of 
idealism. Thompson believed that Althusser’s project was an effort to make the 
Communist Parties protected from the criticism which was coming from libertarian 
communists. Althusser, Thompson argued, ignored Marx’s concepts of alienation and 
reification and, therefore, attempted to reconstruct Marxist science as a philosophy of 
structures. Correspondingly, as for Althusser’s structuralist approach, he wrote that 
“Althusser’s structuralism, like all structuralisms, is a system of closure.”125  
    Thompson’s book, though offering new insights and considered as one of the notable 
critical readings of the Althusserian views, criticised Althusser’s emphasis on the 
theoretical practice and his academic treatment of Marxism. Thompson stated that 
Althusser enjoyed a high popularity only because of the elitism peculiar to the leftist 
middle class intelligentsia. “Isolated within intellectual enclaves,” Thompson wrote, 
“the drama of ‘theoretical practice’ may become a substitute for more difficult practical 
engagements.”126 Moreover, Althusserianism, as Thompson argued, was entirely 
compatible with recognition and promotion in the world of the colleges and universities. 
He wrote: “it allows the aspirant academic to engage in a harmless revolutionary 
psycho-drama, while at the same time pursuing a reputable and conventional intellectual 
career.”127 Thompson’s view here was obviously a reductionist evaluation of 
Althusser’s theoretical works. Althusser’s structuralist Marxism challenged this 
orthodoxy by arguing for Marx’s scientific achievement and investigating into the 
epistemological break in Marx’s thought.   
    Dealing with the epistemological break in Marx’s thought in several essays, Althusser 
specifically explored this break in “On the Young Marx” (1960), “Elements of Self-
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Criticism” (1974), and “On the Evolution of the Young Marx” (1974). However, he had 
already paved the ground for the emergence of these positions in Reading Capital 
(1965). In Reading Capital, Althusser differentiated Marx and Hegel concerning their 
attitude towards dialectics. It was in Reading Capital that Althusser, for the first time, 
criticized the common misunderstanding that had regarded Marxism as a kind of 
historicism. Correspondingly later on, while separating the thought of mature Marx 
from Feuerbach, he wrote: “between the 1844 Manuscripts and the Mature Works Marx 
discovered his definitive terminology.”128 Also, in “Elements of Self-Criticism” (1974) 
he explored “The ‘Break’” he had recognized in the process of development of Marx’s 
thought: “[W]ith The German Ideology,” Althusser argued, “something new and 
unprecedented appears in Marx’s work, something which will never disappear.”129 
Although the major subject of this essay was to criticize Marx’s own ideas regarding the 
relation between two breaks, the break in Marx’s thought and Marx’s break from 
bourgeois ideology, Althusser still had belief in the magnificent outcome of the 
epistemological break in Marx’s thought while revising a number of his early 
propositions.130  
    The “epistemological break” in Marx happened while he was transforming his early 
intellectual framework of thought to a mature theory. Mature Marx, in Althusser’s view, 
worked on what was significant for a truly Marxist philosophy: dialectical materialism. 
Althusser borrowed the concept of the epistemological break from Gaston Bachelard, 
the philosopher of science. Bachelard introduced this concept in his La Formation du 
l’esprit scientifique (1967), by which he meant a shift from non/pre-scientific ideas to 
the scientific. Using a number of other terms in the works of Gaston Bachelard 
underpins Althusser’s ‘scientific’ method in arguing for the differences between the 
mature and scientific Marx as opposed to the young and ideological Marx. Discussing 
“Marx’s scientific discovery” in his latter essay “On the Evolution of the Young Marx” 
(1974), Althusser again referred to his dichotomy of “scientific” and “ideological.” He 
presented the conclusion of his thesis on the epistemological break in Marxism in this 
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way: “the appearance of a scientific theory of History in a domain hitherto occupied by 
conceptions which I called ideological.”131 
    Another part of Althusser’s critical exploration of classical Marxism included his 
rejection of the simplistic belief in a strict economic determinism. The determining role 
of the economic was one of the most familiar theses in classical Marxism according to 
which it was the economic mode of production, the base, which determined both law 
and ideology, the superstructure. Marx’s well-known argument regarding the economic 
mode of production clearly implies the marginalization of other elements: 
 
The specific form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers, 
determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself 
and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element … it is always the direct relationship of 
the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers – a relation  always 
naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and 
thereby its social productivity – which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structural, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and 
dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state.132 
 
Marx places most emphasis on the role played by the economic mode of production in 
determining the “specific form of the state.” It is the “hidden basis of the entire social 
structural.” This thesis suffers from a one-dimensional determinism that neglects all 
other elements involved in the social formation. Engels soon recognized the weakness 
of this argument in that it might be considered as an example of absolutism in Marx’s 
framework of thought. Subsequently, he tried to defend Marx against this criticism in 
those letters he wrote after the death of Marx. In one of his letters Engels considered 
“the various elements of the superstructure” to be determining: 
 
The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure: political 
forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit, constitutions, established by the victorious 
class after a successful battle, etc; juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all these 
actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, 
religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas, also exercise their 
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influence upon the course of the historical and in many cases preponderate in determining 
their form.133 
          
Although Engels did his best to remove this theoretical inadequacy from Marxism, 
economic determinism had been already established as one of the characteristic features 
of Marxism. In fact, it was Marx’s argument in Capital that was the core of attention for 
both traditional Marxists and their critics. Althusser, too, criticized this classical Marxist 
view that called for a one-to-one relationship between economy, on one hand, and 
ideology and political system, on the other. Rejecting the simple cause and effect 
relationship between them, Althusser presented a more complex model to show the 
relationship between these components.  
    Althusser’s argument looked at each one of these components, later called by him 
‘practices,’ as relatively autonomous. The concept of “relative autonomy” was 
Althusser’s solution for this classical Marxism problem. He believed each practice in 
social formation enjoys a relative autonomy and is relatively independent from other 
practices. He expanded his views on the condition of the “practices” in his “On the 
Materialist Dialectic” (1963). This essay, later included in For Marx (1965), is one of 
the highlights in Althusser’s critical study of Marxist philosophy. Althusser dedicated 
the first part of the essay to “Practical Solution and Theoretical Problem” where he 
defined what he meant by ‘practice:’ “any process of transformation of a determinate 
given raw material into a determinate product, a transformation effected by a 
determinate human labour, using determinate means (of ‘production’).”134 In addition, 
he regarded ‘theory’ as “a specific form of practice, itself belonging to the complex 
unity of ‘social practice’ of a determinate human society.”135 Althusser thus added a 
new practice, theory, to the classic three practices, economics, politics, and ideology.  
    This argument had three results: providing a new rationale for Althusser’s high 
evaluation of Marx’s “Theoretical Revolution,” emphasizing the role played by theory 
as a practice in the social formation, and, accordingly, providing Marxism with a 
theoretical character and not with, for example, a political revolution. Althusser was, in 
consequence, criticized by traditional Marxists; they believed Althusser had violated the 
real path of Marxism that was supposed to lead to a universal proletarian revolution and 
not a theoretical practice. 
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    Althusserian structuralist Marxism was concerned with the role and interrelationship 
of the practices in what he referred to later in the same essay as “structure in 
dominance.”136 ‘Structure’ is Althusser’s term for the classical Marxist concept of the 
‘base.’ All other practices are, in Althusser’s view, part of the superstructure. Therefore, 
Althusser, instead of remaining loyal to the classical Marxist terms of base and 
superstructure, referred to them as structure and superstructure. He explained this by 
identifying economics, politics, and ideology as three ‘levels’ of practice. Whereas the 
structure includes the first level of practice, which is the economic mode of production, 
the superstructure consists of a vast number of levels of practice, the Law and ideology 
being only two of them. There is no strict base/superstructure correspondence any 
longer because the structure is determined and regulated by both the structure itself and 
the other practices. Correspondingly, each one of the practices has a relative autonomy 
and can be either determinant or determined. The economic practice, therefore, 
determined the structure and was determined by it. However, the structure was, in the 
last instance, the determinant.  
    Each practice, as a part of social formation, influences and is influenced by social 
formation as a whole. Then, social formation, in turn, influences not only the same 
practice and contradiction but also other practices and contradictions. All this functions 
in a “structured unity” and not in what classical Marxism regarded as an object. 
Althusser writes: 
 
That one contradiction dominates the others presupposes that the complexity in which it 
features is a structured unity, and that this structure implies the indicated domination-
subordination relations between the contradictions. For the domination of one contradiction 
over the others cannot, in Marxism, be the result of a contingent distribution of different 
contradictions in a collection that is regarded as an object.137 
 
What happens to a contradiction within the structured unity determines the pattern of 
dominance and subordination of all contradictions because social formation has a 
structured character. In order to demonstrate the relations between the contradictions in 
the social formation’s structure in dominance, Althusser made use of the Freudian 
concept of ‘overdeterminism.’ Freud exploited the term to explain his idea of the 
representation of the dream-thoughts in images through two psychic mechanisms, 
condensation and displacement. Althusser, on the other hand, wanted to show the 
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complex nature of the relation of the practices to each other and to the structure in 
dominance.  He used this term to show the effects of the contradictions in each practice 
on the social formation: “the reflection in contradiction itself of its conditions of 
existence, that is, of its situation in the structure in dominance of the complex whole.”138  
    One of the implied meanings of overdeterminism is that all effects in the complex 
whole arise from several causes. This concept thus rejects the old one-to-one casual 
relationship between base and superstructure. There are, Althusser maintains, a number 
of contradictions in all practices that are overdetermined in the sense that each one of 
them effects and is affected by both the structure in dominance and other practices of 
the complex whole. Overdeterminism, for this reason, was used by Althusser to show 
his critical reading of Marx’s thesis of economic determinism; it also shows Althusser’s 
structuralist method of discussing the complex relationships of the practices of social 
formation, which was accordingly called by Althusser ‘the complex whole.’     
    Moreover, Althusser was a structuralist in that he approached what he called the 
complex whole not only as a structured unity but also as determined by its structure in 
dominance. The object of study, in structuralism, is regarded as a system, and it is the 
structure of the system, the difference and relation between its units, which is analyzed. 
To investigate the relations and differences between the units of a system is the task of 
the structuralist critic. Thus Althusser argued for a structural relationship between the 
contradictions in each practice. More importantly, the economic mode of the production 
in classical Marxism was, for Althusser, the structure that is always determining at the 
last instance. This is the theory in which Marxism and structuralism meet. 
    Although Althusser always responded critically to those views that considered him a 
structuralist, his version of Marxism, as I have demonstrated, is structuralist.139 
Furthermore, Althusser comes closer to structuralism as far as his anti-humanist account 
of Marxism is concerned. Althusser’s re-reading of Marx demonstrated that Marxism 
was deeply anti-humanist in its definition of the subject. Although I will discuss 
Althusserian Marxism’s anti-humanist idea of the subject later in this study, it would 
suffice now to say that whereas the human being was at the centre of attention for 
humanism, in Marxism it was the social formation that was regarded as a whole and not 
the subject. Similarly, while the humanist tradition dealt with and believed in the 
freedom of humans, Marxism held the argument that being human is itself determined 
by, for example, the economic.         
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4.3 Materialized Ideology: A Non-Ideological Definition    
Althusser’s discussions of the concept of ideology provided a new and unorthodox 
definition of the term. This redefinition of ideology critically rejected the long-believed 
perception of the concept, from Marx onwards, as ‘a set of abstract beliefs and ideas.’ 
Althusser’s revolutionary view on ideology appeared in “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses” (1969), which is published with a number Althusser’s other essays in 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (1971).        
    Althusser’s essay consists of three major parts: “On the Reproduction of the 
Conditions of Production,” “Infrastructure and Superstructure,” and “On Ideology.” It is 
in the second part that Althusser begins to explain his concept of ideology by referring 
to the classical Marxist notion of a strict relationship between ideology as the 
superstructure and the economic mode of production as the base. Elaborating on the 
implications of “Infrastructure and Superstructure” in Marxism, Althusser pointed to 
Marx’s view on ideology as one of the levels of social formation in this way: 
 
... Marx conceived the structure of every society as constituted by ‘levels’ or ‘instances’ 
articulated by a specific determinism: the infrastructure, or economic base (the ‘unity’ of the 
productive forces and the relations of production), and the superstructure, which itself 
contains two ‘levels’ or ‘instances’: the politico-legal (law and the State) and ideology (the 
different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.)140 
   
Whereas the Marxist doctrine of economic determinism believed that it was the 
economic that determined ideology and, thus, regarded ideology as always dependent 
on the economic factor, Althusser looked at the constituent parts of, what he called the 
“complex whole” or “social whole” from another perspective. For him, ideology was a 
practice that enjoyed a relative autonomy. Hence, contrary to what was already thought 
of in Marxism, ideology affects the structure, which is Althusser’s term for the Marxist 
‘base,’ while itself being affected by the change in the structure that it has caused. This 
change would also affect the other levels of social formation in two ways: first, the 
change in ideology would influence other practices in that the complex whole is itself a 
structured unity and any change in one of its levels affects the other levels; secondly, the 
complex whole, affected by ideology, is to affect other practices because of the changes 
in its structure in dominance. Therefore, whereas classical Marxism considers ideology 
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to be ‘determined’ by the economic base, it is relatively autonomous in the Althusserian 
model.  
    Apart from this, in the same essay Althusser presented his view of the functions of 
ideology in the form of two theses. The first thesis is “ideology represents the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”141 This thesis is to some 
extent an expansion of the classical Marxist concept of ideology as ‘false 
consciousness.’  It means that ideology does not represent the real condition of 
existence; it represents our imaginary relationship to it. Therefore, ideology is the 
imaginary relation between the human consciousness and his/her world; it is imaginary 
in that it is represented to the subject by the subject’s imaginary relation to the world. 
Althusser had already mentioned that ideology was different from science in that it was 
not based on knowledge. However, it should be mentioned that ideology is different 
from science not by its falsity, but because it is the social that predominates in it and 
not, as in science, the theoretical. 
    The second thesis, which included a revolutionary proposition, argued for “the 
material existence” of ideology. The materialization of ideology is one the most 
persuasive arguments in Althusser. However, it should not be taken as an abrupt 
declaration. He had already implied such a doctrine while discussing the characteristics 
of all the levels of practice in social formation. As Tony Lovell shows in his Pictures of 
Reality: Aesthetics, Politics, Pleasure (1980), one can feel the materialization of 
ideology in the Althusser’s early works: 
 
In his substitution of this ensemble of practices, under the delegatory guidance of the 
economic, for the base/superstructure hierarchy, Althusser breaks with the dualism of 
ideas/material forces. What distinguishes one level from another is not its materiality. All 
levels are constituted by practices, and all practices are material, just as all are informed by 
ideas …  Both the ideological and the theoretical are redefined as practices which produce 
particular products and, as such, are as much material forces as are economic and political 
forces.142  
 
    It was, however, in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” that Althusser 
explicitly talked of the material existence of the ideas and ideologies. Ideology was here 
regarded as a material practice within “the material existence of an ideological 
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apparatus.” For example, concerning the existence of the ideas of a single subject’s 
belief, he stated that his belief was material because  
 
his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals 
which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatuses from which derive the 
ideas of that subject.143  
 
Althusser’s materialization of ideology was in close affinity with his conceptualization 
of ‘ideological State apparatuses.’ In the Althusserian theory, ‘State apparatus,’ which is 
a classical Marxist term, also includes a set of ‘ideological State apparatuses.’  This is 
what Althusser added to the Marxist theory of the State. He wrote: 
 
In order to advance the theory of the State it is indispensable to take into account not only 
the distinction between State power and State apparatus, but also another reality, which is 
clearly on the side of the (repressive) State apparatus, but must not be confused with it. I 
shall call this reality by its concept: the ideological State apparatuses.144  
 
Althusser referred to the Marxist concept of the State apparatus as ‘the Repressive State 
Apparatus’ since, according to Marxist theory, it contained, such apparatuses as the 
Courts, the Police, the Prisons, and the Army. On the other hand, the Ideological State 
Apparatuses included those institutions that they may first seem “distinct and 
specialized” to the observer while they are part of the State apparatus. Althusser 
provides a relatively long list of the ISAs. The Church, the School, the Family, and the 
Arts are among the ISAs, which were described by Althusser as ‘religious,’ 
‘educational,’ ‘familial,’ and ‘cultural’ ISAs respectively. 
    On the other hand, ideology gains a new significance for Althusser in his critical 
reading of Marx. That is to say that the complex whole, containing several ideologies, is 
itself determined by ideology. Thus, there are ideology and ideologies for Althusser. 
Ideologies are historical and specific; we can name them; they include, for example, 
religious ideology, intellectual ideology, political ideology, and so on. However, 
ideology is different from ideologies in that it is what governs the structured complex 
whole. It is thus structural. It is a structure with no history or end. Althusser’s attitude 
                                                 
143
 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 114. 
144
 Ibid., p. 96. 
 97
towards ideology reminds us of Lacan’s idea on the unconscious in that Althusserian 
ideology, like the Lacanian unconscious, is structural and dominates the structure.   
 
4.4 Interpellation and the Subject of Ideology 
Although the title ‘theory of the subject of ideology’ appears neither in Althusser nor in 
secondary criticism, the present section, while outlining the principles of this theory, 
considers Althusser’s ideas on the constitution of subjectivity as a theory that believes 
the subject to be predominantly the subject of ideology. The immanent relationship 
between the subject and ideology was what Althusser sought to explore in the mature 
phase of his intellectual career. In Althusser’s theory the subject in a modern capitalist 
state becomes subjected to the ideological State apparatuses.  The conditions in/through 
which an individual becomes the subject to the State are reproduced by both the 
ideological State apparatuses and the Repressive State Apparatus, which are Althusser’s 
terms for the major divisions of the classical Marxist concept of the State apparatus.  
    The last part of Althusser’s well-known essay, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses” (1969), provided an inquiry into how ideology works in order to 
reproduce both itself and its subjects. The essay, as Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle 
have demonstrated, seeks to argue for this proposition that “ideology is bound up with 
the constitution of the subject.”145 Althusser’s view of “the constitution of the subject 
was highly influential in that it critically explored both the reproduced conditions of 
becoming a subject and the role played by ideology in the constitution of the subject. 
The subject, from Althusser’s perspective, is constituted by ideology: 
 
I say: the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and 
immediately I add that the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar 
as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as 
subjects.146  
 
    He then goes on to explore how the subject becomes constituted by ideology and 
what mechanism is behind the subject’s obedience and his/her surrender to ideology. 
The argument presented here is one of Althusser’s most influential theses. Terry 
Eagleton, pointing to this theme of the essay,  writes: “How is it, the essay asks, that 
human subjects very often come to submit themselves to the dominant subjects of their 
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societies ideologies which Althusser sees as vital to maintain the power of a ruling 
class?”147  
    Although Althusser had provided an answer to this question in his early works, it was 
in this essay that he formulated the way ideology made an individual become a subject. 
Having already talked of the reproduction of the conditions of production of the subject, 
he presented his theory on the individual’s subjection in this essay in a more concrete 
way. In Althusser’s theory, individuals are born into ideology and immediately become 
subject to it. Individuals are called to participate in the practices of some particular 
ideologies that are the product of the ISAs. The subjects suppose that they have their 
own personal ideas and act according to them. However, what really happens is that 
they are “always already subjects.” The subjects do not realize their subjection to 
ideology and consider themselves to be free and independent individuals. On the 
contrary, ideology is prior to the subjects and makes them feel recognized: “you and I 
are always already subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological 
recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, 
distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects.”148  
    A major mechanism behind the individual’s subjection to ideology is what Althusser 
called interpellation. Interpellation is the process through which ideology addresses an 
individual upon its arrival to society and, in this way, makes him/her the subject to that 
ideology. The main thesis here is that “ideology interpellates individuals as subjects.” 
The way ideology makes an individual a subject happens through interpellation. It is 
through interpellation that the subjects are constituted as the effects of pre-given 
structures. Ideology, which is a pre-existing structure, interpellates the individual and 
thus constitutes him/her as a subject. Interpellation deals with the moment and process 
of recognition of interaction with ideology. This process shows how the subject 
recognizes his/her relation to reality and it is also a confirmation of the subject’s 
ideological position: 
 
I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ 
subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into 
subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called 
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interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most 
commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’149  
 
This ‘hailing’ is a call for participation in the practice of an ideology. It is through 
hailing that ideology ultimately meets its objective: “recruiting subjects from among 
individuals.”  Successful hailing occurs if the subject recognizes that the hail is really 
addressed to him/her. If a hailing is successful, the individual becomes a subject to that 
particular ideology, and hence interpellated. When the hailed individual in the street 
turns round because of the hailing of police, “he becomes a subject.” He/she turns round 
because he/she has recognized that “the hail was ‘really’ addressed” to him/her.    
    Ideology thus functions to constitute individuals as subjects. Individuals are 
interpellated primarily through the first “ideological state apparatuses” they are exposed 
to including the family, the school, and the church. These are institutions that exist 
before the entry of the individual into them. Althusser finally presents an expanded 
version of his earlier thesis. According to this developed thesis, 
 
ideology has always already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making 
it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which 
necessarily lead us to one last proposition: individuals are always-already subjects.150  
 
 Althusser, at the end of the essay, expands his views on the subject by presenting his 
classification of the subjects and the Subject. This reminds us of his idea on the 
difference between ideology and ideologies. There are ‘subjects’ and ‘the Subject’ in 
the way ‘ideologies’ and ‘Ideology’ exist. The subject is the individual who becomes 
interpellated while the Subject required by ideology; ideology, like structure, requires a 
Subject.  
    Referring to the biblical story of the dialogue between Moses and God, Althusser 
emphasizes the moment Moses was hailed by God. God hailed Moses in his name, and 
Moses replied: “It is (really) I! God says to Moses “I am what I am”. This proves God 
to be the Subject and Moses to be the subject in that he obeyed God: 
 
God thus defines himself as the Subject par excellence, he who is through himself and for 
himself (‘I am what I am’), and he who interpellates his subject, the individual subjected to 
him by his very interpellation, i.e. the individual named Moses. And Moses, interpellated-
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called by his Name, having recognized that it ‘really’ was he who was called by God, 
recognizes that he is a subject, a subject of God, a subject subjected to God, a subject 
through the Subject and subjected to the Subject.151    
 
    Therefore, there are two implications of the subject whenever the term is used: the 
subject through ideology and the subject to ideology. There also exists in this process a 
guarantee that says “every thing really is so.” Althusser thus summarized what he had 
discovered about ideology in the form of these four premises: the interpellation of 
individuals as subjects, their subjection to the Subject, the mutual recognition of 
subjects and Subject, and the absolute guarantee that every thing will be all right if the 
subjects recognize what they are and have accordingly.  
    Althusser’s perception of the way the subject is constituted is demonstrative of his 
idea of the anti-Humanist Marxism introduced in his previous works. While Humanism 
regarded the human being as free and self-conscious, for Althusser s/he is considered as 
the agent of ideology and participates in the reproduction of the conditions of his/her 
being subjected. Moreover, whereas the classical concept of the subject commemorates 
the idea of the subject being the ‘cause,’ for Althusser the subject is the ‘effect’ because 
the situation into which an individual is born precedes him/her and the subject is the 
effect of it.  Therefore, s/he as subject is “always-already interpellated.”  
     The subject is the effect of the ideological structure into which he/she is born, and by 
which s/he is immediately hailed. In both ways, being an agent and an effect, the subject 
loses its humanistic designations as autonomous, self-conscious, and free. Althusser 
rejected the humanist notion of the individual as a self-conscious and autonomous being 
whose actions could be explained in terms of personal beliefs, intentions, and 
preferences. However, Althusser’s analysis of the subject did not allow for the 
possibility of individuals resisting the process of interpellation. 
 
4.5 Critical Evaluation of the Althusserian Model of the ‘subject/Subject’: 
      A Hegelian Reading 
Althusser’s attempt to remove all Hegelian traces from Marx resulted, arguably, in a 
limitation for his theory of the subject of ideology. This limitation, frequently neglected 
in the literature available on Althusser, resulted in the lack of the exploration of the 
impossibility of the transition of the subject to the Subject and its consequences in the 
Althusserian theory. For Althusser, the subject is the individual who becomes 
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interpellated by ideology and the Subject is what is required by ideology. Althusser, 
however, did not investigate the ‘lack’ that always exists between the subject and the 
Subject. In this section I seek to explore this theoretical limitation in Althusser through 
employing a Hegelian approach. Providing a Hegelian reading of Althusser is of 
significance to the present project in that it is considered as a step in approaching the 
Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic.  
    Althusser’s theory of the subject of interpellation has attracted extensive critical 
attention. I discussed Judith Butler’s Hegelian approach in developing the Althusserian 
concept of interpellation in Chapter Two. I also referred to Slavoj Žižek’s criticism of 
the term from a psychoanalytical approach. What is noticeable here is that Žižek, too, 
attempts to develop the term through Hegelian terminology. Žižek argues that the 
Althusserian theory of interpellation is “more complex than it may seem” and considers 
some parts of this theory as “unthought.” He analyses the Althusserian concept of 
interpellation in the following way: 
 
What remains ‘unthought’ in Althusser’s theory of interpellation is thus the fact that prior to 
ideological recognition we have an intermediate moment of obscene, impenetrable 
interpellation without identification, a kind of ‘vanishing mediator’ that has to become 
invisible if the subject is to achieve symbolic identity – to accomplish the gesture of 
subjectivization. In short, the ‘unthought’ of Althusser is that there is already an uncanny 
subject that precedes the gesture of subjectivization.”152    
 
Žižek’s reference to the ‘vanishing mediator’ demonstrates his Hegelian approach to the 
analysis of the Althusserian interpellation. However, engaging Althusser’s theory of 
interpellation on several occasions in his works, Žižek explores the term, like most other 
problems, from a Lacanian perspective. For example, although Althusser acknowledged 
the influence of both Freud and Lacan in the formation of some of his ideas, Žižek 
believes that the Althusserian term of interpellation itself is an “implicit reference to 
Lacan’s thesis on a letter that ‘always arrives at its destination’” because: “the 
interpellative letter cannot miss its addressee since, on account of its ‘timeless’ 
character, it is only the addressee’s recognition-acceptance that constitutes a letter.”153     
   Similarly, a reconsideration of the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ through 
the Hegelian doctrine of the non-identity of the subject-the other can be illuminating in 
investigating the problem of the lack between the subject and the Subject. Discussing 
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his model of the ‘subject/Subject’, Althusser used the concept of the Absolute Subject, 
which is reminiscent of Hegel’s notion of the Absolute Spirit. Althusser wrote: 
 
We observe that the structure of ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in the name 
of a Utopia and Absolute Subject is speculary, i.e. a mirror-structure, and doubly speculary: 
this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its functioning. Which means 
that all ideology is centered, and the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the 
Center, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double 
mirror-connection such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject.154   
 
    Althusser was not interested in exploring the question of the impossibility of any 
meeting between the subject and the Subject. Although he mentioned that the subject 
would never become the Subject, he did not explore two serious consequences that this 
non-identity would bring to the subject: its ongoing subjection and incomplete identity. 
As I demonstrated earlier in the thesis, Ernesto Laclau has investigated the ongoing 
subjection of the subject when he is dealing with the role of ideology’s immanent lack 
in the constant political subjection of the individual.155 As for the incomplete identity of 
the subject, a Hegelian reading will further explore the Althusserian model.  
    What I want to suggest is that this limitation of the Althusserian theory of the subject 
can be removed by what he was originally critical of. The limitation in ‘the subject/the 
Subject’ model proposed by Althusser is solved by the Hegelian perception of the 
subject-object non-identity. As I demonstrated in details in Chapter Three, Hegel was 
predominantly concerned with the conditions in which the subject was in a condition of 
either identity or non-identity with the object, Nature, substance, or God. The Hegelian 
condition of the subject-object identity, known as the Absolute, was thus in close 
affinity to the Romantic notions of nature and pantheism. If pantheism meant the 
manifestation of the Spirit in Nature and, hence, the unification of the Spirit and Nature, 
the German ‘absolute idealism’ movement, too, believed in the oneness of the opposing 
concepts in the realm of the Absolute.  
    Hegel claimed that a complete identity of the subject and object is only one of the 
important and rare moments of the Absolute. As Frederick Beiser states, Hegel 
“declared that the absolute is not only the subject-object identity but the identity of 
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subject-object identity and subject-object non-identity.”156 Subsequently, although 
arguing for the existence of a condition in which there might be the subject-object 
identity, Hegel also stated that such a condition could only constitute a part of the realm 
of the Absolute.   
    The subject-object identity in Hegel bears resemblance to the Romantic subject’s 
desire of unity with Nature. In my analysis of the German idealism’s notion of nature I 
demonstrated the Romantic subject’s desire for a state of complete identity with Nature. 
This desire, as Hegel claimed, could not be fulfilled in that no subject could reach the 
state of complete unity with Nature.   
     As I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, the Hegelian conception of the Absolute 
and the pre-mirror stage in its Lacanian sense are similar in that there is a state of non-
identity in both conditions. While in Hegel this state happens between the subject and 
the Spirit, in Lacan this state comes to existence between the subject and its mother. 
There always remains a lack between the subject and Nature in Hegel, the subject and 
its mother in Lacan, and, the subject and the Subject in Althusser. Demonstrating the 
process of the interpellation of the subject by ideology, Althusser was not concerned 
with the impossibility of the full identity between the subject and the Subject. However, 
Althusser could have observed this lack in the story of Moses he referred to at the end 
of his well-known essay on Ideology, where he refers to God as the Subject: 
    Moses asked several times to see God, but when he was summoned to meet Him, he 
could not see Him and fell unconscious. What happened to Moses is reminiscent of the 
Romantic subject’s incomplete unity with nature. The Romantic subject’s desire of 
unity with Nature, represented in the Romantic poetry, was due to fail in that the 
pantheist desire of unity with Nature was never to be experienced.  Moses, too, could 
not fulfill his wishes of seeing God. Moses, the subject, can thus be characterized as an 
unfulfilled Romantic subject who could not succeed in seeing God, the Subject. 
    If we have a Hegelian treatment of the story, we will find out that the impossibility of 
seeing God by Moses originally goes back to the impossible full identity of the subject 
and the Spirit. According to Hegel, the identity of the subject and the Spirit is merely 
the identity of the subject/ the Spirit identity and the subject/the Spirit non-identity. 
Therefore, a full identity between Moses and God could not happen because of the 
ongoing non-identity at work. 
    This biblical story provides a good example of the essential difference between the 
acts of seeing and hearing. As I referred to in Chapter Two, Edmund Ortigues 
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demonstrated the differences between the significance of eye and ear in the Symbolic 
and the Imaginary in his Le discoure and le symbole (1962). Ortigues believed that 
whereas the act of hearing is in relation to the Symbolic, the act of seeing is observed in 
the realm of the Imaginary. The Symbolic is exposed to the subject in the language s/he 
hears, while the Imaginary begins when s/he sees her/his image in the mirror. 
    This difference between the acts of hearing and seeing leads us to think of the 
difference between the subject and its manifestation, that is its body. What we speak to 
in our conversations is the subject and not its body. What we are speaking to and 
hearing from is thus the subject and not the person, individual, or the body. Also, the 
predominance of the Symbolic order that is created by language further confirms the 
presence of the subject and the consequent absence of the body. 
    Moses, in his talk with God, was located only in the Symbolic in that he could not see 
God. That is to say, Moses could not see God because he was not positioned in the 
Imaginary. The gap between Moses and God can be defined as, to use the Lacanian 
terminology, the Real. The Real, that which resists being expressed in language, could 
not be touched, comprehended, and experienced. What happened to Moses was the 
Real. The subject, however, is the conveyer of all Lacanian triad orders at the same time 
whereas the Imaginary is lacking in this biblical story. Moses cannot even imagine the 
image of God when he does not see Him. What happens here is the impossibility of the 
subject/the Subject identity since one of the triad orders is missing. Towards the end of 
the story we are told that Moses falls unconscious when God manifests Itself. When he 
wakes up, God has already left the scene. 
    Furthermore, there are two lacks in the ‘subject/Subject’ model of Althusser: the lack 
in the Symbolic engendered by the negativity of language and the lack in the Subject in 
that it is not materialized and observable. While the first lack happens in language, the 
second cannot be included into the realm of language and understanding; that is why, as 
Althusser mentioned, God answers Moses’ question in this way: “I am what I am.” The 
Subject can also be conceived of as the model ideology wants its subjects to follow. The 
subjects never become the Subject in that if it happens, they are no more subjects to the 
Subject and, in turn, become the Subject. Ideology always presents a subject model to 
its subjects and this model is never completely touched by the subject. 
    What is notable is that the more a subject attempts to cope with the model, the more 
s/he is required by ideology to follow it. This is an endless chain of subjectivization. 
This mechanism acts exactly the way superego functions in its Žižekian terms: it is like 
a bank to which we can never pay off our debts. Based on this theory, the more pious 
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one is, the more fearful s/he becomes of committing sin; the more committed to 
ideology one remains, the more subjected and alienated s/he will become. 
Consequently, the subject is permanently subjected by the Subject and both mentioned 
lacks are behind this mechanism. 
    In conclusion, Althusser’s failure in theorizing the gap between the subject and the 
Subject should be considered as the result of his anti-Hegelianism. Althusser’s major 
attempt to purify Marx from Hegel is thus regarded as the major criticism of his theory 
of the subject of ideology. The Althusserian model of the ‘subject/ Subject’ needs 
reconsideration in that the impossibility of the transition of the subject into the Subject 
should be analysed through exploring the lacks that exist both in the subject and 
between the subject and the Subject. 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
Although the Althusserian concept of interpellation ultimately considers the subject as 
the subject of ideology, this theory faces challenging questions. The Althusserian 
concept of ‘the structure’ is central in that it not only determines the subjectivity of the 
subject but also the structure in dominance of the social formation. Also, Althusser’s 
redefinition of ideology, as having a material existence, proves to be in close affinity 
with ‘the structure.’  
    The preceding sections provided an investigation into the notion that ideology is also 
constituted by lack. Likewise, the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ needs re-
consideration in that the state of non-identity between the subject and the Subject should 
be examined. Althusser’s attempt to remove Hegel from his version of Marxism led to 
ignoring the lack that always exists between the subject and the Subject. A Hegelian-
Lacanian reading of this model is illuminating in removing its shortcomings in that such 
reading investigates into the character of this lack and the reasons for its permanent 
existence and ongoing function.  
    While the Althusserian concept of the subject tends to be the subject of ideology, 
Lacan’s concept of the subject, as I shall study in the next chapter, considers it as the 
subject of language. Having critically studied the Althusserian concept of ideological 
interpellation in this chapter, I shall attempt to evaluate it through the Lacanian concept 
of the linguist alienation later in the thesis. I shall also refer to the Lacanian concept of 
desire and consider it, in an Althusserian sense, ideological. Then, I will argue for the 
impossibility of a complete identity between the subject and what it desires, or between 
the subject and what ideology requires it to desire.  
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Chapter Five: 
The Subject of Language: The Unconscious, Otherness, and the 
Problem of Lack in Identity   
 
  
5.1 Introduction 
Although Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytical treatment of the subject has been variously 
referred to as ‘the subject of desire,’ ‘the subject of fantasy,’ and the subject of the triad 
orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real, the present chapter seeks to demonstrate 
that the Lacanian conception of the subject ultimately tended to consider it as ‘the 
subject of language.’ My discussion of the subject of language here is in parallel to my 
study of the Althusserian perception of the subject as the subject of ideology that was 
critically evaluated in the previous chapter. Emphasizing the negativity of language, this 
chapter investigates the formation of the lack over which the subject’s identity is 
established. The significant role played by the unconscious, language, and the Other in 
the process through which the subject is formed is thus discussed while studying 
Lacan’s parallel employment of both Jakobson’s linguistic theories and Hegel’s 
philosophical doctrines concerning the formation of subjectivity.  
    The exploration of the Lacanian perception of the subject as ‘the subject of language’ 
is central to the present thesis in that I will attempt to draw it into dialogue with the 
Althusserian concept of the subject as ‘the subject of ideology’ in the following chapter. 
In establishing the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of the 
subject I investigate both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject through 
focusing on the relationship between the subject, on one hand, and language and 
ideology, on the other hand. This chapter thus focuses on those aspects of the Lacanian 
subject that directly link it to the Symbolic and, accordingly, the language that the 
subject is exposed to. 
    Lacan’s frequently-quoted statement, “the unconscious is structured like a language,” 
will clearly be central to the development of the discussions of the present chapter; 
however, my analysis expands to include the ways in which the subject acquires 
language and the transmission of the ‘lack’ within language. I also seek to demonstrate 
that the reappearance of this lack in the Other further makes the identity of the subject 
built on lack.   
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    The present chapter includes four main sections. First, Lacan’s development of the 
Freudian theory of the unconscious is studied since there is a close affinity between the 
Lacanian conception of the unconscious and his approach to the analysis of the subject’s 
identity. Secondly, the core of the chapter is Lacan’s consideration of the subject as ‘the 
subject of language’ and the linguistic alienation of the subject. I shall discuss the 
Lacanian perception of the linguistic alienation in that I aim to compare it with the 
Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation in the following chapter. An attempt 
is made here to assess ‘the structure of the Symbolic’ through studying the significant 
role of the Other in its construction.  
    Then, the analysis of the chapter is presented that is an investigation into the problem 
of ‘lack’ in Lacan with reference to Hegel’s concept of the self-consciousness and the 
lack that permanently exists in the condition of the subject-other identity. My reading of 
Lacan’s centres on the Hegelian idea of the incomplete subject through emphasis on the 
negativity that language includes and which further establishes the subject’s identity on 
lack. Finally, the chapter, while attempting to outline the major features of the Lacanian 
subject, considers it as an ‘Anti- Cartesian Other in the Imaginary.’ 
 
5.2 The Unconscious: Freudian or Lacanian?  
Illustrating Lacan’s perception of the unconscious that was widely distinguishable from 
that of Freud, this section seeks to address the ‘structured’ and, hence, ‘ordered’ 
character of the Lacanian concept of the unconscious. I shall go through Lacan’s 
concept of the unconscious in order to demonstrate the structural affinity between the 
ordered character of the Lacanian unconscious and the structured feature of language, 
particularly with reference to Jakobson who was instrumental in Lacan’s theories on 
subjectivity and the subject’s identity.   
    Although Freud’s exploration of the unconscious provided Lacan with a thorough 
investigation into the hidden mechanism and the problematic nature of the unconscious, 
the concept was re-defined by Lacan. However, Freud’s influence was so tangible that 
Lacan, at the climax of the conflicts that gave birth to different splits in 
psychoanalytical theories, chose the title ‘Freudian’ for his newly founded Ecole 
Freudienne de Paris in 1964. Likewise, in “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’” Lacan 
declared that his major objective was to investigate “Freud’s Revolutionary Method.”157 
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Likewise, as Shoshana Felman has demonstrated, we can see “originality” not only in 
his spectacular theories but also in his “return to Freud.”158    
    Although the much quoted ‘iceberg analogy’ is the most frequent metaphor for the 
unconscious in Freudian psychoanalysis, one of the less taken but ultimately useful 
ways to investigate the unconscious is to discuss it within the context of the interaction 
between two Freudian terms: the “pleasure principle” and the “reality principle.” 
Analyzed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and expanded on in The Ego and the 
Id (1923), the concept of the “pleasure principle” was employed by Freud in his analysis 
of the nature of human mind, culture, and even civilization. Freud thus explained the 
interaction between these two principles: 
 
…what decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle. This 
principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start. There can be no 
doubt about its efficacy, and yet its programme is at loggerheads with the whole world, with 
the macrocosm as much as with the microcosm. There is no possibility of its being carried 
out through; all the regulations of the universe run counter to it.159  
 
The conflict between pleasure and reality principles was what predominantly effected, 
Freud maintained, the “developmental process of the individual.” It is this conflict and 
its ultimate consequences that form the mentality, way of life, and attitudes of the 
individual. The pleasure principle, as the name implies, is that which generally makes 
human beings feel good. This principle stands against the reality principle that drives 
what is supposedly more ‘important’ in the course of our life. Regarding such conflict 
and its role in “the development of the individual” Freud stated:  
 
In the developmental process of the individual, the programme of the pleasure principle, 
which consists in finding the satisfaction of happiness, is retained as the main aim. 
Integration in, or adaptation to, a human community appears as a scarcely avoidable 
condition which must be fulfilled before this aim of happiness can be achieved… the 
development of the individual seems to us to be a product of the interaction between two 
urges, the urge towards happiness, which we usually call ‘egoistic,’ and the urge towards 
union with others in the community, which we call ‘altruistic.’160  
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If one considers the immediate, always present and most affective consequence of the 
conflict between pleasure and reality principles, or between “egoistic” and “altruistic” 
urges, s/he will grasp a fruitful perception of what the unconscious is and how it works. 
In other words, the desire for pleasure that cannot be fulfilled because of the reality 
principle is repressed in a place in the mind that can be referred to as the unconscious 
mind. According to Freud, “under certain conditions,” a drive impulse that has faced 
resistances that seek to put it out of action “enters the state of repression.”161 One 
should note that although the unconscious is the space for the repressed wishes, it is 
partly constituted by them:  
 
      We have learnt from psychoanalysis that the process of repression essentially consists in the 
idea representing a drive being not removed or destroyed, but prevented from becoming 
conscious. We say then that it exists in an ‘unconscious’ state and we have strong evidence 
that it also remains unconsciously active, even in ways that ultimately reach consciousness, 
but let us state from the very outset that the repressed does not constitute the whole of the 
unconscious.162 
      
    The Freudian unconscious is thus like a storeroom in which we may find those parts 
of our wishes, feelings, memories, and urges that are outside of the domain called the 
conscious. This storeroom, however, is not passive and inanimate. It is alive, always 
present, energetic, and far more affective than we usually think of. Therefore, the 
unconscious domain is the place where unfulfilled desires not only dwell but also assert 
influence on our character and life. The unconscious, furthermore, is both determining 
and out of control. In other words, it is determining in the sense that it urges us towards 
the fulfillment of our repressed desires, and it is out of control in that it is manifested 
and realized beyond our conscious control. 
    Dreams are the veiled manifestation of the wish fulfillment. Like neurotic symptoms, 
dreams are the effects of compromises in our psyche between desires and the prevention 
from their realization. Dreams disobey logical principles and narrative coherence 
because they mix together the residues of immediate daily experience with the deepest 
and often most infantile wishes. The interpretation of dreams, Freud stated, was “the 
royal road” to our understanding of the unconscious. Nonetheless, we should note that 
the “Dreams are one way in which the unconscious speaks.”163  
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    In order to understand dreams we need to decode them. The decisive point here is that 
the manifest content of the dream, the part which is remembered and narrated by the 
dreamer, must be differentiated from the latent dream thoughts, which uncover the 
hidden meaning of the dream. For a psychoanalyst it is the latent meaning that really 
matters because, as Ruth L. Munroe explains in his discussion of Freud’s The 
Interpretation of Dreams: 
 
Discerning the latent meaning of the dream requires special familiarity with the language of 
the unconscious and, almost always, supplementary materials, such as the patient’s 
associations, or an intimate knowledge of the patient’s experience and way of reacting. It 
requires a dynamic theoretical orientation—that is, a capacity to perceive patterns from a 
few disjoined fragments.164    
 
    In order to explore the latent meaning of the dream Freud introduced a revolutionary 
approach to the “dream-work” in his The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). According to 
this theory dreams are supposed to function by four major mechanisms: condensation, 
displacement, representation, and secondary revision. The first two operations of the 
dreams, condensation and displacement, are of central importance to the present 
analysis in that they are the major points in Lacan’s development of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. Condensation happens when a whole set of different ideas is pressed 
and packed into one image. Condensation, therefore, operates through the fusion of 
several different elements into one.  On the other hand, displacement is that function in 
the dream-work that substitutes one image or symbol with something associated with it. 
Displacement thus means the associative substitution of one signifier in the dream for 
another.       
   The characteristics of the ‘id’ in Freud are so closely in affinity to his concept of the 
unconscious that they are also the characteristics of the unconscious in the later 
Freudian theory. The id is in charge of primitive instincts. The id’s only mission is to 
fulfill the pleasure principle. Maintaining that the id had an entirely free and fearless 
character, Freud mentioned its complete lack of anxiety in this way:   
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The id knows no precautions to ensure survival and no anxiety; or it would perhaps be more 
correct to say that, although it can produce the sensory elements of anxiety, it cannot make 
use of them.165   
 
The instinctual gratification for pleasure is the only occupation of the id. The id is 
irrational, lawless, and essentially disjoined from social and moral rules. It is the locus 
of sex, violence, and delinquency. The id is the only component of mind that is present 
from birth and does not care about reality and the needs of anyone else. An illustrated 
example here is a newly born infant. When it needs something, is hungry, or in pain, the 
need must be fulfilled otherwise it continues to cry regardless of time, place, or the wish 
of others.  
    On the other hand, Lacan’s perception of the unconscious diverges clearly from that 
of Freud. If the unconscious was, for Freud, characteristically close to id, it was, for 
Lacan, as I shall demonstrate, close to superego. Lacan had already demonstrated his 
antagonism to most of the then dominant psychoanalytic approaches in his doctoral 
dissertation, the only published work by him before Écrits (1966), entitled On Paranoid 
Psychosis in Its Relation to Personality (1932). Edith Kurzweil, while mentioning such 
conflicts, outlines the close connection between Lacan and Freud: 
 
Ever since Jacques Lacan published his doctoral thesis in 1932, [On] Paranoid Psychosis in 
its Relation to Personality, he has "reinterpreted" Freud, and has mercilessly attacked the 
medicalization of American psychoanalysis, American empiricism, behaviorism, 
psychology, scientism, and the American domination of the International Psychoanalytic 
Association. His sweeping challenges have frequently been nasty, personal; they range from 
theory to clinical practice, from culture to politics. 166 
 
Lacan, remaining faithful to Freud, broke the ground of the psychoanalytic road by 
rejecting the bureaucratically imposed convention of the International Psychoanalytical 
Association. Instead, he contributed theoretically to the development of knowledge 
concerning the still shadowy concept of the unconscious.  
    Lacan’s perception of the unconscious, which was manifestly distinguishable from 
the Freudian approach to the term, was fully developed in his 1964 seminars, later 
compiled as The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1973 [1978]). In a 
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preliminary seminar called “The Freudian Unconscious and Ours” Lacan referred to the 
work of Claude Lévi-Strauss and suggested that it was Nature that provided signifiers 
and they provided human relations with structures. Later in the seminar he mentioned 
that, before any formation of the subject, the subject was already included in the level at 
which there was counting and things were counted. This was apparent, as Lacan 
maintained, in the naive words of the little boy who declared: “I have three brothers, 
Paul, Ernest and me.” For Lacan, “he who counts is already included,” and it is only 
later that the subject has to “recognize himself as he who counts.”167 The linguistic 
structure thus gives both shape and status to the unconscious. “It is this structure,” 
Lacan wrote, “that assures us that there is, beneath the term unconscious, something 
definable, accessible and objectifiable.”168 
    Later in the same seminar Lacan contended that Freud’s followers had misunderstood 
the latter’s concept of the unconscious. “The Freudian Unconscious,” Lacan stated, “has 
nothing to do with the so-called forms of the unconscious that preceded it, not to say 
accompanied it, and which still surround it today.”169 Lacan believed that Freud’s 
concept of the unconscious included neither “the romantic unconscious of imaginative 
creation” nor “the locus of the divinities of night.” Lacan argued that Freud was 
attracted by slips of tongue in spoken sentences and the stumbled words in written 
language. Freud, in Lacan’s view, sought the unconscious in these phenomena and the 
discovery was what was produced in this gap. Towards the end of the seminar Lacan 
concluded that: 
 
Thus the unconscious is always manifested as that which vacillates in a split in the subject, 
from which emerges a discovery that Freud compares with desire—a desire that we will 
temporarily situate in the denuded metonymy of the discourse in question, where the subject 
surprises himself in some unexpected way.170 
   
    The Lacanian unconscious is formed through language acquisition that is in parallel 
to the oedipal phase. The chaotic nature of the Freudian unconscious is thus ordered by 
the acquisition of language. Lacan’s famous announcement of the unconscious that 
considered it to be structured like language appeared in his seminar entitled “Sexuality 
in the Defiles of the Signifier” (1964):  
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The unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject, it is the dimension in 
which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently 
the unconscious is structured like a language.171 
 
Lacan’s formulation of the unconscious as linguistically structured and ordered was 
later manifested also in his Écrits (1966), where he wrote:   
 
… the unconscious has the radical structure of language and that a material operates in the 
unconscious according to certain laws, which are the same laws as those discovered in the 
study of natural languages—that is, languages that are or were actually spoken.172  
 
Such close affinity between the unconscious and language was so significant in Lacan’s 
thought that he referred to it on several other occasions. For example, discussing the 
way the unconscious functions beyond our control and common mode of signification, 
Lacan, while discussing his concept of desire, mentioned the identity of the unconscious 
and language: 
 
The unconscious exists, not because there is unconscious desire, in the sense of something 
impenetrable … which emerges form the depths of all its primitiveness, in order then to 
raise itself to the higher level of consciousness. Quite the contrary, if there is desire, it is 
only because there is the unconscious, i.e., a language, whose structure and effects escape 
the subject: because at the level of language, there is always something that is beyond 
consciousness, which allows the function of desire to be situated. 173  
 
Furthermore, discussing the consideration of the symptoms in psychoanalytic 
psychopathology in his “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis,” Lacan again reminds us of the structured character of the symptom 
when he maintained that it “is itself structured like a language: a symptom is language 
from which speech must be delivered.”174     
    However, the Lacanian Symbolic also includes the Freudian superego that also 
functions like a language. The Superego knows no limit as far as its desire of finding us 
guilty is concerned. Žižek argues that: 
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The Superego draws the energy of the pressure it exerts upon the subject from the fact that 
the subject was not faithful to his desire, that he gave it up. Our sacrificing to the superego, 
our paying tribute to it, only corroborates our guilt. For that reason, our debt to the superego 
is unredeemable: the more we pay it off, the more we owe.175   
 
Hence, the superego’s endless desire for confirming our guilt, if we sacrifice to it, is like 
the endless chain of signifiers, which is made possible both in language and the 
unconscious. The structure of the superego is, too, like that of language: on one hand, it 
can be grammatical, which reminds us of our traditional view of the superego, and, on 
the other hand, it can be like a long non-grammatical sentence, which it knows no rule 
and limit. Moreover, the way the superego is established is similar to the way we master 
our native language. The regular and permanent practice of acquiring a native language 
ultimately results in the emergence of a structured superego.  
    The Lacanian treatment of the unconscious, which considered it as “structured,” was 
distinguishable from Freud’s designation of it as disordered and chaotic. However, 
Lacan’s idea on the unconscious was also different from that of Freud in another sense. 
The unconscious in its Lacanian sense constituted just another realm of the unconscious. 
Whereas the instincts of/in the unconscious come from, as Freud maintained, the innate 
id, Lacan pointed out that they were not only structured like a language but also might 
be driven by the language the subject acquired. Thus, although the id is disordered and 
chaotic, its manifestations are structured like a language.  
    Moreover, in another one of its realms the unconscious hosts the language we 
acquire. As Lacan writes at the beginning of one of his papers, he seeks to “alert 
prejudiced minds from the outset that the idea that the unconscious is merely the seat of 
the instincts may have to be reconsidered.”176 This new attitude towards the contents of 
the unconscious has been ever since instrumental to the development of the 
psychoanalytic thought. In other words, the unconscious is no longer manifested merely 
in the animal principle. It has rather a character both much closer to, and influenced by, 
language. The result of my analysis, at this point, comes close to Bruce Fink’s 
evaluation of Lacan; for Lacan, the unconscious is not only structured as a language but 
also is itself language.177  
     The crucial point, however, is that the unconscious is not only formed and structured 
by language but also its formation is in parallel to the construction of the identity of the 
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subject. Lacan’s concept of the subject of the unconscious, as Lorenzo Chiesa suggests, 
can designate two different meanings: ‘the unconscious subject’ and ‘the subject of the 
unconscious.’ “The subject of the unconscious is, for Lacan,” he writes, “both the 
unconscious subject, a psychic agency that is opposed to the agency of consciousness 
(or, better, self-consciousness), and the subject of the unconscious, the subject subjected 
to the unconscious.”178 Therefore, the subject that is subjected to the unconscious is also 
subjected to the language he/she is exposed to. I shall examine the relation of the 
subject’s identity to language, and, particularly, to language signifiers in the coming 
section. 
 
5.3 The Structure of the Symbolic: 
      The Other, Identity, and the Subject of Language 
This section attempts to outline the formation and constitution of what is called 
throughout the thesis ‘the subject of language.’ The section first seeks to examine ‘the 
structure of the Symbolic’ that is explained with reference to Lacan’s employment of 
structuralist linguistics. The present study demonstrates how Lacan’s employment of 
Jakobson’s linguistic theories in reading Freud results in the similar structure of both the 
unconscious and the Symbolic. Then, the role of the Other is investigated in the 
construction of the subject of language; this is studied through dealing with the Other 
and the structure that it creates for the subject. What is of central interest to the present 
research is that ‘the subject of language’ can be similarly treated as the subject of the 
Other; subsequently, the paradoxical relation of the subject to language will be studied: 
whereas the subject conventionally thinks that s/he owns it, s/he is actually constructed 
by it. The emerging subject thus undergoes an alienation that happens in the language 
acquisition process. The crucial point that will be addressed is that the acquisition of 
language, which is based on lack because of its negativity, results in the construction of 
a subject whose identity is thus based on lack.  
    A study of the close association between the subject and language in Lacan is crucial 
in the further exploration of the subject’s identity that I aim at analyse in parallel lines 
with the Althusserian theory of the subject of ideology in the coming chapter. As I shall 
demonstrate in the following chapter, the Symbolic in Lacan is what determines the 
structure of social formation in Althusser. Whereas I examined the Althusserian concept 
of the structure in the previous chapter, I now seek to outline the Lacanian concept of 
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the Symbolic and the correspondence between it and the subject. Also, the lack in the 
subject’s identity in the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject,’ which I critically 
investigated in the previous chapter, can be more scrutinized with reference to the 
problem of the lack over which the subject’s identity is constructed in the Lacanian 
theory of the subject. 
 
5.3.1 Language and the Structure of the Symbolic     
Lacan’s consideration of the unconscious as structured like a language demonstrates the 
influence of structuralism on his thought. Structuralism tended to approach the object of 
study as a system, be it a language, myth, or cultural phenomena. When the unconscious 
is regarded to be ‘structured,’ it means that it is a system of signs operating according to 
its particular codes of signification. The unconscious – not including the Freudian id, 
which is chaotic, lawless, and, hence, unsystematic – is regarded as a structured system 
with its own internal rules that create its self-regularity and autonomy. Ian Parker has 
argued for the significance of structuralist approaches to exploring the Symbolic as 
follows: 
 
Structuralism does help us to capture something of the nature of symbolic order as the 
overarching system of signs which includes the language we learn to be recognized as 
human and which governs social identities in culturally specific versions of the reality 
principle.179 
 
This structuralist mode of approaching the object of study is manifestly observed in the 
areas of the humanities of the mid-twentieth century. Lacan went further to argue that 
Freud was a pioneer of the then dominant structuralist’s “terrain” when he asked: “Isn’t 
it striking that Lévi-Strauss—in suggesting the involvement in myths of language 
structures and of those social laws that regulate marriage ties and kinship—is already 
conquering the very terrain in which Freud situates the unconscious?”180 Structuralism, 
in addition, played a major role in the development of Lacanian category of the 
Symbolic.  
    Language, in Saussure’s view, is nothing but a system of signs governed by its 
internal rules. While the earlier linguists had been working only on the history and 
characteristics of different languages, Saussure was interested in the study of linguistic 
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structure. “The linguist,” Saussure wrote, “must take the study of linguistic structure as 
his primary concern, and relate all other manifestations of language to it.”181 Hence, he 
coined the terms langue and parole to point to two essentially different notions of 
language: parole or speech is the individual utterance and the language used in 
performance, and langue or language system that consists of the structure, internal rules 
and those principles that enable a language to function. Whereas the earlier linguists 
mainly focused on parole, Saussure was concerned with the analysis of langue.   
    “A language as a structured system,” Saussure maintained, “is both a self-contained 
whole and a principle of classification.”182 Considering language as a “structured 
system,” Saussure argued that the words were only ‘signs’ that are made up of two 
parts: a written or spoken mark that is called signifier and the concept of and the thought 
behind this mark in our mind that is called signified. These new attitudes towards 
language met their climax when he asserted that the relation between the signifier and 
signified was arbitrary and conventional. The startling implication here was that 
meaning was relational and based on the difference between the signifiers. Therefore, it 
is the difference and the relation between and among the signifiers that is of high 
importance in structural linguistics. Emphasizing the role of the difference in the 
creation of meaning, Terence Hawkes, provides the following example: 
 
It is clear that what makes any single item ‘meaningful’ is not its own particular individual 
quality, but the difference between this quality and that of other sounds. In fact, the 
differences are systematized into ‘oppositions’ which are linked in crucial relationships. 
Thus, in English, such an established difference between the initial sound of tin and the 
initial sound of kin is what enables a different ‘meaning’ to be given to each word. 183 
 
Consequently, it is the idea of ‘difference’ and its role in making things meaningful that 
needs central attention. Structuralism, as Jeremy Hawthorne puts it, is “interested rather 
in that which makes ‘meaning’ possible than in meaning itself: even more crudely – in 
form rather than content.”184   
    Although Lacan explicitly demonstrated his homage to Saussure in his “The 
Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious,” he presented a new perspective to our 
perception of the sign, be it a word or image. He brings this interesting story in order to 
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challenge Saussure in that not only two signifiers sometimes happen to have one 
signified but also the sex of the subject determines his/her entry into the Symbolic 
order, created by language:  
 
A train arrives at a station. A little boy and a little girl, brother and sister, are seated across 
from each other in a compartment next to the outside window that provides a view of the 
station platform buildings going by as the train comes to a stop. “Look,” says the brother, 
“we’re at Ladies!” “Imbecile,” replies his sister, “Don’t you see we’re at Gentlemen.’185   
 
As observed in this story, whereas there was a signified for each signifier in Saussure, 
Lacan believed that there was not a particular and one-to-one relation between the 
signifier and the signified in that sometimes two signifiers might refer to the same thing. 
Moreover, whereas Saussure argued it was the relation between the signifier and 
signified that was behind the process of the generation of the meaning for a sign, such 
relation is considered by Lacan to happen between the signifiers. There is a changing 
movement through one signifier to another in the realm of the unconscious. These 
signifiers create the signifying chain. Thus, while in Saussure a sign is what it is 
because it is not another sign (negative differentiation), in Lacan it is the signifier that is 
what it is because it is not another signifier. Thus, as Martin Thom states: 
 
He [Lacan] rejects the Saussurean illustration of the relation existing between signifier and 
signified because it suggests to us that ‘the signifier answers to the function of representing 
the signified’. Lacan would hold, rather, that meaning springs from (metonymic and 
metaphoric) relations between signifiers. Rather than being a ‘representation’, meaning in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is a question of production.186   
 
Lacan’s argument here is closely related to Freud’s concepts of thing-presentation and 
word-presentation. Freud had already attributed the presentation of the word to the 
conscious and that of the thing to the unconscious. Hence, in order to focus on the 
Lacanian concern with the mechanism of the production of the meaning in the 
unconscious we should, as Martin Thom demonstrates, refer to language’s metonymic 
and metaphoric functions, which happen “between signifiers.” 
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    Furthermore, Lacan saw in Jakobson what proved to be revolutionary in the former’s 
development of the subject formation. Jakobson had already talked substantially of the 
“bipolar structure of language,” the ultimate function of which was to select and to 
combine the linguistic signs in “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbances” that contained Jakobson’s most influential argument in which he 
expanded his views of the “metaphoric and metonymic poles” of language. Exploring 
aphasic disturbances, he maintained that they “lie between two polar types”: 
 
Every form of aphasic disturbance consists in some impairment, more or less severe, either 
of the faculty for selection and substitution or for combination and contexture. The former 
affliction involves a deterioration of metalinguistic operations, while the latter damages the 
capacity for maintaining the hierarchy of linguistic units. The relation of similarity is 
suppressed in the former, the relation of contiguity in the latter type of aphasia. Metaphor is 
alien to the dissimilarity disorder, the metonymy to the contiguity disorder.187    
 
Language has two modes of arrangement in our verbal behaviour: the selective and the 
combinative. Jakobson considered metaphor and metonymy to be the binary opposed 
poles that carried the two-fold process of selection and combination of linguistic signs. 
Language, consisting of two vertical and horizontal axes, operates based on two 
functions: the selective function, happening in the paradigmatic axis, is close to what is 
referred to in literary terminology as metaphor, and the combinative function, 
happening in the syntagmatic axis, is almost the same as what is called metonymy. 
Metaphor is the technique of a complete substitution of a semantic unit with another 
while metonymy is the technique of placing a semantic unit in relation to another. 
Jakobson conceived of metaphor and metonymy as binary opposed poles that carried the 
two-fold process of selection and combination of linguistic signs. Therefore, in his study 
of aphasic disturbances, he argued that in the patient who suffered from dissimilarity 
disorder it was only the combinative aspect that functioned. Correspondingly, the 
selective function of language does not operate in the patient who suffers from 
contiguity disorder.   
    Importantly Jakobson referred to Freud and argued that his own findings were in 
parallel to Freud’s mode of the interpretation of dreams. However, we should note that 
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Jakobson takes both Freudian ‘displacement’ and ‘condensation’ for the metonymic 
function, and considers the metaphoric function as close to Freudian ‘identification and 
symbolism.’ This is one of the most misunderstood parts of Jakobson’s influence on 
psychoanalysis because most suggest Jakobson linked the metonymic pole of language 
to Freudian ‘displacement’ and the metaphoric pole to ‘condensation.’ Jakobson, but, 
presented the argument in another way: 
 
      A competition between both devices, metonymic and metaphoric, is manifest in any 
symbolic process, be it intrapersonal or social. Thus in an inquiry into the structure of 
dreams, the decisive question is whether the symbols and the temporal sequences used are 
based on contiguity (Freud’s metonymic ‘displacement’ and synecdochic ‘condensation’) or 
on similarity (Freud’s ‘identification and symbolism’). 188  
 
As we see in the above extract from his discussion on “the metaphoric and metonymic 
poles,” Jakobson considered the Freudian ‘displacement’ to be “metonymic” and 
‘condensation’ to be “synecdochic.” Therefore, Jakobson believed that both 
‘displacement’ and ‘condensation’ happen within the same pole—synecdoche and 
metonymy are closely related. On the other hand, he maintained that the metaphoric 
pole, the selective function of language, was close to Freudian ‘identification and 
symbolism.’  
    Lacan’s most significant work includes mingling Freud’s method of the interpretation 
of dreams with Jakobson’s structural linguistics. He analyses Freudian ‘condensation’ 
and ‘displacement’ in the light of Jakobson’s metaphoric and metonymic poles: 
 
            Verdichtung, “condensation,” is the superimposed structure of signifiers in which 
metaphor find its field; its name, condensing in itself the word Dichtung, shows the 
mechanism’s connaturality with poetry, to the extent that it envelops poetry’s own properly 
traditional function. 
   Verschiebung or “displacement”—this transfer of signification that metonymy displays is 
closer to the German term; it is presented, right from its first appearance in Freud’s work, as 
the unconscious’ best means by which to foil censorship.189  
 
However, we should note that Jakobson regarded both Freudian ‘displacement’ and 
‘condensation’ as the metonymic function, and took the metaphoric function as close to 
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Freudian ‘identification and symbolism.’ Such difference between Jakobson and 
Lacan’s consideration of Freudian terms has been overlooked by most of the scholars in 
this area. David Lodge notices the difference in a short note to Lacan’s paper.190 This is 
one of the most misunderstood parts of Jakobson’s influence on psychoanalysis in that 
he did not link the metonymic pole of language to Freudian ‘displacement’ and the 
metaphoric pole to ‘condensation’: he rather considered both Freudian terms to be 
metonymic. 
    Paying homage to Jakobson in one of the endnotes to his paper, Lacan explicitly 
talked of the high importance of linguistics to the psychoanalysts.191 Lacan’s attempt to 
re-formulate the unconscious was thus in parallel to his employment of structural 
linguistics. The close affinity between the unconscious and the Symbolic becomes more 
significant if one considers the role of language in constituting both. The Symbolic 
order opens when the subject acquires language. The unconscious is structured and 
formed when the subject acquires the subject. Therefore, language plays the 
instrumental role in both the formation of the unconscious and the construction of the 
Symbolic. As I shall demonstrate in the next section, both the unconscious and the 
Symbolic are structured through and similar to language.  
 
5.3.2 The Other and the Subject of Language 
The present section seeks to address the Lacanian perception of the subject as the 
subject of language with particular emphasis on the significance of the Other in the 
construction of the subject. Early stages of the emergence of the idea of ‘the Other’ are 
important in the formation of the subject’s subjectivity. Also, the Other appears to be 
inevitably functioning in the construction process of the subject of language in that it is 
manifested in the language exposed to the subject. 
    The other, distinguishable from the Other, is for the first time manifested to the child 
in the mirror stage. Lacan’s paper “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” 
contributed to the Sixteenth International Congress of Psychoanalysis in 1949, is his 
most well-known and significant contribution to the then small body of knowledge of 
both the development of the unconscious of the human subject and his/her recognition 
of consciousness. The paper, however, had its nucleus in one of his earlier papers 
contributed to the fourteenth Congress in 1936. Lacan here focuses on the behaviour of 
the six to eighteen-month old infant. The infant, in this stage, while looking at its image 
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in the mirror, becomes aware of, for the first time, the existence of the other. The infant 
takes its image in the mirror to be an other’s image. Having no idea of its self, the infant 
immediately comes up with a false conception based on which it imagines that the 
image it sees in the mirror is its other. The mirror stage is regarded as the first phase in 
which the idea of the other rises in the unconscious. Dedicating the beginning part of his 
paper to a discussion of Baldwin’s work, Lacan thus provides the reader with his idea 
on the mirror stage: 
 
      the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency 
to anticipation—and, for the subject caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns out 
fantasies that proceed from a fragmented image of the body to what I will call an 
“orthopedic” form of its totality—and to the finally donned armor of an alienating identity 
that will mark his entire mental development with its rigid structure.192 
 
         This small quotation suffices to demonstrate the existence here of the keywords that 
were to become a major part of Lacan’s psychoanalytic thought: internal pressure, 
anticipation, identification, fantasies, fragmented, totality, and alienating identity. 
Lacan’s style of writing should be also noted. He is cautious not to fall in the rhetorical 
trap that may lead his readers to come up with a false understanding of his ideas. For 
example, discussing the mental development of the infant when it recognizes its body as 
a totality, Lacan argues that by totality he means the “orthopedic” form of it, or naming 
the “alienating identity,” he refers to it as a “finally donned armor.”   
         The infant first becomes aware of the other and then of itself. Moreover, the idea of 
the self rises after the first phase of mirror stage when the infant experiences the other. 
A psychic phase emerges here in which the infant begins to falsify its ‘self’ simply 
because it identifies it only by and through its ‘other.’ The infant is subjected to a 
falsified conception of itself that is based not on its self but rather on the other. That is 
why what happens afterwards is, according to Lacan, the Imaginary, which is a level 
that exists in the whole course of the subject’s life  
    The mirror stage, furthermore, is instrumental in the formation of the subject. This 
stage is the first phase in which the child is separated from mother. It is interesting to 
mention that what replaces mother in the child/mother identity formula is the other. 
Afterwards, the child experiences the first moments of the recognition of him/herself as 
a separate self. It is in the Imaginary that the child shapes its self. As Jacqueline Rose 
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argues, the mirror stage is “the focus for the interdependency of image, identity and 
identification.” She writes: 
 
As a result of identifying itself with a discrete image, the child will be able to postulate a 
series of equivalencies between the objects of the surrounding world, based on the 
conviction that each has a recognizable permanence.193  
 
This is the moment when the child is developing an ego for his/her self. Immediately 
afterwards, the ego creates the ideal ego, which is both one of the manifestations of the 
superego and also an unconscious drive for the ego’s identifications with a narcissistic 
character. However, we should notice that the ideal ego is different from what Lacan 
called the “ideal-I” in his mirror stage paper. Moreover, as Mikkel Borch-Jacobson 
suggests, the terms ego ideal and ideal ego are also different in Lacan in that he 
attempted “to distinguish the ego ideal, understood as an agency for symbolic law, from 
the ideal ego, understood as an agency for imaginary captation.”194  
   The following constituent parts of the human subject come into being after the mirror 
stage: the other, ideal-I, self (I), ego, ideal ego, and superego. Although I have 
attempted to put them in chronological order, they might overlap. The infant becomes 
the subject immediately after it sees the other in the mirror. The infant recognizes itself 
for the first time because of and based on the other. Jacqueline Rose has remarked that 
the child’s image sends back to it “the message of its own subjecthood.”195 The self is, 
thus, subject to the other.  
    The Symbolic order is that which surrounds the subject; it exists before the entry of 
the subject into it. Language plays the determining role in the Symbolic order in a way 
that the unconscious mind becomes subjected to it. The infant, after becoming the 
subject in the mirror stage, is again subjected when it acquires language. While the first 
stage of the subjecthood results in the Imaginary, the second stage begins with and 
continues in the Symbolic order.  In these two stages, there are two others that come to 
existence. The other that emerges in the Imaginary is considered by Lacan as the ‘other’ 
whereas the other constructed in the Symbolic is spelled with the capitalized O: the 
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Other. The subject can be also an Other to others. It means that the subject, too, plays a 
role in the Symbolic order by which others also construct their subjectivities based on it. 
    The relation between language acquisition processes and mental development 
concerning the rise of the unconscious desires happen in the Symbolic. While the 
unconscious in the Imaginary is dealing with the demand of recognition, in the symbolic 
it is desire that the subject desires. Such desire is outside. It is the desire of the Other 
desired for us. It is present in the language of the others, the language we unconsciously 
learn when we are a child. In order to study the major role played by language in the 
mental development process of the subject an expansion of the term ‘desire’ sounds 
helpful to a great extent. Lacan in his mature “The Subversion of the Subject and the 
Dialectic of Desire” argues: 
 
Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand rips away from need, this 
margin being the one that demand—whose appeal can be unconditional only with respect to 
the Other—opens up in the guise of the possible gap need may give rise to here, because it 
has no universal satisfaction.196 
 
Thus, desire comes into being, or “take[s] shape,” after the already existing demand and 
need. ‘Demand’ is the characteristic feature of the Imaginary and ‘need’ is found in the 
Real; however, ‘desire’ rises in the Symbolic. Not to forget, the Symbolic is where the 
big Other is present and it also includes language. Thus, it is the language of the big 
Other that brings the subject desire. To demonstrate what language brings to the 
subject’s subjectivity is of great significance to the perception of the idea of the subject 
of language. The subject is subjected to this desire. The source of desire is the 
unconscious.  The unconscious in the Symbolic subjects the subject to its own desire 
that is the desire of the Other. Lacan framed the interdependence between the 
unconscious, the Other, and desire as follows: 
 
…the unconscious is (the) discourse about the Other [discours de l’Autre]…in which the de 
should be understood in the sense of the Latin de (objective determination)… but we must 
also add that man’s desire is the Other’s desire [...] in which the de provides what 
grammarians call a “subjective determination”—namely that is qua Other that man desires 
(…).197 
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    Lacan argued for the inevitable effect of the Symbolic order on the formation of the 
subjectivity. Lacan’s argument is here patriarchal in that his theory considers the 
Symbolic to be governed by the Name of the Father. This theory, moreover, regards 
language, a major constituent part of the Symbolic, to be masculine. In Lacan, the 
subject goes through a mental development in the outcome of which is the 
establishment of phallus as lack since the subject should be subjected to what Lacan 
called the law of the “Name-of-the-Father,” which is manifestly patriarchal. 
Subsequently, there emerged a number of critiques of the Lacanian theory of the 
Symbolic.198  
    The term ‘the subject of language’ needs more elaboration in that a number of terms 
such as ‘the subject of desire’ and ‘the subject of fantasy’ are usually employed in the 
literature available on Lacan and his psychoanalytic thought.199 First, the process of 
child language acquisition is instrumental in the transformation of the child as the 
mother’s object of desire to the subject. In other words, after the mirror stage it is 
language that is chiefly responsible for shattering mother/child identity. Language is of 
great concern to Lacan when he discusses the construction of the subject’s identity. The 
subject is now in the Symbolic order that is provided and determined by language. 
    Secondly, the way the child acquires language affects both the rise and formation of 
the superego. It is the process of the formation of the superego that plays a major role in 
the way the subject’s unconscious operates. Language is thus in close association with 
the superego. 
    Thirdly, the establishment of the other in the unconscious happens when the subject is 
exposed to the Symbolic through language. The subject, from this view, is a subject of 
language in that not only its unconscious is structured through language acquisition but 
also the Symbolic exposed to him/her is itself regulated by language.     
    Finally, the term ‘the subject of language’ has been employed throughout the thesis in 
that, as I shall emphasize in the following chapter, language contains a number of 
signifiers that, as argued by Lacan, play a decisive role in the formation of the 
unconscious and, hence, the identity of the subject. These signifiers, that I will refer to 
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in the following chapter as ideological signifiers, act as the subject’s object of desire in 
the whole course of the subject’s life. The term ‘ideological signifier’ is crucial to my 
coming analysis of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic in the next chapter in that it 
includes designations from both Lacanian theory of the subject of language and the 
Althusserian conception of the subject of ideology. 
 
5.3.3 Lack in the Identity of the Subject 
Exploring the ‘lack’ in the unconscious, the Other, and desire, in what follows I seek to 
investigate the ultimate constitutive lack over which the identity of the subject is 
established. However, the main argument of this section is that the lack in the subject’s 
identity, while created by language, is also negated by it. Therefore, an investigation 
into the close affinity between the subject and the identity language constructs is crucial 
in establishing the core of Lacanian subjectivity that I will draw into dialogue with the 
Althusserian subject of ideology in the following chapter. 
    What makes the unconscious, the Other, and desire different from what they appear 
to be is that they share a common feature: they are based on lack. As far as the lack in 
the unconscious is concerned, Lacan argued that the unconscious had a “pre-
ontological” gap. The gap of the unconscious is made when the idea of the other rises. It 
is more shaped when the big Other emerges. The Other is itself a gap in which it is 
never fully experienced by the subject. The other, desire, and even objects of desire 
always remain distant from the subject. Žižek provides us a good analogy in this 
respect: 
 
The great counterpoint to quantum physics, Einstein’s theory of relativity, also offers 
unexpected parallels with Lacanian theory. The starting point of the theory of relativity is 
the strange fact that, for every observer, no matter in what direction and how fast he moves, 
light moves at the same speed; in an analogous way, for Lacan, no matter whether the 
desiring subject approaches or runs from his objects of desire, this object seems to remain at 
the same distance from him.200  
 
    As for desire, there is always misrecognition of fullness in desire. Lacan argues that 
when somebody makes her/his fantasy version of reality, s/he creates coordinate for 
her/his desire. It means that s/he positions her/himself, her/his objects of desire and the 
relation between them. Desires hence are based on lack. It is this loss in desire that is 
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the cause for our permanent desire of desiring. Hence, the concept of ‘lost desire’ in 
Lacan does not mean that desire is lost and one should go to find it; rather, it means that 
desire exists in the unconscious and one seeks to touch it but it is not only based on lack 
but also never fully touched.  
    To bring another example, it will be interesting to compare the lack in the 
unconscious, desire, and the Other to the open space within the letter O. It exists but 
never completely touched. This figure of the open space within the letter O is exactly 
like the object of desire in the unconscious. It exists but it cannot be touched. It is this 
loss the subject is searching to find and seeking to experience in the whole course of 
his/her life. Another interesting example is the act of sex, in which although the male 
subject is filling a gap, both male and female subjects are really filling their unconscious 
gaps through it. The sexual desire never ends; therefore, lack is never removed. Hence, 
the Lacanian formula that ‘the real is the impossible’ is employed to describe that which 
is lacking in the symbolic order. The real is that which may be approached, but never 
grasped. 
    Lacan was particularly interested in those moments and instances that further 
demonstrate the lack within the realm of the three orders the subject dwells. For 
example, his discussion of ‘suture’ at the end of the seminar of “What is a Picture?” 
clearly refers to another instance of lack that is resulted because of the gap between the 
symbolic and the imaginary. According to him, suture is “a conjunction of the 
imaginary and the symbolic.”201 Here Lacan refers to the sharp distinction between 
seeing and the gaze that the subject experiences. Suture is a dialectic of the two, one that 
brings together both the imaginary and the symbolic. Jacques-Alain Miller has further 
analysed this Lacanian term maintaining that it is “the relation of the subject to the 
chain of its discourse.”202 “In order to grasp suture,” Miller writes, “we must cut across 
what a discourse makes explicit of itself, and distinguish from its meaning, its letter.” 
Miller’s definition points to the lack that happens within the realm of the symbolic order 
and is produced when the subject experiences the gap between the imaginary and the 
symbolic in his/her different acts of seeing and the gaze. 
    Moreover, the Other, the unconscious, and desire are also based on lack since they 
are formed and constituted by language, itself characterised by lack. In addition, Lack of 
the mother for the newly emergent subject is going to shatter the state of mother/infant 
                                                 
201
 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of the 
Psychoanalysis, p. 118. 
202
 Jacques-Alain Miller, “Suture (Elements of the Logic of the Signifier),” Screen, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 
1977- 78), p. 25.    
 128
identity that once, in the Real, it enjoyed. It was first in the mirror stage that the infant, 
because of the other and the consequent construction of its self, contributed to the 
deterioration of the identity state it enjoyed. When language is acquired, the subject 
soon enters the state of mother/subject non-identity that gives rise to the subject/other 
supposed identity. Consequently, the subject will be involved in a number of 
identifications, the ideal ego, the model for the subject’s narcissistic manifestations, 
being one of the first. Thus, acquiring language and the disunity of infant mother are 
two other major reasons for the emergence of lack in the identity of the subject.   
    Lack, however, is negated via language. If there is lack in the Other, desire, and the 
unconscious, it is language that negates it and makes it present. The Freudian ‘fort-da 
game’ is a good example. Closely related to the function of language for the subject, 
‘fort-da game’ provides an ingenious example of the role of language in creating 
‘presence’ for the newly-formed subject when it encounters the idea of ‘absence’. In 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) Freud narrated a story about his grandson playing 
while his mother is away from home. Whenever the child threw away a wooden reel, he 
uttered the German fort, which means “gone” or “far.” The child really said ‘o’ by 
which he meant fort. Whenever he made it reappear, since the reel had a string attached 
to it, he happily said da. This common happening was to be interpreted by Freud as the 
moment when the child enters human culture. In other words, the child begins to speak; 
that is to say that he is entering the Symbolic. But what is highly important is that Freud 
recognized that the child was doing so whenever his mother was not at home. 
    Although the observation of this game has given vein to several different 
interpretations,203 what is of high significance to the present discussion is that the 
absence of the mother was to be negated by the presence of language. Freud in his 
“Negation” paper of 1925 argued that there was a dialectical relationship between 
presence and absence on one hand, and confirmation and negation, on the other. He 
wrote: “the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, 
on condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is 
repressed.”204 Hence, the child was confirming the absence of his mother by negating 
her presence. The absence of the mother led to her presence for the child via language. 
In the Symbolic the non-present becomes present by negation. Furthermore, as we see, 
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two major language functions happen here. The selective function operates when the 
absence of the reel is substituted by the word, fort (not to forget that the mother is also 
gone), and the combinative acts when both separate fort and da are uttered as fort da. 
Therefore, although the other or the reel is not present, they are manifested for the 
subject in the word fort. This is what language does for the subject: making present 
whatever is not present. 
     In language, too, there are a number of signifiers the subject seeks to identify 
him/herself with.205 The identity between the subject and these lacking signifiers are 
taken as a remedy in that it functions, at least as far as the state of ‘identity’ is merely 
concerned, like the original identity the infant had with its mother when it was born.  
    The most famous signifier of lack for Lacanian psychoanalysis is the phallus; while 
both phallus and penis stood the same for Freud, Lacan refers to phallus as an effective 
signifier in the unconscious, which is responsible for both lack and sexual difference. 
Phallus dwells in the unconscious and it is not the male sexual organ. The subject’s 
unconscious and desire are both based on the most significant lack that is the absence of 
the phallus. This lack is to play the most significant role in life. The subject’s desire of 
identification with someone or something is under the impact of such lack.  It is the fear 
of its lack in the phallic phase that creates its lack in the unconscious when the subject 
faces threats of castration. The Phallus is, as Lacan shows, a ‘privileged’ signifier in 
that: 
 
One could say that this signifier is chosen as the most salient of what can be grasped in 
sexual intercourse […] as real, as well as the most symbolic, in the literal (typographical) 
sense of the term, since it is equivalent in intercourse to the (logical) copula. One could say 
that, by virtue of its turgidity, it is the image of the vital flow as it is transmitted in 
generation. 206   
 
The subject goes through a mental development in the outcome of which is the 
establishment of phallus as lack since the subject should be subjected to what Lacan 
called the law of the “Name-of-the-Father.” Language acquisition is nothing but 
submission to the rules of language. Becoming a speaking subject, s/he is subjected to 
the rules of the language. Thus, the Name-of-the-Father law is also the big Other.  
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   The desire to reach a state of complete union between the subject and the non-present 
concepts that are present in language comes from the very language the subject 
acquires. These signifiers once supposedly filled the unconscious gap for the subject in 
the phallic phase. Lacan employed the term ‘alienation’ for the process in which the 
subject faces and identifies him/herself with small and big Others; correspondingly, two 
different modes of alienation happens: imaginary alienation that is the result of the 
subject’s identification with the small other in the mirror stage and linguistic alienation 
that happens when the subject is exposed to the big Other. Therefore, as Lacan argues, a 
“twofold alienation” happens to the subject. Lacan thus referred to the other and the 
Other that cause two different modes of alienation in the third series of his seminars: 
 
There is the other as imaginary. It’s here in the imaginary relation with the other that 
traditional Selbst-Bewusstsein or self-consciousness is instituted....There is also the Other 
who speaks from my place, apparently, this Other who is within me. This is an Other of a 
totally different nature from the other, my counterpart.207 
  
Alienation is one of the major characteristics of the Lacanian subject. Linguistic 
alienation happens when the subject enters the symbolic; that is, when he/she acquires 
language. The emerging subject is alienated in that he/she has not been the main cause 
behind the construction of his/her identity. Instead, the subject’s identity is the result of 
his/her identification with the signifiers. It is these signifiers that form the subjectivity, 
and thus determine the future identity, of the subject. The Lacanian subject is the subject 
of the language he/she is exposed to in the Symbolic. The subject, from this point of 
view, seeks to remain identical to language signifiers, as he/she began to try to do so 
when s/he leaned language, but he/she can never experience the state of full identity 
between him/herself and those signifiers. In all his/her life, the subject attempts to fulfill 
this desire. However, the desire is never fulfilled and the gap is never filled.  
    Desire of the Other in the Symbolic, which is manifested in the alienation process, is 
behind the formation of the subject’s identity and his/her attitude towards the identity of 
the other.  The subject does not exist in the pre-mirror stage since the infant feels no 
other. What happens in the complete mother/infant identity is the Real. There is no loss, 
no language, and no others in the realm of the Real. There is only fullness. The Real is 
also the manifestation of complete identity with nature. My earlier discussions on 
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Hegel’s concepts of the absolute and the subject-object identity along with the Romantic 
subject’s obsession with nature can be illuminating in a better understanding of the 
Real.  
    Experiencing a gap between him/herself and his/her mother in the language 
acquisition phase, the subject seeks to fill the gap by unconsciously clinging him/herself 
to a number of signifiers. Language thus is predominantly responsible for not only 
filling the gap that has occurred because of infant/mother non-identity, but also because 
it is based on lack. In other words, lack is filled by lack. The first lack is not touched. 
The second lack is responsible for the new identity of the subject and is negated by 
language. Whereas the first lack belongs to the realm of the Real, the second is 
constitutive of the Symbolic. 
 
5.4 Identification of/with the Other: 
      Self-Consciousness and Lack in Lacan’s Hegel   
Although Hegel’s exploration of the way in which the subject recognizes his/her 
consciousness provides an important philosophical background for any discussions of 
the subject/the other relationship, this section aims to argue for the influence of another 
aspect of Hegel’s philosophy on Lacan’s psychoanalysis that has been often overlooked 
by the Lacanian scholars. Dealing first with the idea of the other in Hegel and its 
influence on Lacan, I will thus attempt to demonstrate the similar aspects between 
Hegel’s idea on the rare moment of a full subject-object identity and Lacan’s idea on the 
impossibility of subject-desire complete unification. The study of Hegel’s concept of the 
absolute Spirit can be illuminating in the perception of Lacan’s idea on the way the 
subject becomes aware of his/her identity.  
    Elaborating on the relevance of the Romantic subject’s desire to be in identity with 
nature to Hegel’s idea on nature earlier in the present study, I also referred to Hegel’s 
theory of the absolute Spirit and his view towards the Absolute. As it is known, there is 
a sharp difference between the absolute and the subject concerning their being and the 
way they are. Therefore, in order to discuss what the subject is it would be of great help 
if one refers to the definition of the absolute.    
    Hegel never presented an explicit definition of the term for ‘the absolute’ was 
regarded as the subject of both philosophy and religion. The absolute, in Hegel, tended 
to be synonymous with such terms including God, nature, or the Spinozan ‘substance.’ 
In addition, the definition provided by Schelling seems to be illuminating here. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, there are differences between Hegel and Schelling 
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regarding the definition of the subject; however, the definition provided by Schelling of 
‘the absolute’ played an important role in Hegel’s perception of both the subject and his 
self-consciousness. Schelling argued that the absolute was “that which is in itself and 
through itself.” He further stated that the absolute was “that whose existence is not 
determined through some other thing.”208  
    Therefore, if the existence of the absolute “is not determined through some other 
thing,” the subject must be and is that whose existence is determined through some 
other thing. The “other thing” for the subject, is, in Hegel, nothing but another subject. 
The subject is that which is not in itself. Accordingly, we come to this conclusion that 
the subject is that whose existence is determined by another subject. In other words, the 
subject’s perception of his/her being is made by the other subject. As Hegel articulated 
on the subject’s perception and awareness of him/herself: 
 
Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside of itself. 
This has a double significance. First, it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other 
being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it doesn’t regard the other as 
essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.209 
 
Hegel’s dialectical mode of philosophy manifests itself again. It is the dialectic between 
the self and the other that creates the self-consciousness of both of them. Such an 
argument is the opposite of what was earlier thought of the subject’s recognition of 
his/her self-consciousness. Whereas the ego-centred philosophers, particularly 
Descartes, had already emphasized the central role of the rational ego in the subject’s 
self-consciousness, Hegel believed that the subject both “finds itself as an other being” 
and “sees its own self in the other.” As Wilfred Ver Eecke suggests: 
 
Hegel points out that to “come outside of” oneself in order to see another as a self-
consciousness means two things. It means that the other is not constituted as another self-
consciousness. The other is only constituted as a projection of the self-consciousness that 
the first consciousness has not yet become aware of in itself … Hegel also points out that to 
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“come outside” means that the first does not know itself, but on the contarary it has falsely 
discovered itself in another being and therefore has found itself as another being.210 
 
     On the other hand, Lacan’s theory on the subject’s grasp of his/her identity in the 
mirror stage, too, emphasizes the role of the ‘other’ in the construction of the subject’s 
identity. Lacan was informed of the significance of this part of Hegel’s philosophy 
when he attended Alexandre Kojève’s seminars in the 1930s. Kojève is considered, 
along with Hippolyte, as key in introducing Hegel’s philosophy to twentieth-century 
French intellectual thought. A materialist philosopher, Kojève was, in his readings of 
Hegel, influenced by existential phenomenology. Kojève was interested in Hegel’s idea 
on the subject’s process of being recognized through the eyes of the ‘other’ that would 
ultimately lead to the recognition of self-consciousness.  
    Hegel’s “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and 
Bondage,” from which the above extract was quoted, contains an imaginary story about 
the moment the subject obtains his self-consciousness. This frequently narrated tale, 
called the ‘Master/Slave dialectic,’ is employed in order to clarify Hegel’s view of self-
consciousness. The Master and the Slave are two subjects whose existence is dependent 
on each other. In other words, the Master remains a master as far as there is a Slave, and 
vice versa. Therefore, the Master, in the recognition of his self-consciousness needs an 
other subject that finds itself in the character of the Salve. The Slave, too, recognizes 
himself as a slave when an other subject, the Master, exists. Thus, the emergence of the 
subjectivity of one of them is pre-conditioned with the existence of the other 
subjectivity.  
    It was the dialectic between Master and Slave and its ultimate result that was of high 
significance for Kojève. The looser in the Master/Slave relation is ultimately the Master 
in that he identifies himself only through the Slave, and therefore, he is not, as we might 
think, free. The Slave, on the other hand, while gaining recognition from the Master, is 
not dependent on him since he has already another source of self-affirmation, which is 
his work. It is the Slave that becomes free now. Subsequently, we have a reversal of 
roles; the Master becomes the Slave, and the Slave becomes the Master. Kojève was 
particularly interested in this part of the story:  
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If man is nothing but his becoming, if his human existence in space is his existence in time 
or as time, if the revealed human reality is nothing but universal history, that history must 
be the history of the interaction between Mastery and Slavery: the historical ‘dialectic’ is 
the ‘dialectic’ of Master and Slave.211 
 
Therefore, according to Kojève, the subject’s desire for recognition in the subject-other 
dialectic, illustrated in Hegel as the Master/Slave dialectic, is manifested in the 
historical dialectic, one that creates history. It means that it is a dialectic that is 
operating in all human relations as well as revealing “human reality.” Being either the 
Master or the Slave, the subject may change in the course of time; it is through, and 
because of, this change that history proceeds. The manifestation of this dialectic is 
observed in most of human conditions such as the subject/the other, mother/infant, and 
even lover/beloved relations. Lacan developed such relations through elaborating 
Hegel’s thought:  
 
The subject’s desire can only be confirmed in this relation through competition, through an 
absolute rivalry with the other, in view of the object towards which it is directed. And each 
time we get close, in a given subject, to this primitive alienation, the most radical aggression 
arises – the desire for the disappearance of the other in so far as he supports the subject’s 
desire.212 
 
    Hegel’s emphasis on the role played by the other in the process of the emergence of 
the self-consciousness on the subject provided Lacan with an insight into the role of the 
image for the subject in the mirror stage. Furthermore, whereas Kojève considered 
Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic as the historical dialectic, Lacan not only discussed the 
way the subject becomes the subject of desire for the other but also dealt with the 
aggression emergent in the subject while the subject’s desire is confirmed by 
competition or rivalry with the other.  
    The other part of Hegel’s philosophical system that is of significance for investigating 
the lack in the identity of the subject is his ideas on the subject/object non-identity. 
Although there are similar treatments here by both Hegel and Lacan, this aspect of 
Hegel’s mark on Lacan is often neglected in the studies in this area. As I discussed 
earlier, Hegel’s ultimate estimate of the possibility of the subject-object identity, which 
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was under the partial influence of Schelling, seems to be like pantheism. Whereas 
pantheism’s only aim was to reach the state of complete unification between the creator 
and the created, German Idealism, too, believed in oneness of the opposing concepts in 
the realm of the absolute.  
    Consequently, although Hegel argued for the existence of the state in which there is a 
subject-object non-identity, he later came to this conclusion that such a state, only if 
identical with its opposite that is subject-object identity, could constitute part of the 
realm of the absolute that the subject was able to experience. Hegelian notions of the 
absolute are in close affinity with the Romantic doctrine of pantheism. If the Hegelian 
concept of the absolute brings together the subject and object in an identical sense, the 
originally theological Romantic doctrine of pantheism deals with the oneness of nature, 
the creator, and man, the created; it also points to the oneness of God, the creator, and 
nature, the created. The subject-object identity, if we think of the object as nature and of 
the subject as human being, is possible only in the realm of the absolute. However, 
Hegel and Schelling believed that no subject could enjoy the state of complete 
unification with nature or the absolute. The subject-object identity is possible only in the 
realm of the absolute.   
    Whereas I have so far discussed the influence of Hegel on Lacan, Slavoj Žižek 
elaborates the relationship in the opposite direction; he attempts to read Hegel through 
Lacan. For instance, in The Metastases of Enjoyment, he dedicates a part of the 
discussion to read Hegelian ‘substance as subject’ according to the Lacanian concept of 
the subject. Moreover, towards the end of the book he answers the imaginary 
interviewer’s questions regarding the relation between Hegel and Lacan. Žižek’s 
elaboration on Hegel’s idea on “the passage of consciousness to self-consciousness” 
reminds the reader of Lacan’s view regarding mental developments and, particularly, 
the notion of the construction of an independent, self-contained ego. He argues: 
 
The passage of consciousness to self-consciousness thus involves a kind of failed encounter: 
at the very moment when consciousness endeavours to establish itself as ‘full’ 
consciousness of its object, when it endeavours to pass from the confused foreboding of its 
content to its clear representation, it suddenly finds itself within self-consciousness – that is 
to say, it finds itself compelled to perform an act of reflection, and to take note of its own 
activity as opposed to the object.213     
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    As for Lacan, the subject goes through a number of phases before becoming exposed 
to the Symbolic; there emerges, from the beginning, a false perception of such concepts 
as self, rational cogito, and ego. Moreover, the identity of the subject and a number of 
others in the Symbolic is almost impossible. Any attempt to reach a state of complete 
union between the subject and those other signifiers is itself a desire that comes from 
and is made by the other. This desire is almost lost since it exists only in language, and, 
furthermore, it has been immediately repressed. The subject, in Lacanian terms, seeks to 
identify him/herself with a number of signifiers in the language that he/she acquires 
when he/she, for the first time, experiences the state of diversity from his/her mother. In 
all his/her life, the subject attempts to reach a state of complete unification and identity 
between him/herself and those signifiers that once, when he/she acquired language, 
filled the unconscious gap for him/her; this gap came into existence because of the 
deterioration of the unity of the mother and child. However, although the newly born 
baby is in a state of complete union and identity with its mother, we should not forget 
that it has not become a subject yet.  
    There rises a lack when the mother/infant non-identity is to be replaced by language 
that is also based on lack because of the negating feature of language. Interestingly, the 
lack is replaced and supposedly filled by lack. What can solve the problem is that these 
two processes happen simultaneously and they are in the form of one unified lack. 
Whereas the first lack is not experience by the subject, the second lack, filled by 
language, is responsible for the constructed identity of the subject.  The subject thus 
forever carries a lack of full identity between itself and the mother, nature, God, 
substance, or the other be it language or ideology.  
    The subject-Nature non-identity in Hegel, which is, as demonstrated above, similar to 
the subject-mother unity in Lacan, causes a lack in identity in that it makes it 
incomplete. There is always a lack in the subject that causes this incompleteness and, in 
turn, there is always a lack caused by this incompleteness. Thus, there can never be a 
full identification of/with the Other. The subject-Nature non-identity in Hegel is thus in 
parallel to the subject-Other incomplete identification in Lacan.  
    This conclusion is central to my analysis of the problems emerging in the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic in the following chapter in that if one can also apply a Hegelian 
approach to the Althusserian theory of the subject, what I sought to present in the 
previous chapter, then the Lacanian and Althusserian theories can be converged 
regardless of Althusser’s non-Hegelian reading of his version of Marxism. In addition, 
both theories have been thus demonstrated as Hegelian in their treatment of the subject. 
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Therefore, referring to Hegel on both occasions is of high significance to what the 
present thesis seeks to present: the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the 
analysis of the subjectivity. 
 
5.5 The Lacanian Subject: 
      An Anti-Cartesian Other in the Imaginary 
The idea of the ‘Lacanian subject’ provides an understanding of the subject that is not 
only different from but also in manifest opposition to the Cartesian subject. Whereas the 
Cartesian subject believed in the coherence, certainty, and centrality of himself, the 
Lacanian subject is a split and de-centred subject that is driven by the contradictory 
parts, orders and drives of his/her unconscious.  
    It was Freud who for the first time theoretically damaged the modern subject’s 
illusion of free will, unity, and a rational ego. Lacan, too, contributed to Freud’s attitude 
towards the human subject by expressing his revolutionary mirror stage theory 
according to which the subject, from the very beginning, constructs an imaginary and, 
thus, not true concept of his/her own self. The Lacanian subject is also similar to the 
Freudian subject particularly as far as the idea of the mental fragmentariness and 
instability of the subject is concerned. 
    Such a falsified notion of the self is also in contradiction with the Cartesian subject in 
that while Descartes considered self in terms of its free and decision-making character, 
the Lacanian subject is not free; he/she is subject to the Symbolic, and thus subject to 
language he/she learns in the phallic phase. This is Lacan’s most severe critique of the 
liberal-humanist post-Renaissance doctrine of the human subject as autonomous, 
consciously coherent, and free. The Lacanian subject, on the other hand, is not only 
determined but also subject to the Symbolic order. It is driven and determined not by 
his/her rational ego but by, for example, the Other’s desire when he/she enters the 
Symbolic and learns language. 
    Lacan was highly critical of the Cartesian subject’s assured confirmation of himself 
as a rational and existing cogito because of its act of thinking. He frequently repeated 
this criticism in his papers and seminars. For example, immediately after presenting his 
vague formulas on the mechanism by which the unconscious operates, Lacan once more 
refers to Descartes and his famous “I think, therefore, I am:” 
 
“I am thinking, therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum) is not simply the formulation in which the 
link between the transparence of the transcendental subject and his existential affirmation is 
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constituted, at the historical apex of reflection on the conditions of science. Perhaps I am 
only object and mechanism (and so nothing more than phenomena), but assuredly insofar as 
I think so, I am—absolutely.214  
 
Lacan presented his critical reading of ‘cogito’ and believed that the main difference 
between Descartes and Freud begins with their different usage of the word. Freud’s term 
for ‘cogitatio’ was ‘psychical’ that did not mean consciousness whereas the term came 
close to such meaning in Descartes.  
    In a seminar entitled “Of the Subject of Certainty” Lacan first stated that “Freud’s 
method was Cartesian”; however, immediately afterwards he mentioned that it was only 
“in the sense that he sets out from the basis of the subject of certainty.”215 After 
elaborating on the question ‘of what can one be certain?’ Lacan analyzed Descartes’ 
cogito argument in this way: 
 
Descartes tells us—By virtue of the fact that I doubt, I am sure that I think, and—I would 
say, to stick to a formula that is no more prudent than this, but which will save us from 
getting caught up in the cogito, the I think—by virtue of thinking, I am. ... in avoiding the I 
think, I avoid the discussion that results from the fact that this I think, for us, certainly cannot 
be detached from the fact that he can formulate it only by saying it to us, implicitly—a fact 
that he forgets.216 
 
Then, Lacan pointed to the differences between the Cartesian and Freudian concepts of 
the subject of certainty. Mentioning that Freud declared the certainty of the 
unconscious, Lacan believed that Descartes had to re-assure himself about whose 
existence he had just re-assured himself because there was always “an Other that is not 
deceptive, and which shall, into the bargain, guarantee by its very existence the bases of 
truth.”217 Towards the end of the seminar Lacan thus concluded: 
 
Descartes did not know, except that it involved the subject of a certainty and the rejection of 
all previous knowledge—but we know, thanks to Freud, that the subject of the unconscious 
manifests itself, that it thinks before it attains certainty.218   
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    Lacan’s criticism of the Cartesian subject has been critically investigated in a number 
of recent readings. One of the most critical readings of Lacan is that provided by Alain 
Badiou who, aware of the significant influence of Lacanian psychoanalysis, refers to it 
in the introduction to his Being and Event as one of the major trends in the “global state 
of philosophy.”219 However, Badiou does not apply a strictly structuralist treatment of 
the philosophical problems, and he is not interested in the Lacanian and Althusserian 
anti-humanist doctrines such criticising the possibility of metaphysics and replacing 
ontology for structuralist concerns. Whereas the subject in Lacan tends to be the subject 
of the unconscious, for Badiou the subject is conscious in its in its engagement in the 
acts of decision and fidelity. In the last ‘meditation’ of Being and Event entitled 
‘Descates/Lacan,’ Badiou argues that Lacan is categorized in the Cartesian epoch of 
science in that Lacan still advocates the thought that “the subject must be maintained in 
the pure void of its subtraction if one wishes to save truth.”220 Accordingly, we should 
not think of Lacan as an absolute opposition to Descartes: 
 
When Lacan writes that ‘thought founds being solely by knotting itself within the speech in 
which every operation touches upon the essence of language,’ he maintains the discourse of 
ontological foundation that Descartes encountered in the empty and apodictic transparency 
of the cogito.221   
     
Badiou’s meditations are clearly reminiscent of Descartes’ meditations and the 
philosophical tradition he is part of. The particular feature in Descartes, and also in a 
number of other philosophers such as Plato, that is of high significance to Badiou is 
mathematicism. Badiou can be considered Cartesian in that his philosophy emphasises 
the significance of mathematic to ontology: “mathematics is ontology.” This 
philosophical proposition is, in Badiou, concerning the new mathematics of set theory 
that is concerned with unpredictable and unimaginable quantities, and deals with new 
infinities that transform our previous modes of thinking.  
    On the other hand, Badiou is not Cartesian in that he criticises the Cartesian binary 
oppositions including mind/body, the subject/object, and world/representation as 
enemies of ontological philosophy.222 He offers a post-Cartesian perception of the 
subject in that for him there are no philosophical events per se; on the contrary, he 
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argues that there are only four conditions that are themselves in the non-philosophical 
realms including art, science, politics, and love. Correspondingly, there are only four 
truth procedures that are artistic, scientific, political, and amorous subjects.  
    However, the Lacanian subject, as exposed above, remains the antithesis of the 
Cartesian subject, especially as far as the idea of the credibility and authenticity of the 
ego is concerned. Moreover, the Cartesian subject’s certainty of his self-consciousness 
is, for Lacan, a mere illusion. It is based on shaky foundations since Lacan believed the 
subject was seeking ‘the lost desire’ and he/she did not know it was lost. Even if the 
subject supposes that he/she has experienced desire, it will be soon lost since it is 
essentially based on lack.  
    The Lacanian subject’s fragmented character is in close affinity with man’s 
fragmentation in modernity. Ego, from a Lacanian view, is unstable and uncertain, 
whose integrity is constantly under the threat of both external and, particularly, internal 
forces. As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, modernity, in its first phases, was built on 
the Cartesian subject’s certainty, centrality, and unity of consciousness. However, both 
modernity’s dreams and Cartesian wishes turned out to be lacking in the twentieth 
century. As Charles Larmore argues, the Lacanian subject appears to be highly critical 
of not only Cartesian subjectivity but also of the modern philosophical trends, especially 
Kant, that have attempted to present their ideas of the constitutive subject.223  Lacan’s 
understanding of the subject was not only critical of Kant but also of the philosophy 
founded on the idea of the free and rational acts of a purely epistemological ego.        
        
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has outlined the identity of what I call the subject of language. The study 
first demonstrated the structured character of the Lacanian unconscious as the result of 
the acquisition of language. Secondly, it was argued that Lacan’s notion of the subject 
can be considered as the subject of language. This study paves the way for my following 
discussion of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of 
subjectivity in that whereas the subject in Althusser is determined by the structure and 
its identity is formed through ideological interpellation, the identity of the Lacanian 
subject is in direct association to the language he acquires. Therefore, the convergence 
of these theories can result in a more inclusive model for the analysis of the subject’s 
identity. 
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    Demonstrating that the Other, desire and the unconscious all are based on lack, this 
section focused on how lack is both created and negated by language. Language is not 
only responsible for the formation of the unconscious and the Symbolic but also for 
negating the lack it and its ultimate identity include. Similarly, language belongs not to 
the subject; it belongs to the Other. Consequently, I argued that the Lacanian subject of 
language is really the subject of the Other. Otherness thus was explored in the present 
analysis of the subject with reference to the position of language between the subject 
and the Other. It is represented in the language the subject embodies; although s/he 
speaks the language, it is the language that determines and shows his/her identity. The 
alienation of the subject occurs when it is exposed to language.  
    In order to understand the lack over which the identity of the subject is based one 
should first refer to Hegel’s discussion of the subject-object non-identity in which he 
argues that a full identity of the two is almost impossible. The subject-other non-identity 
in Hegel is reminiscent of the mother-subject non-identity. If the other in Hegel’s 
doctrine of the Absolute can also be conceived of as Nature, it was for Lacan either the 
image in the mirror or the big Other of the Symbolic. Likewise, both referred to the gap 
between the subject and the other. Lacan explored this lack in the realm of what he 
called the Real. For Lacan, the lack also exists in the Symbolic because it is constructed 
by language. In addition, the Lacanian subject was considered as an anti-Cartesian 
subject in that the former showed that the subject is falsified by the other in the 
Imaginary and hence his claims of self-autonomy and establishment are all refused. The 
subject of language, situated in the symbolic, is falsified by the other in the Imaginary 
and determined by the Other in the symbolic that is language.  
    Throughout the next chapter I seek to demonstrate that the Lacanian subject and the 
Althusserian subject, which was analysed in the previous chapter, play a supplementary 
role to each other in that each one of them focuses on a particular aspect of the subject’s 
identity; whereas the Lacanian subject tended to consider the subject as the subject of 
language, the Althusserian subject considers it as the subject of ideology. Consequently, 
my analysis will focus on the subject as positioned between language and ideology, or 
between linguistic alienation and ideological interpellation. 
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Chapter Six: 
The Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic as a Critical Approach: 
Problems and Premises 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to outline the major problems and theoretical premises of a critical 
approach to the analysis of the subject referred to throughout the present thesis as ‘the 
Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic.’ As its name implies, this critical perspective includes 
the application of both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject to the same 
object of study. The central thesis of this chapter is the development of, despite certain 
theoretical problems to be discussed, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a critical 
model for the analysis of the subject’s identity. This dialectic is also demonstrated 
between the language and ideology to which the subject is exposed and, 
correspondingly, occurs between the linguistic alienation and ideological interpellation 
of the subject in the realm of its unconsciousness. 
    This critical model does not simply draw together similarities between both the 
Lacanian and Althusserian perceptions of the subject. In the first chapter of the present 
thesis I referred to those apparent similarities between the Lacanian and Althusserian 
conceptions of the subject that have caused misunderstanding for a number of critics in 
putting them into a particular category. These similarities could be misleading in that 
they lead scholars to overlook the incongruities at work. The Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic as a critical approach faces a number of theoretical problems in that it not only 
embodies two different systems of thought with different disciplinary backgrounds but 
also deals with two different phases in the construction of the identity of the subject.  
    The present chapter includes three major sections. First, I present an account the 
apparent paradox within the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic that is considered as ‘the 
convergence of lack and material.’ Then, I approach the question of the construction of 
the identity of the subject through following the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic by 
studying the association between the Lacanian perception of linguistic alienation and 
the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation. I shall thus present an analysis of 
‘linguistic alienation as dramatic interpellation.’ The third section examines the 
construction of ‘the subject in the ideological Symbolic.’ This section seeks to face the 
major theoretical premises and problems of the critical methodology of the analysis of 
the identity of the subject called the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic. The first 
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theoretical premise includes the exploration of two major questions: ‘inter-subjective 
dialectic’ and ‘intra-subjective lack.’ The second premise focuses on ‘the ideological 
constitution of the subject,’ where an analysis will be presented on the process the 
subject goes through while ideologically constituted. Finally, ‘the representation of 
identity in language,’ is studied where the identity of the subject is investigated as 
represented in the ideological language s/he is dramatically exposed to both in infantile 
and mature years.  
 
6.2 The Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic:  
      The Convergence of Lack and Material 
Providing a more inclusive perspective for the analysis of both the formation of 
subjectivity and the determination of the subject, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is 
concerned with two essentially different constitutive parts of identity: language and 
ideology. As I explored in the previous two chapters, whereas language, because of its 
negativity, is based on lack, ideology, in its Althusserian sense, has a material existence. 
The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus provides a critical perspective that is involved 
in the convergence lack and material. Bringing other examples of the apparent 
incongruity of this convergence, I seek to demonstrate that the Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic, though having an ostensibly paradoxical feature, is not only a more wide-
ranging model in analysing the construction of the subject’s identity but also offering a 
critical approach to a strictly Lacanian and Althusserian conception of the subject. 
    As demonstrated earlier, the similarities between the Lacanian and Althusserian 
conceptions of the subject have led some scholars to categorize them in the same 
group.224 Criticising those responses that are based on an exploration of these apparent 
similarities earlier in the thesis, I shall now discuss the problems facing the critic 
whenever the term ‘Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic’ is applied. I shall later argue that 
these two theories of the subject are supplementary to each other in that each focuses on 
a constitutive part of identity, that is language and ideology, and also each is concerned 
with a particular phase in the development of the subject, the infantile and mature years.   
    A major theoretical problem in bringing together Lacan and Althusser in the form of 
a unified theory is that they are dealing with two essentially different realms: the 
unconscious and ideology. ‘Where do the unconscious and ideology meet?’ This is a 
question that is, first of all, preceded by another question regarding the possibility of 
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any meeting between the two. An immediate answer to the first question based on my 
earlier exploration of Lacan and Althusser’s theories of the subject is that they meet in 
language. Concerning the construction of the unconscious through language I presented 
a discussion in Chapter Five. However, what remains unsaid is an exploration into the 
possibility of any meeting between the unconscious and ideology: 
    The unconscious, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is built on lack. A preliminary 
hypothesis concerning the convergence of the unconscious and ideology is that 
ideology, too, should have been based on lack. As I showed in my Hegelian reading of 
the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ in Chapter Four, the Subject is the 
model ideology presents to its subjects and there always remains a gap between the 
subject and the Subject.225 I also demonstrated in Chapter Two the way Laclau has 
explored the gap between the subject and what ideology requires it to be, that is the 
Subject. Laclau argues for the impossibility of a full identification in different subject 
positions. In their conception of ‘the subject of politics’ Laclau and Zac investigate how 
politics functions through a number of terms and claims which it never accomplishes. 
These terms need to be “empty in order to constitute the aims of a political 
competition.”226 However, besides the gap between the subject and the Subject that both 
Althusser and Laclau refer to, there is also a lack in the Subject itself in that it is never 
materialized. The Subject which ideology presents to its subjects as a model to cope 
with is never completely fulfilled by the subjects of that ideology. The Subject itself is 
thus based on lack.227 The Subject, the ideal political subject required by ideology, is 
itself conceived of as ideology for the political subject and is never fully realized. 
Therefore, if the Subject, which is based on lack, is considered as a manifestation of 
ideology, it can be thus argued that ideology, too, is based on lack. 
    As for language/ideology relation, it should be mentioned that the abstract character 
of language and the concrete existence of ideology provide the Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic with a major problem that is the incongruity of language and ideology, abstract 
and concrete, and lack and material. Analyzing language/ideology relation, one should 
note that while language is abstract and negative, ideology, in its Althusserian form, is 
conceived of as concrete and material. Moreover, the Lacanian perception of the 
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unconscious, which is constructed through language acquisition process, considers it as 
incomplete and dislocated; on the contrary, according to Althusser, ideology has a 
concrete entity, a material existence, one that can be touched and felt everywhere. 
    The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic might be thus conceived of as the convergence 
of lack and material. However, this incongruity appears to be vital for the permanent 
functioning of the dialectic between language and ideology. This dialectic is manifested 
in what has been called in this thesis ‘the ideological signifier.’ I refer to the dialectical 
association of language and ideology in the construction of the subject’s identity as the 
ideological signifier. As I shall argue later in this chapter, the ideological signifier, the 
realm which brings language and ideology together, plays a central role in the 
construction of identity through the alienation and interpellation of the subject both in 
language acquisition process and mature years.  The study of language/ideology relation 
is not merely concerned with the combination of the Lacanian and Althusserian theories 
of the subject; it is crucial in the understanding of identity in that the subject can, and 
should be, simultaneously analyzed from these two approaches.  
    Lacanian psychoanalysis, though focusing on the individual, is also involved in the 
social for two major reasons: first, Lacan considered the Symbolic to be the determining 
factor in the construction of the unconscious when he argued that “the unconscious is 
structured as a function of the symbolic.”228 The Symbolic, as the social, is what the 
subject, as the individual, is exposed to. Secondly, the Lacanian unconscious can be 
considered as not having only an interior life within the subject; it also has a life outside 
the subject. It is formed by the Other and comes from the Other: “the unconscious is the 
Other’s discourse.”229 The unconscious is thus not limited only to the psychic and the 
individual; it is trans-individual and concerned with the social. 
    As far as the position of language is concerned, it embodies both the individual and 
the social. Language is a site where the individual and the social, the particular and the 
universal, meet. The subject, as the site for the individual and the particular, is thus 
constructed by language that not only includes the social and the universal but also 
constitutes the ideological symbolic. Although of different origins and dealing with 
different objects of study, Lacanian and Althusserian theories provide a sophisticated 
critical methodology in their present converged form. Applying the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic to the analysis of the representation of the subject’s identity in a 
novelistic work of art could prove illuminating in that it brings into consideration the 
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individual and the social, the particular and the universal, and the psychic and the 
symbolic in its focus on language/ideology relation. If Lacan argued for the construction 
of identity through the alienation of the subject by language, the Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic demonstrates the construction of ideological identity through the alienation of 
the subject by the ideological signifier.  
    This critical model also examines those aspects and phases of the construction of the 
identity of the subject that are neglected by either Lacanian or Althusserian notions of 
subjectivity. If Lacan was mostly concerned with subject formation in the oedipal 
period and Althusser was involved in the ideological interpellation of the mature 
subject, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic presents a model for the analysis of the 
subject that emphasised both the language acquisition period and the mature years of the 
subject. Elaboration on this theoretical convergence is not an argument regarding a 
simple matter of comparison or a casual relationship. This convergence, however, 
provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of the subject. The Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic becomes more significant when we bring into consideration the 
large number of disciplines – literary and cultural theory and criticism, gender studies, 
semiotics, and film theory, to name only a few – that have been influenced by Lacanian 
and Althusserian theories on the subject. 
    The critical methodology offered by the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic does not 
merely give the Althusserian concept of interpellation a psychoanalytic character; it also 
aims to add to the Lacanian perception of language and the unconscious the concept of 
ideology. What should be noted is that if one of these two perspectives alone is applied 
to reading literary texts, the study would not be inclusive in that each merely focuses on 
one particular aspect and phase in the construction of the subject. Furthermore, whereas 
the Lacanian subject is analyzed through his/her desire and fantasy, the Althusserian 
subject is considered to be subjected to ideology. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic, 
however, studies the ideological fantasies of the subject and the way they have been 
formed through the unconscious interpellation of the subject.  
  
6.3 Linguistic Alienation as Dramatic Interpellation 
To begin with, I consider the close affinity between the Lacanian concept of ‘alienation’ 
and the Althusserian perception of ‘interpellation’ and the role they play in the 
construction of the subject’s identity. The section argues that the alienation of the 
subject by language in infantile phase is a dramatic process of interpellation while the 
interpellation of the subject by ideology in mature years causes his/her further 
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alienation. I shall also demonstrate that both processes take place in the subject’s 
unconscious. 
    By ‘alienation’ Lacan meant the process in which the subject identifies 
himself/herself with a signifier in the language he/she is exposed to. Alienation is a 
major characteristic of the Lacanian subject: the subject is first alienated through 
identification with the other in the mirror stage; later, it is alienated through 
identification with the language he or she acquires.230 The subject, therefore, cannot 
construct its own identity. The subject’s identity is the result of the subject’s 
identification with the signifiers. On the other hand, ‘interpellation,’ in Althusser’s 
view, is the process through which ideology addresses an individual upon its arrival to 
society and, in this way, makes him/her the subject to that ideology. Althusser’s main 
thesis here is that “ideology interpellates individuals as subjects.”231 The way ideology 
makes an individual a subject happens through interpellation. It is through interpellation 
that individuals are turned into subjects. In Althusser’s theory, individuals are born into 
ideology and immediately become subject to it. The subjects do not realize their 
subjection to ideology and consider themselves to be free and independent individuals. 
    There are two implications of the subject whenever the term is used: the subject 
through ideology and to ideology. In Lacan, too, the subject, after the mirror stage, 
becomes a subject through language and becomes a subject to a number of signifiers 
that alienate him/her. Subjection in Lacan happens through language and to signifiers. 
Language acquisition process happens when the subject becomes alienated by the 
signifiers. Linguistic alienation can be thus referred to as a dramatic mode of 
interpellation, one that the subject is not aware of. The concepts that alienate the 
subject, which I call ideological signifiers, exist in the language the child unconsciously 
acquires. 
    Apart from this common feature of the terms alienation and interpellation, one should 
also point to those characteristics of language and ideology that provide a common 
context for the subject. First, both language and ideology are pre-existing structures in 
which the subject is positioned. It means that they always already exist before the 
subject’s entry into them. “[T]he notion that the human subject is constituted by pre-
given structures,” Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake maintain, “is a general feature 
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of structuralism, according to which subjectivity is determined by structures such as 
language, family relations, cultural conventions and other social forces.”232 On the other 
hand, Althusser’s thesis, “individuals are always-already subjects,”233 can be observed 
also in Lacan when he demonstrates that the Symbolic order exists before the entry of 
the subject into it. Language plays the determining role in the Symbolic order and the 
unconscious becomes subjected to it. 
    Secondly, while ideology interpellates the individual and thus constitutes him/her as a 
subject, language, too, includes a number of signifiers with which the individual seeks 
to be in state of identity. In other words, the subject is both the subject to/of language 
and ideology he/she is exposed to. Moreover, if interpellation deals with the moment 
and process of recognition of interaction with ideology, alienation designates the 
moment and process of the formation of the subject based on language. Both processes 
show how the subject recognizes his/her relation to reality, which is, in this regard, 
constructed through language and ideology.  
    The Lacanian subject is the subject of the language he or she is exposed to in the 
Symbolic. The Althusserian subject is the subject of/to the ideologies that interpellate 
him/her. Thus, the Lacanian-Althusserian subject is subject to both language and 
ideology. The ideological signifier interpellates the emerging subject in a dramatic way 
through language acquisition, and, accordingly, the subject is alienated; it also alienates 
the mature subject through a dramatic interpellation. The crucial point to make here is 
that ideology is manifested in language, and, also, the subject is interpellated through 
language. This leads us to contemplate more on the relation of ideology to language and 
the ways and moments in which language embodies ideology. Towards the end of the 
present chapter I shall elaborate more on this question when I attempt to analyse the 
ideological character of the Symbolic.  
    The Lacanian-Althusserian subject, though seeking to remain completely identical to 
signifiers, cannot enjoy a state of full identity between him/herself and them. Whereas 
the Lacanian subject always fails in his/her attempts of fulfilling this desire, the 
Althusserian subject, likewise, cannot become a Subject. In other words, a state of 
complete identity in both cases is impossible. The result is a ‘gap’ that is never filled. 
This gap is shaped in the subject’s unconscious while he/she enters the Symbolic. That 
is why the Lacanian/Althusserian dialectic is to be mostly conceived of in the 
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exploration of the Symbolic. If we categorize the complete mother/infant identity into 
the realm of the Real, there is no loss, no language, and no ideology in this state of 
identity.  There is, instead, only fullness and complete identity between the infant and 
the mother, or, as in Hegel, between the subject and Nature. 
    The mechanism through which both language and ideology construct a subject never 
permits the subject enjoying a state of full identity between him/her and the signifiers. 
The more a subject attempts to cope with the model presented by ideology, the more 
he/she is required by ideology to follow the model. As in language, the endless chain of 
subjectivization happens because these signifies have in their essence a gap in that they 
are only to be found in language and not in reality. There is, therefore, a lack in both 
ideology and language on which they are constructed. In order to discuss the function of 
both ideology and language in the subject’s identification with them it is illuminating to 
refer to the way superego functions in its Žižekian terms: it is like a bank to which we 
can never pay back the whole of our debts; the more we pay off, the more we are in 
debt. 
    The concepts of ‘ideological interpellation’ and ‘linguistic alienation’ contribute to 
this anti-humanistic view that the subject is not the cause and creator; he/she is, 
however, the effect and created. The subject is the effect of both language and ideology 
into which he/she is born, and by which he/she is both alienated and interpellated. Both 
language and ideology are structures. Language, in structuralism, is conceived of as a 
‘structure,’ and ideology, in Althusser, is referred to as ‘the structure.’234 My argument 
here is that the language that alienates the subject is manifested in the ideological 
structure by which the subject is interpellated. While the subject participates in the 
construction of his/her false sense of completeness in the mirror stage, he/she 
participates in the reproduction of the conditions of his/her subjecthood. The close 
affinity of Althusser’s theory of the subject to that of Lacan concerning the relation of 
the subject to both ‘society’ and ‘mirror-image’ has been thus mentioned by Terry 
Eagleton: 
 
the relation of an individual subject to society as a whole on Althusser’s theory is rather like 
the relation of the small child to his or her mirror-image in Lacan’s. In both cases, the 
human subject is supplied with a satisfyingly unified image of selfhood by identifying with 
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an object which reflects this image back to it in a closed, narcissistic circle. In both cases, 
too, this image involves misrecognition, since it idealizes the subject’s real situation.235  
 
    More interestingly, one can observe in Althusser’s definition of ideology implicit 
echoes of Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary. Whereas Lacan believed that the subject 
immediately after the mirror stage lived in the Imaginary, Althusser, too, argued for the 
“an imaginary relation” of the subject to “the real conditions of existence.” This 
‘imaginary relation’ is what Althusser calls ideology. Moreover, Althusser’s proposition 
that ideology is “an imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence”236 is also in 
parallel to the Symbolic in that it is represented in language; it is language that 
constructs, maintains, and changes the imaginary relation of the subject to the real 
conditions of existence. In addition, the relation of the child to the image in the mirror is 
‘imaginary’ in that the child imagines that the other is complete and identifies itself with 
the supposedly complete image of the other in the mirror.  
    Ideology, according to Althusser, does not reflect the ‘real’ world; what ideology 
misrepresents is itself one step far from the Real. Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary is 
distinguishable from the Real as far as language is concerned. Anthony Elliott has 
described this relation in the following way: 
 
For Althusser, there is a duplicate mirror-structure at the heart of the ideological process, a 
structure which possesses all the unity and plenitude of Lacan’s imaginary order … what 
the mirror of ideology essentially does is to implant received social meanings at the centre 
of the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence. Thus, in 
constituting the self in relation to discourses of class, race, sexuality, nationalism, and the 
like, the individual comes to misrecognize itself as an autonomous subject, believing itself 
to be legally free and self-legislating.237 
 
Although Elliott’s approach in this regard appears to be illuminating in a further 
investigation of the association between Lacanian and Althusserian theories, he does not 
work on the problems emerging in the process of the development of a critical 
perspective based on both theories.   
    While the Lacanian alienation happens in an indirect way in the infantile phase of the 
development of the subject, the Althusserian interpellation takes place directly for a 
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mature subject. However, the Althusserian concept of interpellation can happen 
dramatically both for the emerging and the mature subjects. Consequently, each one of 
these theories focuses on one aspect of the process of subjection. If Lacanian theory is 
concerned with the formation of the subject in infantile phase, Althusserian theory is 
dealing with the subjection of the individual in mature years. The Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic thus brings into consideration both infantile and mature years in the 
development of the subject.  
    Secondly, whereas alienation in Lacan is an unconscious process of which the 
emerging subject is unaware, and interpellation in Althusser happens directly to the 
mature subject, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic regards interpellation as also taking 
place dramatically. For instance, when the subject is watching a programme on TV, 
he/she is indirectly interpellated by not only the ideological framework the programme 
is part of but also by the ideological signifier reproduced there.  
    Moreover, language acquisition process can be also considered as a dramatic 
interpellation. Likewise, alienation, too, is not merely confined to infantile years. The 
grown up subject is also alienated by the ideology that interpellates him. Thus, 
alienation is the immediate consequence of interpellation in both infantile and mature 
years.     
     The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus provides a model for the analysis of the 
subject’s identity that pays attention to two different modes of the alienation of the 
subject through bringing into consideration two different phases in the development of 
the process of the construction of the subject. Also, it is not only concerned with the 
direct way of interpellation, as in Althusser, but also explores the dramatic ways of 
interpellation in both infantile and mature years that cause alienation. The common 
medium in both processes is what I refer to as ideological signifier. I shall further 
explore the language/ideology relation in the following sections.    
 
6.4 The Subject in the Ideological Symbolic:  
      Towards a Critical Methodology  
Although the ‘Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic’ provides a more wide-ranging critical 
methodology for the analysis of the subject, it faces certain theoretical problems. Any 
attempt to bring together the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject 
inevitably faces a number of theoretical problems. While I referred to some of these 
problems in Chapter Two in my evaluation of recent theoretical treatments of the 
Althusserian and Lacanian concepts of the subject, I aim here to scrutinize the problems 
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emerging in, as well as the methodological premises of, the Lacanian-Althusserian 
dialectic.  
    This section consists of three main subsections: first, an exploration of both ‘inter-
subjective dialectic’ and ‘intra-subjective lack’ in the identity if the subject will be 
presented. Referring to the unconscious character of inter-subjective dialectic, I shall 
analyse two modes of this dialectic that I refer to as constructive and destructive inter-
subjective dialectics. Then, I will explore the intra-subjective lack with reference to my 
earlier study of the constitution of the subject over lack in Lacan with reference to 
distinguishable conceptions of lack in Hegel and Althusser.  
    Secondly, ‘the ideological constitution of the subject’ will be discussed with 
reference to the ideological Symbolic that the subject is exposed to and that ultimately 
alienates the subject through an unconscious act of interpellation. And finally, the 
question of the ‘representation of identity in language’ will be examined with reference 
to the ideological languages that bring about ideological subjectivities. The exploration 
of ideological signifier will thus be crucial to this section in that it plays a central role in 
the constitution and representation of the ideological identity of the subject in the 
language exposed to, and produced by, the subject 
 
6.4.1 The Inter-Subjective Dialectic and Intra-Subjective Lack 
The inter-subjective dialectic and intra-subjective lack play a significant role not only in 
the construction of the identity of the subject but also in causing the incompleteness of 
identity and the impossibility of the subject. I will first demonstrate that there is always 
an inter-subjective dialectic at work in the ongoing process of the construction of 
identity. Then, I will argue that the intra-subjective lack is what causes the ongoing 
changes in the identity of the subject, on one hand, and results in the incomplete nature 
of identity and the impossibility of the subject, on the other hand.  
    The terms identity and subjectivity, though theoretically distinguishable in definition, 
are often used interchangeably. However, I shall consider identity as an umbrella term 
which includes and brings together different subjectivities within the subject. Thus, 
whenever I refer to the identity of the subject, I am really talking of all the constituent 
subjectivities of the subject. That is why the general terms of national identity and 
religious identity are considered in the present thesis as merely national subjectivity and 
religious subjectivity. When the term national identity is used for national subjectivity 
widely in media and mass culture, a particular subjectivity of the subject’s identity has 
been regarded as the most dominant constituent part of that identity; that is to say, these 
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general terms are used whenever a particular subjectivity is considered as the whole 
identity. This usage of the term identity has enjoyed a wide popularity in media and 
mass culture whereas the term subjectivity is the scholarly term to denote only a 
constituent part of the subject’s identity.  
   As demonstrated earlier in the thesis, Hegel’s dynamic of inter-subjectivity with intra-
subjectivity in one separate and autonomous entity is considered to be one of the first 
attempts that dealt with the internal dialectics between subjectivities in the same 
identity. The dynamic of inter-subjectivity is what exists between different subjectivities 
inside the subject’s identity. This dynamic has also an external manifestation that exists 
between the subjectivities of different subjects.238 
    There are different approaches to what the inter-subjective dialectic within the 
subject’s identity causes for the subject in contemporary theory; these approaches can 
be generally divided into the constructivist and linguistic determinist. The structuralist 
tradition of the humanities argues for the self-regulatory character of the systems and, 
correspondingly, the restricting power of the structures. Structuralism believes in the 
subject’s lack of freedom from the structures including language and ideology. 
Structuralist approaches thus employ a determinist approach to the subject, which is 
primarily linguistic. On the other hand, post-structuralist thinkers have given more 
freedom to the subject in its encounter of the structure. Can the subject overcome the 
inter-subjective dialectics within his/her identity by constructing a new subjectivity? 
Whereas a constructivist standpoint would agree with the possibility of constructing a 
new mode of identity for the subject, a linguistically deterministic answer to this 
question would argue for the impossibility of a complete re-construction of the identity 
of the subject that is distinguishable from its original identity in every aspect. 
    An illuminating response based on both constructivist and linguistic determinist 
approaches can be observed in Judith Butler whose concepts of ‘performativity’ and 
‘the agent’ have further explored the inter-subjective dialectic.239 However, her concept 
of ‘the agent’ comes out of the power that has enabled it. Butler’s analysis of the 
struggle between the agent and all-including power can be read as her interest in inter-
subjective dialectic. What is notable is that this struggle first happens in language and 
has a ‘psychic’ aspect. No subject invents by itself the language he/she speaks; speaking 
a language is rather like borrowing it; it is a citing from an already existing vocabulary. 
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The individual subject does not, and cannot, decide the meaning of words in that the 
subject always already finds itself in a language that has established signifying codes. 
When we learn to speak, we learn to use those codes; even when we become proficient 
speakers, our speech still has to follow those codes and rules.  
    There is, for Butler, always a negative power at work that does not let the inter-
subjective dialectic result in a new subjectivity. On both sides of the dialectic there is an 
attempt of subjection. Subjectivity is always exerting subjection through power. Thus, 
there are always at least two powers at work in the dialectic between two subjectivities. 
For Butler, as in Hegel, this dialectic happens in the psyche of the subject. That is why 
Butler approaches any inter-subjective dialectic through emphasis on the subjection that 
any subjectivity exerts. She writes: 
 
Subjection is a kind of power that not only unilaterally acts on a given individual as a form 
of domination, but also activates or forms the subject. Hence, subjection is neither simply 
the domination of a subject nor its production, but designates a certain kind of restriction in 
production.240 
  
There is a struggle between different modes of subjection in that subjection is itself ‘a 
kind of power.’ As demonstrated earlier in the thesis, Butler seeks to present a theory 
that provides more freedom for the subject in comparison with other structuralist 
theories. Whereas Lacan’s emphasis on the Symbolic results in the impossibility of any 
constructivist attempt of the subject, Butler’s concept of the agent and his/her 
performativity allows more freedom. While the Lacanian subject is linguistically 
determined, Butler’s agent can be conceived of as constructivist.  
    A similar account of the internal dialectic within the identity of the subject has been 
mentioned by D. E. Hall. Referring to the ‘meta-awareness’ of the subject when facing 
any internal dialectic, Hall argues that “the possibility that one can gain control over 
that which has controlled one’s consciousness by becoming conscious of that dynamic of 
control is the premise of most twentieth-century theories of politicized subjectivity.”241 
What Hall is concerned with happens only when the subject differentiates him/herself 
both as the knowing subject and the object of study. ‘Meta-awareness,’ the term 
employed by Hall, is the awareness of the conflict between our self and the other 
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subjectivities of our identity. ‘Meta-awareness’ thus points to the self-reflexive nature of 
the dialectic between the constitutive subjectivities of the subject’s identity. 
    The inter-subjective dialectic in the identity of the subject can be considered as 
having constructive and destructive modes. Constructive inter-subjective dialectic 
happens when a new subjectivity emerges out of the dialectic between opposing 
ideological subjectivities. This newly-formed subjectivity is distinguishable from the 
other subjectivities in that it is conceived of as a synthesis, in the classical Hegelian 
sense, which emerges out of the conflicts between the existing subjectivities. The other 
subjectivities, such as those formed in the process of language acquisition, are the result 
of the subject’s mental attachment to the signifiers. What is notable here is that this 
emerging subjectivity is not fixed and stable; it rather undergoes an ongoing process in 
that there are always a number of other subjectivities in the subject’s identity to which 
this new subjectivity is the other. There is constantly an inter-subjective dialectic 
between the constituent subjectivities of the identity of the subject. Even if an existing 
subjectivity becomes the dominant in the subject’s identity, it is still conceived of 
having undergone a constructive dialectic in that what ultimately occurs is the 
foregrounding of a particular subjectivity. 
    The deconstructive inter-subjective dialectic, on the other hand, occurs when the 
conflicting subjectivities don’t give birth to the rise of a new subjectivity. The subject 
here is dangling between ideological subjectivities. This mode of the inter-subjective 
dialectic can cause psychological disorder for the subject. The frequently quoted term of 
‘shattered personality’ can be applicable to the subject when the deconstructive inter-
subjective dialectic affects his or her identity. This mode of the inter-subjective dialectic 
is what is generally referred to as identity crisis. The significant point here is that this 
mode of inter-subjective dialectic has often an unconscious feature, one the subject is 
unaware of. 
    There is often an intra-subjective dynamic at work within the subject’s identity, one 
that exists within the subjectivity itself. Subjectivity always includes a lack since it is 
constituted by language. Language negates what it signifies, and it is thus based on lack. 
Subjectivity also includes the subjectivity against which it defines itself. This 
characteristic is generally referred to as antagonism. Identity is thus never fully 
constituted and has an ‘incomplete’ character. The ‘incompleteness’ of identity does not 
merely go back to the inter-subjective dialectic inside it. It is also essential to the 
function of identity in that there is always an intra-subjective lack at work that produces 
the impossibility of the subject. For instance, a new social movement cannot claim it has 
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completely fulfilled its purpose since identification with a particular subjectivity or 
doctrine is not ‘reducible’ to identity. There are always other subjectivities in the same 
identity and, furthermore, identity always fails to fully embody what it says it includes. 
Butler, Laclau, and Žižek in their collective ‘introduction’ to Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (2000) have argued for the 
‘incompleteness’ of identity when they are dealing with the ‘identity-claims’ of the 
present day social movements. They write: 
 
…‘identity’ itself is never fully constituted; in fact, since identification is not reducible to 
identity, it is important to consider the incommensurability or gap between them. It does not 
follow that the failure of identity to achieve complete determination undermines the social 
movements at issue; on the contrary, that incompleteness is essential to the project of 
hegemony itself.242    
 
Even if we say that identification may be reducible to a particular subjectivity it is a not 
well-founded proposition in that subjectivity itself functions exactly in the same way 
identity does. Subjectivity, like identity, always negates itself.  
    Investigation into the lack upon which identity is established has been examined in 
contemporary philosophy, psychoanalysis, and post-Marxism. Again here Hegel is 
important. He was specifically concerned with the gap between the subject and the 
absolute Spirit, and his notion of the incompleteness of identity has give vein to the 
contemporary idea of the impossibility of the subject. A major question in critical 
evaluations of identity is the investigation into the lack identity embodies and is built 
on. As Lacan demonstrated, there forms a gap in the identity of the subject immediately 
after the mirror stage.243 Also, as Jameson suggested, there remains a gap in the moment 
of the transition of the Imaginary to the Symbolic.244 Žižek, too, is obsessed by the lack 
the barred O, ideology, is based on.245 However, what makes Althusser subject to 
further criticism is his ignorance of the lack that identity is based on. In other words, 
Althusser did not argue for the existence and operation of an intra-subjective lack within 
identity.  
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    As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, a mythical example of the existence of the intra-
subjective lack could be observed in the story of Moses’ encountering of God. Althusser 
did not deal with this problem from this view; he was not part of the Hegelian tradition 
of analysing inter-subjective dialectic and intra-subjective lack. Althusser renounced 
Hegel when, dealing with Marx’s epistemological break, he attempted to purify the 
latter from the former. As Judith Butler notes in her first book, there were two different 
readings of Hegel in the mid-twentieth-century France: the first reading was that 
provided by Alexandre Kojève and influenced such figure as Lacan and Bataille; the 
second was that presented by Hyppolite and influenced such figures as Althusser and 
Foucault.246 Althusser, in his criticism of the Hegelian influence in Marx, did not bring 
into considerations those parts of Hegel’s arguments that had influenced Lacan. 
However, we should note that the Hegel Lacan was influenced by was not the Hegel 
Althusser tried to separate from Marx: the Hegel Althusser criticised was the 
philosopher who was devoted to the analysis of metaphysics and the Absolute Spirit, 
and the Hegel Lacan followed was the philosopher who was devoted to the analysis of 
the subject’s identity with reference to the idea of otherness.  
    The subject always carries a lack of full identity between itself and the other, be it the 
mother, Nature, God, substance, or language and ideology. The interesting point is that 
the subject always fails in seeking to reach a state of full identity between itself and the 
other. The non-identity of the subject and the other also goes back to the intra-subjective 
lack that exists in identity. The subject thus cannot be completely identifiable with the 
ideological language it both acquires and, consequently, reproduces. The intra-
subjective lack avoids any full identity between the subject and what the ideological 
language requires it to be. This causes the always ongoing functioning of all ideologies. 
Both inter-subjective dialectic and intra-subjective lack generate the always incomplete 
nature of identity.      
    Therefore, the identity of the subject is considered as constituted by different 
subjectivities, themselves formed by ideological languages. The subject always fails in 
its attempts to be in a state of complete identification with what ideological language 
wants it to be. There is thus a permanent state of incompleteness in identity, one that 
causes non-identity of the subject and the other. The subject hence does not experience 
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a stable and fixed condition of identity and it is permanently positioned in an ongoing 
process of change. 
 
6.4.2 Ideological Constitution of the Subject 
 Based on its sameness to that which has created it, subjectivity can be considered as 
identical with the ideology that has produced it. Subjectivity first exists in the Symbolic, 
and then becomes part of the identity of the subject.  Referring to the Althusserian 
definition of ideology, one can propose that subjectivity, except for that produced by art, 
has an ideological character.247 Approaching the Symbolic as ideological, we are 
explicitly providing the Lacanian concept with an Althusserian signification. 
    Language, Lacan argues, is the most significant constituent part of the Symbolic. It is 
also the medium through which the ISAs and, especially the RSAs, exert their power 
and influence. Language, in my argument, remains ideological in that the subject is 
primarily exposed to it through familial and educational systems, which are the 
ideological State apparatuses. Language can be regarded as ideological also because it is 
the medium through which we define our “imaginary relation to the real conditions of 
existence.”248 Likewise, there is no relationship between language and reality in 
structuralism. Language, in this sense, is not the reality but a window through which 
reality is represented.   
    Apart from the function of the ISAs, Language itself reproduces the conditions in 
which the Symbolic becomes ideological. Thus, subjectivity takes on an ideological 
function not only because of the ideological character of the Symbolic but also because 
of the representation of the ISAs in it. Also, the Symbolic is ideological since there 
always exists a ‘problematic.’ Althusser used the term to demonstrate the ideological 
burden of the words and the context in which we are located. Problematic means that a 
word or concept cannot be considered in isolation; it only exists in the theoretical or 
ideological framework in which it is used. 
    Subjection to a number of signifiers in the process of linguistic alienation is a 
dramatic unconscious interpellation. This is manifestly an Althusserian reading of the 
Lacanian concept of alienation. Lacan employed the term ‘alienation’ for the process in 
which the subject identifies him/herself with a signifier. The subject’s identity is the 
result of the subject’s identification with the signifiers. Therefore, it is these signifiers 
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that determine the identity of the subject. The Lacanian subject is the subject of the 
language he/she is exposed to in the Symbolic. The subject, from this point of view, 
seeks to remain identical to linguistic signifiers. Signifiers are conventionally loaded 
with ideological designations. The unconscious becomes, through language, the site of 
these signifiers.  
    The subject’s mental attachment to these signifiers fills for the subject the 
unconscious gap that appears when the unity between the subject and its mother is 
shattered in the process of language acquisition. Here two points should be clarified: 
first, by signifiers I do not merely mean the Lacanian phallus; there are also a number of 
other signifiers that the subject unconsciously seeks to identify him/herself with. 
Secondly, although the phallus has been considered as the dominant signifier in Lacan, 
a signifier that both fills and creates the gap in the unconscious, it also fills the gap that 
emerges in the mother/subject disunity.  
    Lacan’s frequently quoted “the unconscious is structured like a language”249 
considers the formation of the unconscious according to the structure of language. This 
proposition points only to the formation of the structure of the unconscious. If we bring 
into consideration Lacan’s other proposition that “the unconscious is the Other’s 
discourse,”250 we find out that the relation between the unconscious and language is not 
merely a matter of structure; it is also a matter of content. I want to contend that the 
unconscious is ideological in that the discourse of the other is, in an Althusserian sense, 
most often ideological. The Other is always already ideological and in close affinity 
with the ideological feature of the Symbolic. The subject, then, is exposed to an 
ideological Other, and its subjectivity becomes ideological. However, the subject’s 
identity is not entirely identical with the Other. There is always an ego that considers 
itself to be different from the Others. The ego, however, is only a small part of the 
subject’s identity. Thus, apart from that, the other subjectivities in the subject’s identity 
are identical with the ideological Other. I call these subjectivities ideological.  
    The second exception that remains outside the realm of the ideological subjectivity, 
besides the ego, is ‘real art.’ Althusser’s famous declaration on art is illuminating here. 
In “A Letter on Art in Reply to André Daspre” he wrote: 
  
      The problem of the relations between art and ideology is a very complicated and difficult 
one. However, I can tell you in what direction our investigations tend. I do not rank real art 
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among the ideologies, although art does have a quite particular and specific relationship 
with ideology.251 
 
A significant question to ask here is ‘what is ‘real art’ is by definition?’ Or, what did 
Althusser mean by it? Answering this question leads us to the area of aesthetics and 
Althusser’s relation to literary and artistic criticism. The immediate answer is that we 
refer to any classic work of art as real art. What a classic work of art is would be 
relevant to the philosophy of aesthetics. I will shortly contend that ‘real art’ is that 
which, although including ideologies and being produced in an ideological framework, 
distances itself from ideology and the ideological context in which it is produced. A 
work of art is here considered as having a distance from the ideologies it represents; this 
distance is created by criticising, satirizing, or simply deliberately ignoring the 
ideologies that create a context for the text. What is of interest to me is first how these 
ideologies are represented in the text, and, then, how they have transited into the 
language which carries them.  
    An Althusserian reading of other Lacanian concepts gives birth to similar results. For 
example, fantasy in Lacan is generated because of the desire that comes from the Other. 
What I want to show is that fantasy can be an ideological narrative because it comes 
from the Other that is already ideological. Although Lacan considered fantasy to 
embody a sexual narrative, it can also include the fulfilment of those non-sexual 
repressed desires that have been generated by the ISAs. Fantasy, the manifestation of 
the unconscious desires of the subject, is the story we narrate about our desires. The 
desires of the subject are not always sexual. 
    A clear example of the ideological fantasy happens when a smoking teenager dreams 
of buying cigarettes. This fantasy has been created by the ideological rule that bans the 
selling of tobacco to anyone under eighteen. Another good example is a poet’s fantasy 
of receiving the Nobel Prize for literature, a desire generated by educational and cultural 
institutions. It is propagated by ideology, and the institution that awards the prize is 
itself an ideological State apparatus. Other ideological institutions such as TV channels, 
radio stations, newspapers, and websites are all contributing to its ideological 
establishment. Ideological apparatuses such as universities and academic centres invest 
in this poet by, for example, inviting him/her to deliver lectures. Therefore, a discourse, 
which is ideological, is created. The desire of the poet for the Noble Prize is thus 
ideological and determined and reproduced by the Symbolic.  
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    However, as Lacan maintained, in the realm of the unconscious the signifier lacks 
any signified. Ideology thus exists in the unconscious in the form of a signifier, a letter, 
word, phrase, or statement: the signifier has an ideological burden. It is this very 
ideological burden of the signifier that makes us think of it as a signified. Moreover, 
language is the most significant constitutive part of the Symbolic. The ideological 
dimensions of language are thus reproduced every day.  
   Commenting on ‘discourse,’ Julian Wolfreys considers the relationship between 
language and power and maintains that language is not “merely an adjunct to forms of 
power,” it is rather “the articulation of that power.” Referring to Foucault’s view on 
relations between the subject and discourse, he goes further to argue that there are 
always a number of other elements present: 
 
… human subjectivity and identity itself is produced out of various discursive formations as 
a result of the subject’s entry into language shot through and informed by figurations and 
encryptions of power, politics, historical, cultural and ideological remainders organized 
through particular relationships and networks.252 
 
    Formation of subjectivity thus begins with “the subject’s entry into language.” As I 
discussed earlier, language is a battlefield of ideologies. The subject’s initiation with 
language creates an ideological interpellation of which he/she is unconscious. Language 
embodies ideological features and elements; it absorbs and reproduces them, and 
ultimately makes them constructive of the subject’s subjectivity.  
    There are two different phases in the subject’s exposition to language: infantile and 
mature years. I elaborated on alienation in infantile years earlier in the thesis. As for the 
mature years, the subject is alienated through the ideological interpellation that has both 
direct and dramatic modes. An example of direct interpellation is Althusser’s story of a 
police calling an individual in the street; the example for indirect and dramatic 
interpellation, which happens through language, is when the subject watches a movie, 
serial, or news on TV. The subject is here dramatically interpellated through ideological 
language. What is of importance here is that ideological interpellation and its 
consequent linguistic alienation often happen in the unconscious.  
    In both phases the ideological constitution may happen both consciously and 
unconsciously. An example for the conscious ideological constitution of the oedipal 
period is those moments when the child is frequently asking questions. What is 
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operating here and needs to be analyzed is the language the subject acquires, learns, or 
is exposed to. The language the subject encounters in both the oedipal and mature 
phases interpellates the subject. What seems most notable is that, in Althusser, ideology 
and interpellation not only consist of but also constitute each other. Thus, wherever 
there is ideology, we can see interpellation at work. The subject is ideologically 
constituted in that the linguistic signifiers s/he is unconsciously alienated by are already 
ideologically designated and, hence, loaded with an ideological burden. Thus the 
Symbolic the subject is exposed to is itself predominantly ideological in that most of the 
subjectivities are ideological. Moreover, there are different ideological subjectivities in 
the identity of the subject and the subject functions according to the ‘dominant’ one.253 
 
6.4.3 Representation of Identity in Language 
Subjectivity, especially when ideologically constituted, is represented in the language of 
a text. The question of the relation of a text to ideology has been of high interest to any 
Marxist literary criticism. However, what makes the present methodology 
distinguishable is its focus on the representation of ideological subjectivities in 
language. ‘Ideological language,’ a key concept in my analysis of the identity of the 
subject,’ is not responsible for the subject’s whole identity. It represents only a 
particular subjectivity that is itself permanently changing because of the changes in the 
framework and extent to which the subject is exposed. Ideological constitution of the 
subject happens when the ideological signifier is established in the subject’s 
unconscious. Investigation into the ideological language is a complicated process in that 
each ideological aspect of language is itself influenced by a vast number of ideologies in 
the same language. What are the characteristics of an ideological language? The origin 
of the answer goes back to what ideology itself is. In Althusser, except for real art and 
science, everything may be categorized into the realm of ideology. More specifically, 
ideology is that which is found in and produced by the ideological State apparatuses: the 
language in domestic, educational, religious, and political systems is ideological. If we 
consider their mode of language reproduction with especial reference to their 
mechanism of ideological production, we will succeed in determining a moment when 
Marxism and psychoanalysis meet in language. 
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    If, for Althusser, everything except for real art and science is ranked among 
ideologies, therefore, language, in most instances of its usage is provided with an 
ideological character. Therefore, the process of language acquisition includes ideology 
acquisition too. The subjection of the subject to ideology happens through language 
dramatically. Language makes us the subject to ideology from an early stage of life 
sometimes even without our perception of it. Language is a pre-given structure to the 
subject, and it thus plays the role of the Other for the subject. On the other hand, every 
subject uses and expresses language in its particular way, and, accordingly, it is also a 
belonging of the subject. Then, language is both the other and the self to the subject.  
    Furthermore, language can be conceived of as the converging point where both the 
universal and the particular come together. Language, as the other, is the site of the 
universal. It is, as what the subject owns, the site of the particular. The identity of the 
subject is thus characterised by its distance from the universal and the particular. What 
happens to the subject when positioned in the particular in opposition to the universal 
has been the subject of a substantial philosophical debate. A recent contemplation on the 
struggle between the two is Laclau’s “Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of 
Identity.” He argues that “pure particularism is self-defeating:” 
    
... the argument for pure particularism is ultimately inconsistent. For if each identity is in a 
differential, nonantagonistic relation to all other identities, then the identity in question is 
purely differential and relative: it presupposes not only the presence of all the other 
identities but also the total ground that constitutes the differences as differences. ... if a 
particularity asserts itself as mere particularity, in a purely differential relation with other 
particularities, it is sanctioning the status quo in power relations between the groups.254 
 
    If the Other is considered as the universal to which the subject is exposed and if the 
self is taken as the particular which the subject produces, language will become the 
terrain where both are manifested. Bringing into consideration Laclau’s remarks on 
particularity, one can propose that language is functioning on its universal feature, 
which comes from the Other.  
    Artistic language – produced by the persona of lyric poetry or manifested in a poetic 
novel, to name only a few – often represents the particular and not the universal.  
Whereas language is closely related to the universal, it becomes the site for particularity 
in some inventive styles of composition.  However, there is still a conflict between the 
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universal and the particular in the creative style of writing: any invention in language is 
in opposition to the Other from which language has been obtained. Therefore, there is 
always a struggle with the Other in artistic works. Reviewing my argument concerning 
the consideration of the Other as constitutive of the ideological Symbolic, I want to 
contend that artistic invention in language is in a profound conflict with the ideological 
Symbolic that has already constituted the subject.  
    The subject’s relation to language in the above examples reminds us of the famous 
Lacanian idea of ‘the wall of language.’ Language is that which keeps the subject from 
the Other. Language, on one hand, divides the subject and the Other, and, on the other 
hand, divides the subject itself. In a seminar Lacan pointed to the wall of language as 
the factor behind the separation of the subject from the Others: 
 
So there’s the plane of the mirror, the symmetrical world of the egos and of the 
homogeneous others. We’ll have to distinguish an other level, which we call the wall of 
language…The subject is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the wall of 
language… In other words, language is as much there to found us in the Other as to 
drastically prevent us from understanding him.255 
 
Lacan’s consideration of language, like Laclau’s emphasis on universality, is in favour 
of the Other. In both accounts, although an individual ego exists and particularity is at 
work, it is the Other that exerts its influence at the last instance. Language, 
consequently, becomes the site for dialectics between ideological subjectivities.  
    Yet, the subject can succeed in affecting the Other, the structure, if we agree with the 
Althusserian model in which every change in a practice results in a change in the 
structure to which that practice belongs. The Althusserian model of the position the 
subject provides, in comparison with Foucauldian and even Lacanian approaches, a 
‘relative freedom’ for the protagonist of a literary text in his/her acts of identity re-
construction. Ideology is regarded by Althusser as having no beginning and end. It is 
part of human existence. The subjects need ideologies in that they need to explain 
themselves, even in their sexual and non-sexual fantasies. But what makes the 
Althusserian model different is that while in Lacan the subject is doomed to be 
governed forever by the desire of the Other, and also while in Foucault the subject’s 
psychic identity is marginalized in favour of the discourse that has already produced 
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him/her, in Althusser the subject can affect the structure and ideology. The Althusserian 
subject, because of his/her practices, including the theoretical practices, can affect not 
only the other levels of the social formation but also the complex whole itself. 
    As far as the subject’s act of the development of language in his/her mature years is 
concerned, the Althusserian model also provides a relative freedom for the literary 
protagonist of a given text in facing the conflicts between the his/her linguistic 
inventions and the ideological subjectivities that surround him/her. The Lacanian 
subject is always doomed to be determined forever by the Symbolic. This theoretical 
feature has been ignored in both Žižek and Butler’s evaluations of Althusser. However, 
Butler’s concept of the agent is similar to the Althusserian model in that it seeks to 
come out of a linguistically determinist framework and deals with the complicated 
process of de-institutionalization and the rise of new subjectivities within the subject’s 
identity. 
    As noted, the representation of identity in language is mostly analysed throughout 
this thesis through focusing on the realm of the Symbolic. However, the relation of 
language to the Imaginary and the Real has also aroused challenging critical 
evaluations. In his paper on Freud and Lacan Althusser demonstrated how the 
Imaginary itself is structured and determined through the order of language. Examining 
Lacan’s psychoanalytical concepts of the triad orders that the subject is positioned in, 
Althusser argued that “the moment of the imaginary itself ... is marked and structured in 
its dialectic by the very dialectic of the Symbolic Order, that is, of the human order, of 
the human norm ... in the very form of the Order of the signifier, that is, in the form of 
an Order formally identical to the order of language.”256    
    Concerning the relation of language to our understanding of the Real, I demonstrated 
earlier in the thesis that Lacan approached the Real as that which is not expressed in 
language and, hence, which the subject cannot experience. However, the problem here 
is that the Real, though inexpressible, exists. As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, 
Jameson argues that Lacanian theory of the triad orders is notable in that it investigates 
these three different orders in the same subject. For him, the transition of the Imaginary 
into the Symbolic is important, an approach observed in Lacan’s reading of Poe’s “The 
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Purloined Letter.”257 Also, as discussed earlier, Žižek employs both Lacan and Hegel in 
order to deal with the relation of language to the Real.    
    What is important here is that the conception of the Real is made through the 
Symbolic. In other words, there is nothing outside the Symbolic that can deal with the 
Real. In our perception of the Real we use language that is a major constituent part of 
the Symbolic. Even philosophers, who are obsessed with the investigation of the Real, 
inevitably explore it through the sign system of the Symbolic, language. Therefore, any 
discussion of the association of language to both Real and Imaginary orders is itself 
determined by the Symbolic. 
    The question of the construction and representation of identity is also crucial in 
Critical Discourse Analysis. Norman Fairclough’s work provides a classic example 
here. He focuses on the way language regulates, and also changes, the social order. In 
Language and Control (1989) he deals with the instrumental role of language in 
maintaining and changing ideology and power relations. Demonstrating the way 
language contributes to the domination of some people by others, Fairclough argues that 
the aim of CDA is “helping people to see the extent to which their language does rest 
upon common sense assumptions, and the ways in which these common-sense 
assumptions can be ideologically shaped by relations of power.”258 Later dealing with 
the relationship between language and ideology in Critical Discourse Analysis: The 
Critical Study of Language (1995) Fairclough seeks to develop a theoretical model for 
the analysis of language in relation to ideology and power. 259 However, the main 
project of CDA, as Fairclough maintains in Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for 
Social Research (2003), is concerned with the analysis of linguistic categories including 
the relationship between the structure of the text and the agent of the text, which he 
refers to as “structure and agency,”260 and the linguistic elements of networks of social 
practices, what he calls “orders of discourse.”261  
    The critical model provided by the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic, though 
apparently similar to CDA, is distinguishable from it in several ways. First, there is here 
an emphasis on the Lacanian concept of the unconscious and the process that makes 
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ideology part of language and, accordingly, the unconscious. CDA, however, is not 
involved in the process of the formation of the unconscious as far as the linguistic 
alienation of the subject in the oedipal phase is concerned. Secondly, the ideological 
interpellation of the subject is central in the present methodology in that it produces 
ideological subjectivity within the subject’s identity. As for CDA, while it is concerned 
with ideological discourses, it does not focus on the direct and dramatic ways of the 
interpellation of the subject as far as the role of ideological signifiers in constructing 
identity is concerned. Furthermore, a major shortcoming in the methodology followed 
by CDA is that it emphasises the concept of discourse to the extent that the subject itself 
is marginalized. Dealing with the construction of a particular discourse in a Foucauldian 
paradigm,262 CDA approaches subjectivity through the analysis of the texts and not in 
the identity of the subject. This is a paradoxical consequence of Foucault’s work: 
whereas Foucault’s project was to bring into focus the marginalized subjects and 
minority groups, CDA, on the contrary, tends to ignore the analysis of the subject in 
favour of representing the foregrounded discourse.  
    The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic, however, is concerned with the analysis of the 
subject itself and the way the subject is constructed by the ideological Symbolic 
manifested in the language the subject is exposed to. It also focuses on the way the 
subject’s identity is represented in the language he or she acquires and later reproduces. 
In addition, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic considers the ideological language 
reproduced by the subject as representing only a particular subjectivity within the 
subject’s identity. Ideological language that represents the subject’s identity undergoes 
an ongoing state of changing in that there is always a change at work in the structure in 
which the subject is positioned.  
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
The present chapter investigated the major theoretical problems and premises of any 
critical attempt that applies both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject to the 
same work of art. A summary of the arguments of this chapter includes: first, although 
the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a critical approach to the analysis of the subject 
might be conceived of as the convergence of lack and material, this incongruity appears 
to be vital for the permanent functioning of language/ideology relation that is 
manifested in what I referred to as ideological signifier. Secondly, it was argued that the 
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Lacanian formulation of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of 
ideological interpellation are closely related in a way that both dramatic and direct ways 
of ideological interpellation in infantile and mature years, as two distinguishable phases 
in the development of the process of identity construction, cause linguist alienation for 
the subject. Consequently, the subject undergoes two modes of linguist alienation that 
occur in language acquisition process and the mature years respectively.   
    The chapter, then, concentrates on the theoretical premises of the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic as a critical perspective for the analysis of the identity of the 
subject. First, considering the concept of identity as an umbrella term that brings 
together different subjectivities within the realm of the same subject, I explored the 
‘inter-subjective dialectic’ and the ‘intra-subjective lack’ in the process of identity 
construction. Secondly, I discussed the ideological constitution of the subject with 
reference to the ideological character of the Symbolic and subjectivity. Approaching the 
Symbolic as ideological, this thesis explicitly provides the Lacanian concept with an 
Althusserian treatment. Thirdly, the representation of the identity of the subject in 
language was explored while focusing on ‘ideological signifier,’ a key concept in my 
analysis of the subject’s identity, and the role it plays in alienating the subject. 
However, ideological language is not responsible for the subject’s whole identity. It 
represents only a particular subjectivity that is itself permanently changing because of 
the changes in the framework and extent to which the subject is exposed. 
    In my study of the process of subject formation in Joyce’s novel in the following 
chapter I shall thus focus on the two modes of ideological interpellation and the 
consequent linguistic alienations. Elaborating on the identity construction of the subject, 
I shall explore the relation of language to the Symbolic through exploring the moments 
in which ideology transits into language. This approach shall also foreground the 
ideologies that existed in the context in which the text was produced. The text’s strategy 
towards these ideologies is determined by the way in which these ideologies are 
represented in the text. Considering the self-consciousness of the subject not as a fixed 
state but as an ongoing process that always remains incomplete, the following chapter 
also deals with the role of language in the re-construction of identity through 
investigating the inter-subjective dialectics between ideological subjectivities. 
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Chapter Seven:  
The Ideological Symbolic and Aesthetics of Language in A Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man: 
A Case Study in Subjectivity Formation and Representation 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates how the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic can be applied as a 
critical approach to reading a literary work. First, I shall interpret the process of subject 
formation in the protagonist of James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young man 
(1916), Stephen Dedalus, through both the Lacanian idea of linguistic alienation and the 
Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation. Investigating the ideological 
signifiers in Stephen Dedalus’ language acquisition process, I shall examine the role 
they play in the construction of an ideological subjectivity for the subject. Language 
acquisition process in the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is not only studied in parallel 
to the process of the identity construction of the subject but also examined with 
reference to those ideological signifiers to which the subject becomes mentally attached.  
    I shall also argue that the ideological character of the subjectivities represented in the 
novel can be read through an attentiveness to their ideological language.  Dealing with 
the inter-subjective dialectic between the ideological subjectivities in the identity of the 
other characters of the novel, I shall also examine both constructive and deconstructive 
modes of the inter-subjective dialectic in the identity of Mr Casey and Dante, two major 
characters in the novel. 
    The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is also crucial to the exploration of the re-
construction of identity in the subject’s mature years. I shall therefore outline the re-
constitution of the ideological subjectivities of Stephen’s identity through focusing on 
the new artistic language of the last parts of the novel that he attempts 
 to replace for the language he has been using throughout the novel. The Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic is instrumental in showing how the employment of this new artist 
language is in parallel to the construction of a new artistic subjectivity in Stephen 
Dedalus in that it focuses on the representation of identity in language through dealing 
with the complicated process of identity re-construction and the internal dialectics 
among the constituent subjectivities of the subject’s identity. Otherness within the 
subject’s identity is thus studied here with reference to the different languages of the 
 170
ideological subjectivities. The aesthetics of language in the novel is then examined in 
parallel to the aesthetic theory that the protagonist constructs his new artistic 
subjectivity on.      
 
7.2 The Ideological Other of the Symbolic:  
      Language and the Constitution of the Subject in A Portrait 
The subject is split by the Symbolic order in that the Other he or she is exposed to 
consists of different ideological languages. As argued in Chapter Six, the ideological 
signifiers dramatically interpellate and, then, linguistically alienate the subject in 
language acquisition process. The formation of subjectivity through the unconscious 
acts of identification with the ideological signifiers of the Symbolic is thus conceived of 
as the first major stage in the process of the construction of the identity of the subject.   
    The present section first seeks to demonstrate how ideological signifiers dramatically 
interpellate and linguistically alienate Stephen Dedalus, the protagonist of A Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man.  Family and school, as two significant ISAs, provide the 
contexts where ideological languages function in order to construct the identity of the 
subject. Then, I shall analyze the inter-subjective dialectics between the ideological 
subjectivities and focus on their consequences for the characters of the novel. Otherness 
within the subject’s identity is studied here through exploring the difference between the 
ideological subjectivities provided by religion and nationalism. The deconstructive 
mode of the inter-subjective dialectic is here demonstrated through concentrating on its 
negative mental consequences for some of the characters of the novel. 
 
7.2.1 Linguistic Alienation and Ideological Interpellation: 
         Language, the ISAs, and the Subject Formation  
The infant, throughout the process of language acquisition, is unconsciously alienated 
by language signifiers and, thus, becomes a subject of that language. The exploration of 
the Lacanian concept of alienation is essential to the analysis of the subject formation. 
This section attempts to demonstrate how the identity of the subject, Stephen Dedalus, 
is constructed through both mechanisms of alienation and interpellation. My analysis 
focuses on the role of the language employed by the major ISAs, family and school, in 
the subject formation of the protagonist of the novel.    
    As I demonstrated earlier, alienation can be considered as a dramatic mode of 
interpellation. It is dramatic in that it takes place unconsciously and it is a mode of 
interpellation since linguistic signifiers are ideological. I already argued that besides the 
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phallus, which is the most significant signifier in the subject’s unconscious according to 
Lacan, there are other signifiers with which the subject seeks to be in identity. These 
signifiers are loaded with ideological designations and already defined by ideology.  
    The identity of the subject, in Lacan, is constructed when the subject unconsciously 
seeks a unity between itself and the signifiers. These signifiers alienate the subject in an 
unconscious way. These signifiers are supposedly filling the gap that emerges after the 
mother/infant disunity. This new unconscious unity between the subject and signifiers 
takes place when the mother/infant identity is shattered first because of the emergence 
of the other and then as a result of the subject’s acquisition of language.  
    The novel opens with a tale the protagonist’s father is narrating to him. The diction 
and style of the first two pages of the novel, which deal with the early years of the 
protagonist’s life, have been clearly chosen. They contain the protagonist’s account of 
the first experiences of his life and the tale his father narrated to him: 
 
Once upon a time and a very good time it was there was a moocow coming down along the 
road and this moocow that was coming down along the road met a nicens little boy named 
baby tuckoo…. 263 
 
Although the repetition of such words and phrases as ‘time,’ ‘the moocow coming down 
the road,’ the ‘and’ between “once upon a time and a very good time,” and ‘the road’ is 
a characteristic feature of the tales parents read for their children, the act of ‘repetition’ 
itself in language acquisition process is instrumental in giving an ordered shape to the 
infant’s chaotic unconscious. The unconscious is thus ‘structured’ according to the 
structure of the language the subject acquires. As demonstrated earlier, the Lacanian 
account of the unconscious is in sharp contrast to the Freudian consideration of the term 
as ‘disordered.’ This change in the unconscious from disordered to ‘structured’ is in 
parallel to the process of subject formation. As Colin MacCabe argues, the very story of 
the beginning of the novel also determines the structure within which the subject is 
positioned:  
 
If we refer back to the opening section of A Portrait we can find that the interplay between 
narrative and discourse is dramatized in the opening few lines. The narrative told by the 
father produces the structure through which identification will determine discourse. The 
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position of baby tuckoo within the narrative is the starting-point for the subject’s 
discourse.264   
 
The signifiers, which are themselves based on lack because of language negativity, seek 
to become unified with the subject’s unconscious. The language exposed to the small 
children also determines the structure of their unconscious. For example, the way the 
infant is dramatically entertained and educated through fairy stories depicts a world that 
is based on the binary opposition of good/bad, human being/animal, small/big, and 
children/grown ups. The tale usually told to infants by their parents follows a certain 
narratological pattern that plays a significant role in the subject formation. Furthermore, 
even such childish use of language has a decisive role in interpellating the child 
dramatically; that is to say, the child, through this style and a kind tone, is positioned in 
a context in which he/she will face a number of universal truths and simple divisions of 
good and bad. The narration continues: 
 
His father told him that story: his father looked at him through a glass: he had a hairy 
face.265 
 
His father had a hairy face in contrast to that of his mother. Apart from the father/the 
mother and hairy/hairless binary oppositions and the structural construction of the mind, 
one of the elements of binary oppositions is always the centred. The father is the 
privileged element of the father/the mother binary pair in that the first lines of the story 
open with references to father. As I demonstrated earlier, in Althusser the child has 
already the name and, hence, the identity, of the father, and in Lacan the ‘name of the 
father’ is also considered as the ‘no’ of the father. In both accounts the father’s authority 
is manifested along with the language the subject is exposed to. Language, which 
includes the symbolic rules and the ‘no’ of the father, provides the Other upon which 
the identity of the subject is formed. The Symbolic is both interpellating and alienating 
the subject through language. The family is the first ISA to which the subject is 
exposed. If we regard the family as an ISA, then, we should analyze the interpellation 
happening there. However, interpellation occurs indirectly in the family and the subject 
is not aware of it.  
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    Language in Lacan is thought of as having a masculine character. Stephen, as we 
recognize later, cannot communicate with his father. This rebellion against the father 
changes into the form of rebel against language. His treatment of language later in the 
novel and, especially, in the other two novels by Joyce, shows this influence. Thus, in 
the same page he refers to his mother as having “a nicer smell than his father.” While 
father/mother is a binary opposition, there is also a contradiction between Uncle Charles 
and Dante.  Dante’s two brushes, the one with the maroon velvet back for Michael 
Davitt, and the one with green velvet back for Parnell, are symbols that go throughout 
the novel. Throughout the novel Stephen links these two colors to the way his family 
members deal with Irish politics. The very signifier ‘green’ is symbolically repeated in 
the first poem: 
 
                     O, the wild rose blossoms 
                     On the little green place.266 
 
    It is interesting that in the beginning pages he also mentions the Vances, who can be 
conceived of as the ‘other’ of their family, the way Uncle Charles is the ‘other’ to Dante 
and green to maroon for the little child. These are different binary oppositions at work. 
These ‘others’ are behind the formation of the identity of the protagonist. Other 
important binary oppositions are hot/cold and light/dark, the latter implied in the 
following poem. Eileen, the Protestant girl to whom Stephen wishes to get married is 
the other to him in that while he is a Catholic, she is a Protestant. Stephen thus has to 
apologize because of such a wish: 
 
        His mother said: 
        —O, Stephen will apologise. 
        Dante said: 
        —O, if not, the eagles will come and pull out his eyes. 
                              
                                Pull out his eyes. 
                                   Apologise, 
                                   Apologise, 
                                   Pull out his eyes. 
 
                                   Apologise, 
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                                   Pull out his eyes, 
                                   Pull out his eyes, 
                                   Apologise.267 
 
This part should be considered from different views. First, Stephen is asked not to name 
Eileen because she is a protestant. This is the first moment when Stephen as the subject, 
is requested to remain subject to the ideological framework of the family, represented 
primarily in his mother and aunt. Secondly, this is the first time both in the novel that 
the subject is informed and aware of the punishment of ideology. Thirdly, these motifs 
are included in a language that is expresses kindly and in the form of a poem. The ‘O’ 
uttered by both his mother and aunt is apparently a kind feminine one, but it has really a 
harsh religious consequence: the eagles will come and pull out his eyes. Here ideology 
begins to repress. The eagle here acts like an ideological and repressive State apparatus, 
be it the Catholic Church or the law subject to it. It is a good example of impeachment, 
where the subject is also castrated by the symbolic order.      
    Stephen is made a subject through a poem, a rhythmical one, one that the subject is 
interpellated by dramatically. Both fairy tales and nursery rhymes can be considered as 
means of structuring the child’s unconscious through indirectly interpellating it with 
their signifiers and concepts. Moreover, we see the repetition of certain words in the 
poem. Repetition especially here in this poem is a means to create a pleasant rhythmic 
beat in order to softly and dramatically subject Stephen. 
    The next significant stage of Stephen’s mental development and formation happens 
when he is learning the names, the signifiers. Later we are reminded of the significance 
of the names for him: 
 
She had taught him where the Mozambique channel was and what was the longest river in 
America and what was the name of the highest mountain in the moon.268 
 
Children have a passion for knowing names. They do not know where the longest river 
in America is but want to utter the name of it, which is the word, the signifier. These 
names, here symbols for general knowledge, do play a decisive role in the child’s 
alienation. These words alienate the subject in the Lacanian sense of the term. Later he 
begins to identify himself with these names: 
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Stephen Dedalus 
Class of Elements 
Clongowes Wood College 
Sallins 
County Kildare 
Ireland 
The Europe 
The World 
The Universe 269 
 
These are the words, the signifiers, which provide Stephen with his identity. These 
signifiers are alienating the protagonist of the novel through creating an identity 
between Stephen and them. Thus, Stephen’s identity is formed by his identification to 
them that is in parallel to his alienation in that they are forming him and he himself 
forms himself. Afterwards in his thought, he comes to the major signifier, God. He 
contemplates the different words used for God.270 This is another example of his 
obsession with the signifiers.  
    The word ‘name,’ in ancient Greece, was the word used for the ‘word’. It is the same 
with the Holy Scriptures, when God taught Adam all the names, which is all the words. 
As Maud Ellmann has pointed out, the same function of the words can be seen in the 
character of Wondjina in Homer’s The Odyssey.271 The mythical story of Wondjina 
refers to the relationship between naming the things and their creation. There is always 
a relation between the names and the knowledge they convey and the reality they create. 
This process is later reversed in the novel when Stephen coins a number of words 
through processes of portmanteau and neologism.    
    On the other hand, the school, as another major ideological State apparatus, plays a 
significant role in the interpellation of the subject. Stephen’s first experience of the 
school is mentioned immediately after the end of the first two pages of the novel. The 
style abruptly changes from a simple and dramatic style of a small child to a mediocre 
and descriptive style of a school boy: 
 
The wide playgrounds were swarming with the boys. All were shouting and the perfects 
urged them on with strong cries. The evening air was pale and chilly and after every charge 
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and thud of the footballers the greay leather orb flew like a heavy bird through the grey 
like.272 
 
Although this style is not highly figurative, it is clear that Stephen has an artistic 
concern even from this beginning because he uses a number of similes and images for 
his descriptions.  At school Stephen remains an outsider in that he does not take part in 
the activities done by the other students. Here, as in the family, his egoism is evident. 
From the beginning he divides the world into two, the world of others and the world of 
the self. Although this is common to autobiographical novels, what makes A Portrait 
distinct is that whereas the protagonist of a typical bildungsroman is influenced by the 
society’s conventions, Stephen remains detached from his surroundings from the 
beginning to the end.  
    Clongowes Wood College gives Stephen his first experience of going from an 
ideological apparatus to another one, from family to school. What is of interest here is 
the change in language; in other words, there is an abrupt change between two different 
types of language the subject is exposed to. Whereas the first style of language is 
characterised with a soft tone and kind treatment, and it dramatically brings to the 
subject a structural and linguistic alienation through nursery rhymes, the second mode 
of language includes a harsh tone and directly interpellates the child.   
    The students are ordered what to do and what not to do. Stephen is punished by 
Father Dolan for not working hard; Stephen is not lying and it is because of his broken 
glasses. But the perfect of studies does not believe him. The other events in the school 
make it a place similar to a prison or police headquarter:  
 
        The door opened quietly and closely. A quick whisper ran through the class: the   
    perfect of studies. There was an instant of dead silence and then the loud crack of a   
    pandybat on the last desk. Stephen’s heart leapt up in fear. 
               —Any boys want flogging here, Father Arnall? Cried the perfect of studies. Any  
           lazy idle loafers that want flogging in this class?273 
 
This is an indirect criticism of the traditional system of education, where the teacher 
was supposed to be of absolute power to do whatever he wants to the students. The 
Lacanian concept of the Symbolic is the realm in which Althusser’s ideological State 
apparatuses find their vein in language. Interpellation of the subject through language is 
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observed in the words of the perfect of studies. The description of the aches of the 
beaten hands of Stephen by Father Dolan shows not only Joyce’s uses of different 
imagery and his mastery to represent the act but also the bitter memory of the 
experience: 
 
…the swish of the sleeve of the soutane as the pandybat was lifted to strike. A hot burning 
stinging tingling blow like the loud crack of a broken stick made his trembling hand 
crumple together like a leaf in the fire.274 
 
The educational system, especially in its traditional mode, provides the context in which 
the subject faces direct interpellation and alienation. Studying the role of schools in the 
making of middle-class identities in Victorian Britain while referring to Robert Graves’ 
experiences at school, Regenia Gagnier suggests that “as a schoolboy one had no 
content but rather only relative value in the hierarchy until one finally assumed one’s 
privileged position in society or the empire.”275 The school here becomes a repressive 
apparatus, a place for punishment. Conceived of as a significant ISA in the Althusserian 
theory of ideology, the school now becomes an example for the RSA, where both 
ideological interpellation and physical repression come together. 
    The other significant scene in which ideological language is strongly felt and 
affective is the famous sermon in the third chapter of the novel. Father Arnall delivers a 
sermon that marks the day of St. Francis Xavier. This passage begins with: (dramatic 
interpellation) 
 
 —Remember only thy last things and thou shalt not sin for ever—words taken, my dear 
little brothers in Christ, from the book of Ecclesiastes, seventh chapter, fortieth verse. In the 
name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.276 
  
This is the beginning of Father Arnall’s sermon on “last things,” which are Death, 
Judgment, Hell, and Heaven. Although the first sentence of the extract is directly from 
The Bible, the style of the rest of the paragraph, except for archaism, is like the first 
sentence. First, he uses the common catholic phrase of “my dear brothers in Christ”; 
however, the tone of his speech, which is initially kind and generous, later becomes 
frightening.  
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The repetition of the word ‘God’ brings to our mind that Father is the representative or 
spokesman of God. He gives himself the right to talk to people of God. Father Arnall 
uses other characteristic features of religious language such as is the usage of different 
binary pairs: this world/that world, life/death, Pious/Evil, heaven/hell, Adam/Eve. These 
binary oppositions determine the structure of the mind of the subject. 
    Father Arnall’s account of the beginning of the world emphasizes the story of 
Lucifer’s pride and the famous motif of the novel: “non serviam: I will not serve.”277 
After the break, Father Arnall delivers a sermon and this time focuses on the story of the 
original sin of Lucifer and his fellow angels who fell from heaven at God’s command. 
After describing the hell and its fire, he says: 
 
The horror of this strait and dark prison is increased by its awful stench. All the filth of the 
world, all the offal and scum of the world, we are told, shall run there as to a vast reeking 
sewer when the terrible conflagration of the last day has purged the world. The brimstone 
too with its intolerable stench; and the bodies of the damned themselves exhale such a 
pestilential odour that as saint Bonaventure says, one of them alone would suffice to infect 
the whole world.278 
 
The structure of this part of the sermon is based on The Bible and Giovani Pietro 
Pinamonti’s Hell Opened to Christians, to Caution Them from Entering into It (1688), 
which was translated and published in Dublin in 1868.279 This passage explains the 
horrors of the Hell such as the boiling of the blood and brains of the sinner. Father 
Arnall also says that the worst horror of the Hell is the presence of the devils. Religion 
that was supposed to be compassionate in the beginning of the passage now transforms 
into a source and means of torture.    
    What is of significance is that the aim of this passage is not on spirituality; it is rather 
to evoke fear and to make them frightened. This is the way ideology plans to make 
people become subjected to them.  Interestingly, it is ultimately successful. It makes 
Stephen repent; he is paralyzed by fear and then repents. The repetition of prayer of the 
church at the end of this section is considered as the complete establishment of 
Stephen’s complete repentance.280 The church, as an established ISA, like the school, 
employs a method that is characteristic of the RSAs. The language it employs evolves 
fear and thus ideological institutes become a place to create Repression. 
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    Stephen becomes so affected by this sermon that he thinks of the rich meal he has just 
eaten, and thinks it has made him into a brutish creature. Stephen listens to the rain 
falling on the chapel and imagines another biblical flood coming: 
 
Rain was falling on the chapel, on the garden, on the college. It would rain for ever, 
noiselessly. The water would rise inch by inch, covering the grass and shrubs, covering the 
trees and houses, covering the monuments and the mountain tops. All life would be choked 
off, noiselessly: birds, men, elephants, pigs, children: noiselessly floating corpses amid the 
litter of the wreckage of the world. Forty days and forty nights the rain would fall till the 
waters covered the face of the earth.281 
 
    He becomes calm; the language in the last part of this chapter is full of bright and 
spiritual imagery. The air is clean; he is calm and asks God to forget him. He wants his 
lost innocence back. Stephen is seeking an identity between himself and religious faith. 
In other words, the religious subjectivity now pervades his identity. He confesses to a 
priest that he has had sexual relations with a woman and that he is only sixteen. The 
priest offers forgiveness and Stephen heads home feeling filled with grace.     
    Stephen’s confession makes him feel that he is again in full identity with those 
signifiers that have already constituted his/her identity. Stephen is now at complete 
mental balance. He is calm and even surprised when he finds that the rain is over and 
the sky is all open and blue. The other example of ideological language happens at the 
beginning of Chapter Four when Stephen is reviewing his religious orders:  
 
Sunday was dedicated to the mystery of the Holy Trinity, Monday to the Holy Ghost, 
Tuesday to the Guardian Angels, Wednesday to Saint Joseph, Thursday to the Most Blessed 
Sacrament of the Altar, Friday to the suffering Jesus, Saturday to the Blessed Virgin 
Mary.282 
 
Joyce has here taken the list from a book of order to capture Stephen’s complete 
adherence to the regulations of the church. Except for the only verb of the passage and 
the prepositions all other words are religious. This marks the moment when Stephen’s 
subjectivity is in complete identity with religious concepts and terms. He is now 
completely subject to religious faith. Stephen’s ideological subjectivity, though 
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including the lack that paves the way for later antagonism, is now so dominant that is 
considered as his identity at this part of the novel.  
    Therefore, the family and school provide the contexts where the subject is both 
alienated and interpellated through language. This mode of alienation happens not only 
in Stephen’s infantile phase but also in his later life. Whereas infantile ‘child language 
acquisition’ provides a process through which the child is linguistically alienated by 
ideological signifiers, the grownup subject, too, is dramatically interpellated when, for 
example, he/she is educated at school. Both examples of direct and dramatic 
interpellation occur in A Portrait.   
 
 
7.2.2 The Inter-Subjective Dialectic: 
         Religion, Nationalism, and Otherness  
Language, as the realm of otherness, provides the subject with different ideological 
subjectivities. The ideological constitution of the subject is dependent on the inter-
subjective dialectic of the Symbolic. This section, demonstrating the inter-subjective 
dialectic between religious and nationalistic subjectivities, seeks to argue this dialectic 
can act either as constructive of a new subjectivity or further subjection to previously-
formed subjectivities.    
    Religious faith is one of the most wide-ranging influences on subjectivity in the 
identity of the subjects in A Portrait. As a young boy, Stephen is early exposed to 
Catholicism through Dante’s symbolic maroon velvet brush. Even his name has a 
religious connotation that refers to St Stephen, the first Christian martyr. Catholic 
terminology and references litter the novel from start to end, whether through the 
obvious repetition of prayers or obscure references to Catholic theology and history. To 
take the formal language of religious adherence first, when Uncle Charles asks Stephen 
to recite the prayer before the meal, it is the first time that Stephen has been allowed to 
eat dinner with the elders. Stephen says the prayer: 
 
 Bless us, O Lord, and these Thy gifts which through Thy bounty we are about to receive 
through Christ Our Lord. Amen.283 
 
This is the establishment of Stephen within the religious context in which the Christmas 
dinner is to be served, featuring the traditional form of Catholic blessing, a language 
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both archaic and perfectly at place at the family table. However, it is clear that Stephen 
is not comfortable at the occasion. This is obvious from the way he is dressed: “The 
deep low collar and the Eton jacket made him feel queer and oldish.”284 At the 
Christmas table, Catholicism and nationalism, as two major ideological subjectivities, 
come across together. While Catholicism is in possession of a number of established 
apparatuses and institutions, nationalism remains as a discourse without a formal 
apparatus or established institution in the novel. Stephen becomes familiar with the Irish 
nationalism through the family. His father has patriotic tendencies. Stephen takes 
weekend walks through the town with his father and uncle, listening to their political 
discussions and their stories about the past. Stephen does not understand many of their 
references. Pericles Lewis points to Stephen’s relation to the political events of the day 
in this way: 
 
A portrait tells the story of Stephen’s emergence into consciousness as an emergence into 
Irish history. Political events that play a crucial role in Stephen’s conception of his place in 
history, such as the fall of Parnell, precede Stephen’s conscious understanding of Irish 
politics, and Stephen’s attempts to understand such events are part of the novel’s drama … 
As a child, Stephen cannot solve the problems that theology and politics raise for him … 
Stephen is conscious of growing up in a world in which politics and story weigh upon the 
brains of the living.285 
  
The first significant discussion regarding Irish nationalism happens when Stephen 
returns home from the college. It is the time of Parnell’s death: 
 
         —Parnell! Parnell! He is dead! 
        They fell upon their knees, moaning in sorrow.286 
 
The family tensions run high when discussing the death of Parnell. Whereas Dante later 
says that the church had done the right thing to condemn Parnell, Mr Casey considered 
Parnell a hero and blamed the church for his death. A significant event of the novel 
happens here when a debate rises between Dante and Mr Casey. This sensitive subject 
becomes the topic of a furious, politically charged argument over the family's Christmas 
dinner. When Mr Casey criticizes the negative impacts of the Catholic Church in Irish 
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politics, Dante gets angry and says that nobody should criticize the church. “It is 
religion,” Dante says, “[t]hey are right. They must direct their flocks.”287   
    This disagreement finally becomes a furious argument. Dante quotes The Bible, 
saying that priests must always be respected. She believes that the church should be 
more respected than politics. What is interesting is that Dante answers Mr Casey by 
quoting from The Bible: 
 
“—Woe be to the man by whom the scandal cometh! Said Mrs Riordan. It would be 
better for him that a millstone were tied about his neck and that he were cast into 
the depth of the sea rather than that he should scandalize one of these , my least 
little ones.288 
 
As observed, Mrs Riordan’s answer to Mr Casey is completely borrowed from The 
Bible. Interestingly, sometimes it is Dante herself that becomes the manifestation of that 
faith. Here the normal words and those from The Bible have been mingled together in a 
way that they seem to be of the same origin. She shows her disapproval of Protestantism 
again when she says: “The blackest Protestant in the land would not speak the language 
I have heard this evening.”289 
    Both Catholicism and nationalism attempt to make the Irish subjects subject to them. 
In the debate, Mr Casey is for Irish nationalism and Dante for Catholicism. It is clear 
that both attempt to make the poor Stephen subject to the corresponding ideology. 
Stephen is thus located in a position that two different ideologies are clashing, each one 
attempting to use the language he likes: while Dante uses the language of The Bible, Mr 
Dedalus, another patriotic present at he scene, uses the language of an Irish parody: 
 
              O, come all you Roman catholics 
              That never went to mass.290 
  
When Mr Casey talks about Parnell and the woman he had an illegal affair with, Dante 
gets infuriated clearly because religion would not permit such affairs. Mr Casey 
believes that politics and Irish nationalism are what matter and Catholicism has nothing 
to do with nationalism. There is no resolution between them, as there is none between 
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Dante and Mr Casey. Both insist on their own standpoints.  These two discourses here 
prove to be contradictory. The result is such a hot debate: 
 
                   —God and religion before every thing! Dante cried. God and religion    
             before the world! 
                   Mr Casey raised his clenched fist and brought it down on the table   
             with a crash.  
                    —Very well, then, he shouted hoarsely, if it comes to that, no God for  
             Ireland!291 
 
    The above dialogues manifest an inter-subjectivity dialectic between these two 
subjectivities. This dialectic, though taking place between two subjects, has in internal 
form too. In other words, each one of the subjects is constituted by the opposite of what 
s/he attempts to take side with. However,   one side of the dialectic is so powerful that it 
results in disordered behaviour. As for Mr Casey and Dante, this dialectic is destructive 
in that it creates mental imbalance, manifested in the act of crying and the trembling of 
the body. It is also destructive in that it does not result in a synthesis, which is the 
logical outcome of a dialectic in a purely Hegelian sense. Both subjects, Dante and Mr 
Casey, are subjects of a specific ideological language. The inter-subjective dialectic 
here is not constructive of a new subjectivity; it is rather a means to further subjection to 
the already dominant subjectivity of the identity of the subject. The alienation in Dante 
and Mr Casey is the result of their being ideologically interpellated by Catholicism and 
Nationalism respectively.    
    What is observed in both characters is what is commonly referred to as the crisis of 
identity. Each one of them thinks that he/she is threatened by a subjectivity opposed to 
his/her own. They cannot create reconciliation between the two, or choose one of these 
two subjectivities, or develop one by the other. That is why sometimes we see them in 
the novel acting in another way. For example, Dante, who is religious, hits “the 
gentleman on the head with her umbrella because he had taken off his hat when the 
band played God save the Queen at the end.”292 The same happens to Mr Casey because 
when he says no God for Ireland it does not mean that he is atheist; he is a nationalist 
who believes that the Irish people, because of their involvement in strict religiosity, 
have neglected their cause: “We have had too much God in Ireland.” 293 
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     The nationalist Mr Casey believes in Parnell and thinks of him as the savior; the 
religious Dante thinks of Christ as the savior; these are two ideologies and each need a 
messiah. The intra-subjective lack that I discussed in the preceding chapter creates a gap 
that has to be filled by such a messiah. Ideological subjectivity includes and needs a 
telos. This is the promise of ideology. Parnell was supposed to realize Irish 
independence. The same is right concerning Dante and her belief in the Christian idea of 
the utopia. However, as explained earlier, ideology never fulfils the utopia it depicts and 
this is itself one of the reasons behind the permanent functioning of ideology. On the 
other hand, the inter-subjective dialectic can be constructive of a new subjectivity. Here 
the term dialectic remains loyal to its Hegelian usage in that if the two sides of inter-
subjective dialectic are considered as thesis and anti-thesis, the new subjectivity 
constructed out of this dialectic is a synthesis, one that is different from the two.   
    Later at school, Stephen discusses with other students Irish nationalism. There is also 
inter-subjective dialectic between the students with nationalist aspirations and 
Catholicism that is what the school stands for. What is interesting concerning the 
educational system in A Portrait is that it is so much blended with the religious system 
that is hard and even sometimes impossible to separate them. The Catholic nature of the 
educational system represented in the novel is so marked that the school can be mostly 
considered as a religious institute. Clongowes Wood College is primarily a religious 
institute, and the education there is heavily marked by religious doctrines. Religious 
education is so important that even when Stephen is forced to leave Clongowes because 
of financial problems of the family, he attends Belvedere, a Jesuit school. Although 
there are signs of the religious system everywhere at Belvedere,  he develops, after 
several ups and downs, a passion for writing and artistic activities; what is of interest 
here is that even the play in which he is supposed to act is for a religious occasion, the 
Christian feast of Pentecost.  
     A major ideological subjectivity present in the identity of a number of the characters 
of the novel including some of the students is vulgar or orthodox nationalism. This 
popular form of nationalism plays the role the ‘other’ for the aesthetic ego of Stephen. 
For example, later at the school Stephen is asked by two students, Davin and McCann, 
to develop a more serious interest in politics regarding Irish issues. Davin, a manifest 
Irish patriot, clearly expresses his passion for Irish nationalism in the university: “Vivre 
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L’Irlande!”294 ”Try to be one of us,” Davin says to Stephen, “[i]n your heart you are an 
Irishman but your pride is too powerful.”295 
     This mode of nationalism is expressed in journalistic discourse; it is idealist, 
“schoolboyish”, and concerned with slogans than hard work. Seamus Deane argues that 
both Joyce and Yeats are marked by a rejection of traditional nationalism: 
 
Despite the differences which separate them, Yeats and Joyce repudiate the more 
pronounced forms of political nationalism – those associated with Pearse and with the 
journalism of newspapers like D.P.M Moran’s The Leader – on the same grounds. It is, in 
effect, too crude, too schoolboyish, too eager to demand a spirit of solidarity and service 
that has more in common with propaganda than it has with art.296 
 
However, as Deane later argues, if Yeats’ Ireland was one in which the Celtic past was 
to be embraced, Joyce’s Ireland was one in which spiritual reality did not yet exist. It 
was Joyce’s aspiration and ambition to create it in his works. Thus, if Yeats was 
disappointed with the present Dublin, Joyce’s Dublin was to form anew in his works. “It 
is well known,” Seamus Deane argues, that Joyce “repudiated Irish literary revival,” but 
unlike Yeats he “remained faithful to the original conception of the Revival.” If Yeats 
talked of and indeed gave up “the deliberate creation of a kind of Holy City in the 
imagination” Joyce’s “Dublin became the Holy City of which Yeats had despaired.”297  
    Stephen, instead of becoming a subject to this dominant mode of Irish nationalism or 
to what the educational system calls for, develops a new subjectivity that is neither 
religious nor nationalistic. This new subjectivity is non-ideological and based on art and 
aesthetics. Jean-Michel Rabaté   in his James Joyce and the Politics of Egoism (2001) 
argues that Stephen, as the ego, was in conflict with the idea of the nation. However, 
this does not mean that he was not a political writer; on the contrary, his treatment of 
politics is one of the most complicated: 
 
To say that Joyce should be called an “egoist” is not just flippant provocation or personal 
accusation but an effort to link his literary and political position to a much older debate 
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hinged around the claims of the “individual” fighting against repressive systems, claims that 
were often refused as being either “egoistic” or “anarchistic.”298 
  
There is also a conflict between the rational ego of the Irish subject and British 
Colonialism, Catholicism, and even vulgar nationalism. The rational ego of Stephen as a 
modern Irish subject is in conflict with two sets of others that I call Big External Other 
and Big Internal Other. The identity of the Irish subject is not only host to these ‘others,’ 
but also constructed by them. Whereas British colonialism and the Roman Catholicism 
are the Big External Other to the Irish Subject, the ideological discourses within Irish 
identity such as nationalism are the Big Internal Other. Both are represented in the 
identity of the Irish subject. Big External Other is the target of the rebels of the Big 
Internal Other, and Joyce’s egoism, manifested in his egoistic aesthetics, is rebelling 
against both.    
    The rational ego of the Irish nationalist subject thus occupies only a small space in 
Irish subject/ivity. The two sets of others are so powerful that have given an ideological 
character not only to the Irish subject but also to the Irish rational ego that calls for 
independence and freedom. Ideological subjectivities thus play the role of the other for 
the rational and aesthetic ego of the subject. They give an ideological character to the 
ego itself that supposedly sought to rebel against them. In other words, there is always a 
clash between the rational ego of the Irish nationalist subject, and the other discourses 
that have created the same subject. This clash results in the victory of the others within 
the identity of the Irish subject, and thus the rational ego cannot succeed in its 
aspirations. That is why the vulgar mode of nationalism becomes a dominant 
subjectivity for the characters of the novel. 
    The ideological realm in which the Irish subject is located provides a realm of 
‘otherness’ for the study of Irish identity.  The ideological ‘other’ has given birth to an 
ideological ‘ego,’ and the dialectic between these two constructs what is called the 
ideological identity of the Irish subject. In A Portrait, the rational ego also becomes 
ideological. It is this simplistic, arrogant, and ideological rational ego of Irish nationalist 
subject that Joyce criticizes and satirizes. Davin is a good example of an Irish subject 
with such rational ego.  
    Joyce’s response to this ideological ego may be called, as Jean-Michel Rabaté   has 
done, ‘negoism.’ Joyce’s ‘egoistic estheticism’ transforms into ‘esthetic negoism.’299 
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Stephen’s “ego nego,” first seen in the 1904 text of A Portrait, appeared as “egoism” in 
Stephen Hero, and, then, completely developed as “negoism” in Finnegans Wake.  
Rabaté  ’s discussion is an attempt to separate the ideological rational ego from the 
aesthetic ego in Joyce. The same negoism can be symbolically seen in the famous 
quotation from Ulysses where Stephen says to Bloom “we cannot change the country. 
Let us change the subject.”300 Joyce’s response to ‘the ego/the subject’ dialectic is 
observed in the establishment of the esthetic negoism in his works. 
    Joyce’s consideration of the British colonialists can be called, according to Derek 
Attridge and Marjorie Howes, a mode of semicolonialism. They discuss Joyce’s relation 
to Irish politics in their introduction to the book through reference to the following 
quotation from Finnegans Wake: 
 
     Gentes and laitymen, fullstoppers and semicolonials, hybrids and lubbers!301 
 
Here Joyce, using his portmanteau method, turns the distinction between full stops and 
semicolons into, they argue, “the opposition between permanent and temporary 
inhabitants of a colonized country, or ‘stoppers’ and ‘colonials.’”302 In another essay of 
the same book Marjorie Howes argues that Stephen deliberately leaves out Great Britain 
in order to narrate his nation.303 However, whereas Stephen omits the name of Great 
Britain in the diagram he draws at school, he is rather innovative in his aesthetic 
employment of English language and leaves out the native language of his nation, 
Gaelic. Therefore, Stephen’s treatment of Irish nationalism has provided contradictory 
critiques because his response is paradoxical.  As I show later in the present chapter, the 
idea of beauty in the aesthetic ego of Stephen becomes so dominant that it takes the 
place of such concepts as religion, nation, and home, to name only the most significant.  
    In conclusion, religion and nationalism provide two major subjectivities for the 
context in which inter-subjective dialectic rises. The internal dialectic between these 
nationalism and religious subjectivity is destructive for both Dante and Mr Casey 
because it creates mental imbalance and psychological disorder. What is significant is 
that this destructive dialectic functions in the unconscious, of which the subject may not 
be aware of. Although the nationalist discourse represented in the novel is successful to 
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subjectivate a number of characters, it is not able to meet its ideals. This dialectic is 
constructive for Stephen. It results in the synthesis of a new subjectivity, one that is 
non-ideological and based on art. 
 
7.3 Identity Reconstruction and Representation:  
      From Ideology to Artistic Subjectivity 
Stephen Dedalus, alienated with ideological signifiers and interpellated in domestic, 
educational, and religious contexts, undergoes a long process of re-constructing his 
identity. He moves from ideologically constituted subjectivities to a new subjectivity 
that is creative and artistic, revolutionary, and highly critical of conventions. How 
Stephen re-constructs his identity should be investigated in the analysis of this new 
subjectivity. Stephen’s particular perception of art, manifested in both his aesthetic 
theory and the novel itself, is in close affinity to the construction of this new 
subjectivity.  
    This section consists of two major parts: first, I shall present an argument on the 
materialisation of epiphany that Stephen goes through after he is disillusioned with the 
ideological subjectivities. The materialized epiphany as experienced by Stephen results 
in the emergence of a particular mode of artistic subjectivity, one that is based on 
language and that is to replace the already constituted ideological subjectivities within 
his identity. Secondly, I examine the instrumental role played by language in the 
reconstruction of the identity of Stephen with reference to art/ideology relation in this 
newly-formed artistic subjectivity.    
 
7.3.1 Disillusionment and Materialization of Epiphany 
The transition from the protagonist’s disillusionment with ideological subjectivities to 
the ultimate artistic creativity goes through a materialized experience of epiphany. This 
section, while referring to examples of disillusionment in the novel, provides an analysis 
of the rise of illusions and their consequent change to disillusions in Stephen’s identity. 
Considering Stephen’s experience of epiphany as a decisive moment in his act of 
identity re-construction, the present section seeks to argue that the particular 
materialized character of Stephen’s experience of epiphany is in close affinity with both 
the aesthetic theory and artistic creation of the novel.  
    A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is a novel that contains several instances of 
disillusionments for the protagonist. Stephen’s engagement in an illusion clearly 
manifests his unconscious identification with the corresponding heroes involved in that 
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illusion. As demonstrated earlier, identity is not reducible to a mere act of identification; 
however, investigation of subjectivity by elaborating on its identification to its 
corresponding external manifestation is illuminating in the analysis of identity. What is 
crucial here is that the ideological discourse or the image with which Stephen identifies 
ultimately plays the role of the ‘other’ to him. It means that the identification with a 
character transforms into diversity from him. 
    Stephen first identifies himself with the hero of The Count of Monte Cristo; at home, 
while reading Alexandre Dumas’s novel, Stephen is deeply affected in its adventure and 
romance. Stephen imagines himself as the lover of Mercédès, the novel’s heroine. Later 
throughout the novel he identifies himself with a number of other figures such as Parnell 
and Jesus Christ. He also thinks of the real designations of his name, St. Stephen, the 
first Christian martyr. His identification with Napoleon and Lord Byron is another 
example of his illusion of becoming the national hero of his country. And finally, at the 
last line of the novel, he identifies himself with Dedalus, both as the father and the son.    
    Stephen’s mental acts of identification are the immediate result of his seclusion both 
at home and school. When his father says that his son is a “lazy bitch,” Stephen leaves 
the house and wanders through the rainy Dublin landscape, quoting poems to himself. 
Disillusionment with the family reaches its height when he and his father are in Cork. 
He escapes from it by reciting poems on solitude and thus entertains himself with art. 
The other example of disillusionment with the family is that he is not happy at a 
birthday party of another child. After a set of misunderstanding with his aunt, he sings a 
song with the others, but he mostly enjoys his feeling of being separated from them. 
    Disillusionment is a significant cause for the alienation of the protagonist. The term 
alienation can be widely used in two different contexts. First, there is the Lacanian 
understanding of the term that I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, when I 
outlined the role of language acquisition in the mental development of the subject. The 
second is the general designation of the term that such terms as self-alienation and 
alienated character are its derivations. There is always the dissociation of self/other in 
both modes of alienation. If the subject/other dialectic is what constructs the subject, its 
dissociation brings about alienation. In its general meaning, alienation is used when the 
subject consciously recognizes the limitations and weak points of an ideological 
discourse or an ideal image; the subject becomes alienated here because he/she has no 
firm belief in what he/she used to rely on. Both designations are manifested in A 
Portrait.  
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    Stephen, as a result of alienation, first suffers from moments of psychological 
imbalance that are reflected in his behaviour. He is visiting the prostitutes, and yet 
knows that it is a sin and the source of other sins such gluttony and pride. He knows that 
he should not be sinful, but he cannot help it since he is motivated to commit sin by the 
power of the flesh. His thoughts here are the immediate example of his Catholic faith. 
When contemplating his several acts of sex with a prostitute, he says to himself: 
 
At most, by an alms given to a beggar whose blessing he fled from, he might hope wearily 
to win for himself some measure of actual grace. … A certain pride, a certain awe, withheld 
him from offering to God even one prayer at night though he knew it was in God’s power to 
take away his life while he slept and hurl his soul hellward ere he could beg for mercy.304 
 
This quotation, which sounds like the speech of a clergyman, shows that Stephen is now 
deeply influenced by a constituent subjectivity of his identity. If he wants to be free, he 
should flee; flight is regarded as disobedience. It is interesting to know that it is exactly 
at the time of his becoming a priest that his departure from religious faith begins. He 
thinks that instead of finding the wisdom in the church he should find it in himself and 
his wanders: 
 
      His destiny was to be elusive of social and religious orders. The wisdom of the priest’s 
appeal did not touch him to the quick. He was destined to learn his own wisdom apart from 
others or to learn the wisdom of others himself wandering himself wandering among the 
snares of the world.305 
 
    The novel thus traces the protagonist’s growing disillusionment with such ideological 
apparatuses as the family, the school, the church, and orthodox nationalism.306  In A 
Portrait we see ideologies loosing colour. The movement of the novel, too, is in a way 
that each chapter closes with a synthesis of triumph which is destroyed in the next 
chapter. In each chapter Joyce repeats the same pattern of showing Stephen embracing a 
dream in contempt of reality, then seeing that dream destroyed.  
                                                 
304
 A Portrait, p. 111. 
305
 Ibid., p. 175. 
306
 The conflict between the subject and the mentioned ideological apparatuses has been also discussed  
by Regenia Gagnier when, dealing with the literary subjectivity of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, she refers to “the institutional apparatuses of church, family, and school or State against which in 
the Victorian period ‘the self’ formed and opposed itself.” Regenia Gagnier, Subjectivities: A History of 
Self-Representation in Britain, 1832-1920, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 223. 
 
 191
    These instances of disillusionment ultimately lead to an experience of epiphany for 
Stephen. Of theological and metaphysical origin, the term epiphany is used by Joyce to 
point to an earthly moment in the life of Stephen when a deep and abrupt change 
happens to him. It is believed that St Stephen had experienced an epiphany in the last 
moments of his life by seeing God and Jesus. Epiphany is, however, changed in Joyce to 
an earthly experience. His works are full of these earthly epiphanies. In Dubliners he 
had already demonstrated some examples of epiphany. A good example is that which 
happens to the protagonist in the short story Araby. Joyce defined it in Stephen Hero in 
the following way: 
 
By an epiphany he [Stephen] meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the 
vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed 
that it is for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they 
themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.307 
  
If epiphany in religion has positive consequences for the subject and moves him from 
scepticism to faith and from darkness to light, in Joyce’s usage of the term it does not 
always result in hope. Whereas in theology epiphany comes close to the idea of 
revelation, when a divine truth is manifested to the prophet, in Joyce epiphany has an 
earthly nature, one that reveals a truth to the protagonist about the real life and relations 
between human beings. That is why the description of his experience of sex, which 
ultimately disillusioned him, finds a divine language that almost seems like a religious 
epiphany: 
 
It was too much for him. He closed his eyes, surrendering himself to her body and mind, 
conscious of nothing in the world but the dark pressure of her softly parting lips.308  
 
This style of language brings to mind the language he had already employed to describe 
Mary when he said “The glories of Mary held his soul captive... symbolizing the 
preciousness of God’s gift to her soul...”309 He describes the woman he has an affair 
with the way he later describes Mary. The above quotation is close to a theological 
language and is in contrast to the language that he later uses for the first true love in his 
                                                 
307
 James Joyce, Stephen Hero, John J. Slocum, Herbert Cahoon (ed.), New York: New Directions 
Publishing Corporation, 1963, p. 216. 
308
 A Portrait, p. 108. 
309
 Ibid., p. 112. 
 192
life. Whereas the description of Mary is foreground with a religious mark, the 
description of the girl he sees on the shore is characteristically literary:  
 
She stood before him like one whom magic had changed into the likeness of a strange and 
beautiful seabird. Her long lender bare legs were delicate as a crane’s and pure save where 
an emerald trail of seaweed had fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh. Her thighs, fuller 
and softhued as ivory, were bared almost to the hips where the white frings of her drawers 
were like featherings of soft whit down.310 
 
The style of this passage is highly figurative. There are several examples of imagery at 
work. There is visual imagery in ‘the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird’ and 
‘ling lender bare legs.’ There is also tactile imagery in ‘a sigh upon the flesh.’ In 
addition, there are several similes and metaphors at work. The tone of the passage, 
because of the zealous expression of sensual similes, is passionate and refreshing. This 
tone reminds us of the fact that he is describing a beautiful girl and that this beauty 
proves an inspirational source for him. The style of the above quotation is analogous to 
the Latin paragraph on Mary earlier mentioned. Stephen likes the musicality of the Latin 
phase and here he attempts to create a musical rhythm for his description. The beauty he 
recognizes in the girl and, correspondingly, the language that is involved in that beauty 
are what significantly matter to him. He sees this young girl on the beach when he is 
waiting for the news about his acceptance to the university. Being struck by her beauty, 
he realizes that he is not to be constrained by the boundaries of his family, his nation, 
and his religion. The most significant epiphany in the novel occurs here. 
    Epiphany, though having a religiously spiritual designation, is here given an earthly 
character. The language describing the moment of epiphany is profane and the object of 
description is the sexualized body of a girl. Instead of a spirit, it is the physical body 
that is manifested to Stephen. Whereas the revealed spirit is regarded as truth in the 
theological conception of epiphany, it is the beauty of the earthly material that is 
regarded as the object. In addition, there is an interesting similarity between the 
materialization of epiphany in Joyce and the materialization of ideology in Althusser. 
As I demonstrated in detail in Chapter Four, whereas ideology was predominantly 
described as a set of ideas and, hence, an abstract entity, it was provided with a material 
and tangible existence in Althusser’s definition of the term. Althusser’s idea of the 
materialization of ideology can be applied to Joyce’s attempt in materializing epiphany.  
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    Epiphany, which had been already defined as a spiritual and heavenly experience of 
the manifestation of the truth, was given a materialized characteristic by Joyce. 
Stephen’s experience of the materialization of epiphany is the climax of the 
transformations he went through in the course of the novel. For example, the movement 
from ‘jupe’ to ‘skirt’ in his conversation with the director is expressive of a manifest 
movement from religion to art, from heavenly concepts to materialist perception of 
beauty. Stephen finds beauty in art and realizes that the strictness of the priestly life 
does not go with his love for sensual beauty. 
    Stephen’s movement towards artistic subjectivity, however, should not be conceived 
of as a simplistic and clear-cut process. For example, when he goes to the rector’s office 
to report on Father Dolan, he sees the portraits of saints and “great men of the order.”311 
The emergence of artistic subjectivity is thus in parallel to Stephen’s rebellion against 
his religious faith. In rebelling against his religious faith he is really rejecting his mother 
and aunt, and in rebelling against Irish orthodox patriotism he is really rejecting his 
father, uncle, and Mr Casey. Furthermore, Stephen, in re-constructing his new identity, 
should also rebel against the constitutive ideological subjectivities of his identity. 
Stephen, in his movement toward establishing an artistic subjectivity, manages to 
concentrate on his materialist notion of art. Thinking of Yeats’ hero, Stephen writes in 
his diary records of the last section of the final part of the novel: 
 
Michael Robartes remembers forgotten beauty and, when his arms wrap her round, he 
presses in his arms the loveliness which has long faded from the world. Not this. Not at all. I 
desire to press in my arms the loveliness which has not yet come into the world.312  
 
As noted earlier, Joyce rejected Yeast’s mode of nationalism. Although Yeats was also 
criticized by his contemporaries, the true rebellion for Joyce was a rebellion in art 
through the medium of language. The rebellion towards political independence becomes 
rebellion towards artistic inventiveness in A Portrait. Europe was at war at that time and 
Michael Collins had been taken prisoner during the Easter Rising in Dublin. His 
rebellion needs sacrifice and Stephen accepts that. Lucifer’s “I will not serve” becomes 
illuminating for him. In his dialogue with Cranly towards the end of the novel, Stephen, 
referring to his refusing of his mother’s request to make his Easter duty, says: 
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I will not serve that in which I no longer believe whether it call itself my home, my 
fatherland or my church: and I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as 
freely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to 
use–silence, exile, and cunning.313 
 
Stephen thus rejects being interpellated by religion. There is here the rational ego of 
Stephen that should take arms against ideological subjectivities within the same identity. 
The rational ego of Stephen, being revolutionary, is in conflict with religious, domestic, 
national, and traditional subjectivities in Stephen’s identity. Hence, there are inter-
subjective dialectics at work in this phase of his mental development. Early 
manifestations of this new subjectivity are seen in his elementary poetical compositions.  
Now it is this new mode of language that replaces the early use of language and forms 
the artistic subjectivity. 
   
7.3.2 Ideology, Art, and the Aesthetics of Language in A Portrait 
The process of the reconstruction of identity is a complicated and ongoing one. As I 
showed in Chapter Six, whereas the constructivists argue for the possibility of identity 
reconstruction, linguistic determinism demonstrates the subject’s failure in 
reconstructing its identity because of the inevitable influence of the Symbolic and the 
unconscious/language unity. The representation of identity in language is not a clear-cut 
and simplistic act in that identity, consisting of different subjectivities, does not have a 
fixed state and a simplistic manifestation. This section attempts to demonstrate the 
representation of the reconstruction of the identity of the subject in A Portrait with 
particular reference to the language of the novel. I also seek to explore the opposition art 
manifests to ideology while investigating both ideological and artistic subjectivities 
constituting the subject. The protagonist in this novel critically approaches the 
ideological subjectivities that had already constituted his identity. The artistic 
subjectivity the protagonist seeks to convey is based on the particular aesthetic theory of 
art presented in the novel. The investigation of the conflict between ideology and art, 
their role in constructing their consequent subjectivities, and their representation in 
language of the text is thus instrumental in providing a better understanding of the 
process of the reconstruction of identity in this novel. 
    A Portrait does not serve any particular ideology, but it includes different ideological 
subjectivities and languages of the context it represents. As I discussed earlier in the 
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thesis, Althusser did not rank art among ideologies. Art resists subjection to ideology 
and it is, thus, a refusal of ideology. However, art, while being disobedient to ideology, 
includes it. Ideology is sometimes satirized and, thus, criticized, sometimes refused, or 
simply neglected. If the text is to commit itself to one of them it would itself become an 
ideological product; art has been always in conflict and in a complex relation to the 
ideologies of the context in which it is produced. There is always insubordination to 
ideology in art. Trevor Williams in Reading Joyce Politically (1997) argues that: 
 
…Joyce’s work contains ideology: most of his characters misperceive reality and appear to 
be suffused with false consciousness. But this is not to say that the novel’s effect is 
ideological. There are characters in Dubliners… who briefly show signs of resistance to 
false consciousness, and in A Portrait it is clear by the end that Stephen has escaped the 
dominant ideologies of church and state.314 
 
    Ideologies interpellate Stephen in language from a young age; what happens to 
Stephen is what happens to almost every one: being exposed to ideology, both directly 
and dramatically, through language. Towards the end of the novel Stephen has 
participated in a definitive refusal of ideologies. He expresses his aesthetic theory and 
decides to become an artist after his epiphany. Artistic subjectivity is what that replaces 
the former ideological subjectivity.   
    Although A Portrait represents ideological subjectivities, it is does not take side with 
them and dissociates itself from them. Refusing the interpellation of ideologies, the 
protagonist seeks to achieve a mature artistic subjectivity. Sean P. Murphy in James 
Joyce and Victims: Reading the Logic of Exclusion (2003) points both to the text’s 
relation to ideologies and the way Stephen confronts them: 
 
Joyce testifies in both Stephen Hero (1904) and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
(1916) to the ways ideology, while often employed in the service of disempowering colonial 
subjects, can empower individuals who elect to resist occupying the places dominant 
ideologies carve for them in the totality. ... The act of resistance, a potentially empowering 
use of agency within the systems that enable (and disable) subjectivity, necessarily points to 
a context, to that which the resister resists, namely ideology.315 
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Stephen’s resistance to ideology should be examined through focusing on the way   he 
employs language. Whereas A Portrait manifests a glossary of ideological languages 
including familial, religious, educational, and even nationalistic modes of language, the 
protagonist of the novel is not interpellated and alienated by these languages and their 
ideological signifiers. Sean Murphy’s work on Joyce does not provide a study of these 
different modes of languages. Also, he does not demonstrate the tensions within 
Stephen’s identity that are created because of the conflicts between these modes of 
language, on one hand, and Stephen’s inventive approach to language, on the other. A 
good example to show how Stephen dealt with ideologies in his time is observed in his 
conversation with nationalist Davin. Here his ideas are in close affinity to the aesthetical 
theory he attempts to follow: 
 
      —This race and this country and this life produced me, he said. I shall express myself as 
I am. 
      —Try to be one of us, repeated Davin. In your heart you are an Irishman but your pride 
is too powerful. 
      —My ancestors threw off their language and took another, Stephen said. They allowed a 
handful of foreigners to subject them. do you fancy I am going to pay im my own life and 
person debts they made? What for? 
     —For freedom, said Davin.316 
 
The internal inter-subjective dialectic within the identity of such characters as Dante 
now becomes an external conflict between Davin and Stephen. On one hand, there is 
Davin, a manifest Irish nationalist, and, on the other hand, there is Stephen, who wants 
to fly from those nets such as nationality. Joyce’s word ‘net’ reminds us of the 
restrictions of ideology. As observed, the word ‘subject’ appears here; Stephen does not 
want to become subject to these ideologies. He says:  
 
—The soul is born, he said vaguely, first in those moments I told you of. It has a slow and 
dark birth, more mysterious than the birth of the body. When the soul of a man is born in 
this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of 
nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets.317  
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Whereas in Davin’s view freedom is to be free from the authority of the English, for 
Stephen freedom is to be free from such nets as nationality, language, and religion. 
These three nets provide three ideological subjectivities from them Stephen “shall try to 
fly.” Art provides the wings for such a flight. Later in chapter five Stephen thinks of 
‘flight.’ He watches birds fly. Here flying is a means to be free, which is reminiscent of 
the freedom of Icarus and his son from the prison in Ancient Greek mythology. He 
thinks of the opening lines to the farewell speech of the countess in Yeats’ play The 
Countess Cathleen (1892), where, the swallow is here the symbol for freedom. 
Stephen’s decision “to fly over by those nets” is accomplished through an artistic 
creativity, one that is not bound to ‘nets’:   
 
His soul had arisen from the grave of boyhood, spurning her grave-clothes. Yes! Yes! Yes! 
He would create proudly out of the freedom and power of his soul, as the great artificer 
whose name he bore, a living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable, 
imperishable.318 
 
The idea of artistic creativity finds its proper vein in the last pages of the novel. On 27 
April, the last date in his diary, he says to himself: “Old father, old artificer, stand me 
now and ever in good stead.”319 The last line of the novel thus heralds the beginning of 
the inventiveness. But what should be of concern here is that there is again the clash 
between religion and art even at the last lines of the novel; for example, his reference to 
his mother’s words: “She prays now, she says, that I may learn in my own life and away 
from home and friends what the heart is and what it feels. Amen.”320 Immediately after 
this thought he says: “Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth time the 
reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of 
my race.”321 
   Stephen’s idea of artistic creativity is based on his aesthetic theory that is involved in 
the properties of beauty according to his discussion of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. In 
his dialogue with Lynch, he argues that a work of art, an artistic object that has beauty, 
should achieve integritas, consonantia, and claritas, which he translates into “wholeness, 
harmony, and radiance.”322 These are, in terms of Thomas Aquinas the three qualities or 
conditions of beauty which correspond to the three stages of apprehension. 
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   After his long discussion of his aesthetic theory Stephen defines three forms of art, the 
lyrical, the epic, and the dramatic. In the lyric there is the presentation of the image of 
the artist in relation to himself, in the epic, to both himself and others, and in the 
dramatic to others, and “The artist, like the God of creation, remains within or behind or 
beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, parting 
his fingers.”323 
    References to Byron in the novel are in direct relation to Stephen’s aesthetic theory. 
When asked in Belvedere school about the greatest English poet, he refers to Lord 
Byron. As it is known, Byron went to Greece to fight for the independence of the Greek 
from the Ottoman Turks. Byron can be regarded as a typical example of the Romantic 
subject whose idea of independence sounds similar to that of Stephen.  Hence the idea 
of love, freedom, and heroism with no respect for ideology re-appears. Seamus Deane, 
while arguing for the significance of the idea of independence in Joyce, thus refers to 
Stephen’s act of re-constructing his identity out of what have already constituted him: 
 
      Joyce’s repudiation of Catholic Ireland and his countering declaration of artistic 
independence are well-known and integral features of his life-long dedication to writing. 
Yet he was formed by the Ireland he repudiated and his quest for artistic freedom was itself 
shaped by the exemplary instances of earlier Irish writers who had, in his view, failed to 
achieve that independence which he sought for himself, an independence which was at once 
the precondition and the goal of writing.324    
 
    Stephen’ refutation of Tennyson and his reference to him as a ‘rhymester’ in his long 
debate with his friends at Belvedere College is also in close affinity with his aesthetic 
theory. Tennyson was the most famous poet of the Victorian age; he was referred to as 
poet of the people and was Poet the Laureate from 1850 after the death of Wordsworth 
until his death in 1892. Tennyson was a master of versification, but he is considered 
only as a rhymester by Stephen. Stephen’s modernist creativity was not what the 
nineteenth-century philistines could have possibly appreciated.   
    Stephen’s modernist creativity can be clearly seen in this symbolic contemplation 
after being forced to compete in an academic contest in which the opposing teams wear 
badges with red or white roses—emblems of the York and Lancaster families of the 
fifteenth-century English history:   
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White roses and red roses: those were beautiful colours to think of. And the cards for first 
place and second place and third place were beautiful colours too: pink and cream and 
lavender. Lavender and cream and pink roses were beautiful to think of. Perhaps a wild rose 
might be like those colours and he remembered the song about the rose blossoms on the 
little green place. But you could not have a green rose. But perhaps somewhere in the world 
you could.325 
 
Here the possibility of the existence of a green rose shows Stephen’s artistic 
imagination and modernist creativity that finds its vein in language. The depiction of a 
green rose is a symbol for Stephen’s creativity, one that is not a completely objective 
and realistic representation of the reality as it is. Hence, although there white and red 
roses, Stephen thinks of the creation of a green rose in his art.  This colour is also 
demonstrative of the green place that is Ireland since green is traditionally the colour of 
Ireland. This green rose of the child’s initial imaginative creation acts as a symbolic 
foreshadowing of the young man’s final devotion to artistic subjectivity. 
    Language is the most significant point of concentration in Stephen’s aesthetic theory. 
Language also provides the context and medium of Stephen’s act of reconstructing his 
identity through the establishment of an artistic subjectivity. One observes in Joyce the 
representation of different languages, parodying different styles of composition, and 
using different languages and particularly Latin. A good example of Joyce’s parodying 
of different languages of the history of English prose is in Ulysses.326   
    Throughout A Portrait Stephen develops a particular concern for words including 
jupe, skirt, tundish, and even his name.  He also remembers the words in his father’s tale 
when he was a little child. A good example in his mature years is when Stephen and the 
Dean of the university speak about aesthetics; Stephen is disappointed by the older 
man’s incomplete knowledge of English. When Stephen uses the word ‘tundish,’ 
referring to a funnel for adding oil to a lamp, the dean does not know the meaning of 
this word. In his conversation with the dean, his obsession with and significance of 
language appears:    
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—The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the 
words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write these 
words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for 
me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. 
My soul frets in the shadow of his language.327 
 
    Stephen’s “consciousness of language” is in direct relation to both his consciousness 
that was made by the language he acquired and the consciousness of a new language. 
Stephen reflects that English will always be a borrowed language for him, an “acquired 
speech.” He is aware of the ideological connotations of the words and consciously aims 
at using a non-ideological mode of language to represent his artistic subjectivity. The 
following extract from the novel is demonstrative of Stephen’s involvement in artistic 
language: 
 
  —A day of dappled seaborne clouds. 
       The phrase and the day and the scene harmonised in a chord. Words. Was it their 
colours? He allowed them to glow and fade, hue after hue: sunrise gold, the russet and 
green of apple orchards, azure of waves, the greyfringed fleece of clouds. No, it was not 
their colours: it was the poise and balance of the period itself. Did he then love the 
rhythmic rise and fall of words better than their associations of legend and colour? Or was 
it that, being as weak of sight as he was shy of mind, he drew less pleasure from the 
reflection of the glowing sensible world through the prism of a language manycoloured 
and richly storied than from the contemplation of an inner world of individual emotions 
mirrored perfectly in a lucid supple periodic prose?328   
 
This passage is evoked after his obsession with the phrase ‘dappled seaborne,’ an 
inaccurate quotation from a book by Hugh Miller.329 It demonstrates the power of the 
words upon him. Stephen wonders how this line could affect him to that extent. He is 
touched by both the iambic tetrameter rhythm and the sophisticated diction of this line. 
He feels these characteristics since he is living among the words. Another example of 
Stephen’s obsession with words is the polygluttural techniques he uses. Neologism 
demonstrates Stephen’s love of language; it does not signify merely a new concept 
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Rocks; or, Geology in Its Bearings on the Two Theologies, Natural and Revealed (Boston, 1857). See 
Chester G. Andrson’s note quoted in Seamus Deane’s edition of A Portrait, p. 306.   
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introduced through language, it also brings to mind the idea of introducing a new reality 
in a lexical way.    
    The last chapter is then the most difficult chapter of the novel. It is full of Latin 
phrases, allusions, grammatical and philosophical terms and Stephen’s theory of 
aesthetics. The style is here that of a mature writer. The last part of A Portrait is similar 
to the first parts of Ulysses. He is not any more the baby tuckoo of the first page but a 
promising artist, one that is aware of aesthetics and philosophy of art.  He is writing his 
diaries and talking of forging the uncreated conscience of his race.  
    There is a connection between Stephen’s style and his subjectivity. The development 
of language and subjectivity are in parallel to each other. Moreover, attempting to 
compose in a highly artistic style is expressive of the process of the re-construction of 
the already ideologically constituted identity. John Paul Riquelme deals with the 
relation of the styles of A Portrait to the character: 
 
His constructing styles in A Portrait present a character whose experiences regularly 
involve opposing forces that seem irreconcilable, such as the violent political and religious 
antagonisms that Stephen witnesses during the Christmas dinner in part I. The strongly 
divergent aspects of the book’s language pertain simultaneously, though in different ways, 
to the writer who has learned to work with contrasts and to the character whose life and 
social context are filled with them.330   
  
The “violent political and religious antagonisms,” which Riquelme refers to, find a 
language for themselves throughout the novel. I referred to these antagonisms as 
ideological subjectivities with which Stephen’s artisits subjectivity is in a constant 
dialectic and opposition. As I showed in this chapter, each ideological subjectivity has 
its own ideological mode of language and these languages have been, as I showed, 
represented in this novel. Language is the battlefield of ideological subjectivities. There 
exists a permanent struggle throughout the novel between being ideological 
subjectivities and the subject’s rebellion against them.  But what is crucial is that this 
rebellion happens through language; the rebellion against ideological subjectivities is a 
rebellion against language not only because language is mostly ideologically designated 
but because language is the medium that his identity was already constructed by.  
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    As demonstrated earlier, Language is the space where the universal and the particular 
come together. The identity of the subject is characterized by its distance from the 
universal and the particular. However, there is still a conflict between the universal and 
the particular in the creative style of writing. That is to say, any invention in language is 
really in opposition to the Other from which language has been already obtained. 
Artistic invention in language is, thus, in a profound conflict with the ideological 
Symbolic that has already constituted the subject.  
    If we consider the universal to be found in the subjectivities already constituted the 
identity of Stephen and if we take the particular as the newly constructed artistic 
subjectivity Stephen seeks to arrive at, then, Stephen’s act of reconstructing his identity 
through language first appears to be impossible in that language is closely related to the 
universal than to the particular. Stephen’s answer to this problem should be observed in 
the context of his ‘aesthetic negoism.’ Referring to Rabaté’s ideas above, I discussed 
that the egoistic esthetics of Joyce thus led to the rise of an aesthetic negoist, one that is 
aesthetically inventive in language. Language thus becomes the site for particularity in 
inventive styles of composition. The contradiction between the aesthetic ego of Stephen 
and the ideological subjectivities that have already constructed him is manifested in the 
language he employs towards the end of the novel.  
    Stephen’s aesthetic negoism in language is in parallel to the resistance of his artistic 
subjectivity to ideological subjectivity. Stephen is against being determined by 
ideologies; he is constructivist of a new subjectivity through art. However, determinist 
theories of identity argue that it is impossible for the subject to change the Symbolic and 
language s/he is first alienated with. If we consider Stephen as an agent, in the Butlerean 
sense of the term, then he may partly succeed in re-signifying the chain of signification. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Two, according to Butler’s constructivism, although the 
subject is determined by the Other and language, the agent can succeed in its acts of 
identity reconstructing. A good example is the colour of the rose. Roses are not green in 
the real world, but they can be green in art. The art that portrays the roses as green is a 
non-conventional art that does not go with the common understanding of the objects. 
    The ideological constitution of Stephen is interrupted by art. However, even the 
reconstruction itself is an ongoing process that is open-ended. Stephen himself is a part 
of a new dialectic; he is not complete in subject formation and undergoes an open ended 
process. Stephen becomes a non-ideological subject who rejects ideological 
interpellation and is thus linguistically not alienated. It is the artistic subjectivity of his 
identity that becomes the dominant through inventiveness in language.     
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7.4 Concluding Remarks 
The present chapter has sought to analyze the construction and re-construction of the 
subject’s identity in James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man according to 
the critical approach of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic. The ideological 
subjectivities of ‘the Other’ to which the subject is exposed in the novel were first 
investigated while analyzing both alienation and interpellation of the subject formation 
through the language of the major ISAs. Then, the study showed that while the tension 
between religious faith and nationalistic aspirations provides a deconstructive inter-
subjective dialectic in the identity of the characters of the novel including Dante and Mr 
Casey, it results in the construction of artistic subjectivity for the protagonist. 
‘Otherness’ in this reading was studied within the realm the language creates for the 
subject.      
    The chapter, then, focused on the process of the re-construction of the subject in the 
novel. A complicated and ongoing process, the reconstruction of identity in Stephen 
begins with disillusionment and ends with inventiveness. This process includes 
epiphany, which I argued had a materialized experience. The movement throughout the 
novel is thus from ideology to art; whereas it first begins with the ideological 
interpellation of the protagonist, it ends with a call for an artistic creation that goes 
beyond the ‘nets’ surrounding the protagonist.  
    The exploration of the aesthetics of language as represented in the novel in 
instrumental in the analysis of the representation of identity in that whereas Stephen 
attempts to reject ideological subjectivities, his artistic subjectivity is both constitutive 
and critical of these subjectivities. Therefore, this the process of identity reconstruction 
is represented in the language of the novel in a way that it includes not only the various 
forms of ideological languages but also the new artistic language Stephen ultimately 
employs. However, the inter-subjective dialectic in the identity of Stephen is not 
destructive in that it creates a new subjectivity, one that creates art based on the same 
aesthetic theory he himself has developed in the novel. This newly constructed non-
ideological subjectivity is itself dialectic and, thus, open-ended. The analysis of 
Stephen’s identity reconstruction is thus re-conceptualized from a simplistic and one to 
one relationship between ideological and artistic subjectivity into a complicated process 
in which several ideological subjectivities are involved and the new artistic subjectivity 
is itself conceived of as an ongoing process. 
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Chapter Eight:  
Discussions and Conclusion 
 
 
Critically examining the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject, this thesis 
explored the theoretical problems and methodological premises of a converged version 
of both theories. The central argument the thesis sought to demonstrate was that the 
Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic provides a more comprehensive account of the process 
of the subject formation than a purely psychoanalytical or structuralist Marxist analysis 
of the term. In order to demonstrate a practical reading of the formation and 
construction of the subject’s identity in terms of the critical approach of the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic the present research also proceeded to apply it to James Joyce’s A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916). 
    Concentrating on the Lacanian-Althusserian models of critical theory, the thesis   
studied language/ideology relations through investigating those critical and theoretical 
works that have attempted to make a parallel use of both Lacanian and Althusserian 
theories of the subject. As demonstrated, the ‘Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm,’ was 
practically employed, and harshly criticised in the area of film theory and criticism. I 
also showed that Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject as applied in cultural 
studies suffer from a deep investigation into the problems that emerge in such 
convergence.  
    A notable study of the position of the subject in psychoanalytical and Marxist 
approaches was provided by Fredric Jameson who developed the problem in the 
Lacanian model of subjectivity by referring to the gap emerging in the transmission 
from the Imaginary to the Symbolic. He also commented on Althusser’s relation to 
Lacan by relating the Althusserian perception of the ‘absent cause’ to the Lacanian 
concept of ‘the Real.’ Though original in his findings, Jameson’s response to a 
Lacanian-Althusserian framework faces two essential reconsiderations: first, although 
he analyses the Althusserian concept of the ‘absent cause’ in History, he does not 
consider it as instrumental in the further exploration of the Althusserian analysis of 
subjectivity constitution; secondly, although he concentrates on the gap that is formed in 
the transition of the subject from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, he does not directly 
focus on the other theoretical problems emerging in a Lacanian-Althusserian model of 
analyzing subjectivity. 
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    Laclau and Mouffe’s critical project, which brings together both Marxism and 
Psychoanalysis, has provided an ingenious notion of the subject of politics with 
reference to the Lacanian insights concerning the constitutive lack of the subject and its 
identity. Laclau’s concept of ‘empty signifier’ is innovative in that it explores how the 
impossibility of society and other signifying systems continue to exist through the 
impossibility of a full identification within both identity and ideology. Laclau’s concept 
of ‘empty signifier’ tends to bring both Lacan’s emphasis on language as constructing 
the subject’s identity and Althusser’s perception of the impossibility of the Subject. 
However, instead of employing Laclau’s concept of empty signifier I used the concept 
of ‘ideological signifier’ that not only manifestly refers to language-ideology relations 
in the identity of the subject but also demonstrates the close association between the 
Lacanian concept of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological 
interpellation. 
    As for Žižek’s study of the problem, I showed how he provides a twofold response to 
Althusser. He criticises Althusser’s overlooking of seeing the social fantasy as “filling 
out the voids of the social structure.” Moreover, he criticises the Althusserian concept of 
interpellation because the subject in Althusser, even before the moment of 
interpellation, is already a subject by being “trapped” by the Other. On the other hand, 
Žižek’s concept of ‘the ideological Barred O’ appears to be an explicit affirmative 
response to the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic in that it brings together both the 
Althusserian definition of ideology as present everywhere and the Lacanian perception 
of the barred Other as constitutive of the Symbolic.   
    Judith Butler, too, has critically confronted Althusser’s concept of interpellation. Her 
reference to interpellation as happening within the subject’s identity and, thus, having 
an inter-subjective character, proves to be of close affinity to what the present thesis 
aims at demonstrating: the inter-subjective dialectic between ideological subjectivities 
of the subject’s identity. Interpellation does not always need two persons to occur; it can 
take place within the identity of the subject. If we consider language as the battlefield of 
ideologies and the context in which the subject is interpellated, then, Butler’ concept of 
‘the agent’ and its relation to language provides a relative freedom for the agent in 
reconstructing his/her identity. In my analysis of Stephen Dedalus’ act of reconstructing 
his identity in the penultimate chapter of the present thesis I referred to Butler’s idea of 
the agent as providing a better theoretical framework for my argument that that 
observed in the Lacanian theory of the subject. The Lacanian concept of the subject 
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emphasizes the subject’s inability in reconstructing his/her identity because of the 
inevitable influence of the Symbolic.   
    Employing both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject in their works, the 
above critics have not focused on the problems and principles of the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of subjectivity. As demonstrated in the 
thesis, none of these critical efforts achieve a synthesis of the two models. Therefore, 
the present thesis proceeded to investigate the language/ideology, lack/material, and 
alienation/interpellation relations in the process of the subject formation by first 
studying the subject/object relations in rationalism and romanticism, which provided 
two distinguishable conceptions of the subject for both Lacanian and Althusserian 
models of subjectivity.  
    Considering the Cartesian subject as an objectified subject, I explored the certainty 
and centrality of Descartes’ rationalist treatment of the subject. The mind/body dualism 
in Descartes resulted in the construction of a number of modern binary oppositions such 
as the subject/nature, the subject/object, and centre/margin. The subject/object 
separation as well as the superiority and centrality of the subject established the 
hierarchy of these binary oppositions in a way that the first part of them was considered 
to be superior to the ‘other.’ As demonstrated in the thesis, both Lacan’s and Althusser’s 
concepts of the subject radically criticised the humanist designations of the Cartesian 
subject’s characteristic features of certainty and centrality that resulted in the 
consideration of the subject as free, autonomous, and decision maker.  
    On the other hand, the Hegelian perception of the subject is based on the treatment of 
the subject-Nature identity in German Idealist philosophy. Referring to the inspirational 
and spiritual character of Nature, I demonstrated the way Schelling and Novalis’ nature 
philosophy were in congruity to the pantheist principle of Romanticism. In Hegel, 
however, the subject-object identity ultimately became the subject-Nature non-identity. 
This non-identity with Nature   causes two lacks in the subject’s identity that are the 
lack of a state of complete subject-Nature identity and the lack caused by the gap 
between the subject and Nature. The Hegelian idea of the construction of the subject 
based on the other, which causes the alienation of the subject, was further investigated 
in my analysis of the Lacanian concepts of imaginary and linguistic alienations.   
    The exploration of the subject-Nature identity in German idealist philosophy thus 
provides a philosophical background for investigating the Lacanian notion of the subject 
of language and the corresponding subject-language identity. This approach can be also 
applied to the study of the Althusserian model of the subject/Subject.  Furthermore, the 
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incompleteness of the subject in both Lacanian and Althusserian accounts of the term 
can be further explored through investigating the mentioned lacks in the Hegelian 
perception of the subject. 
    I referred to the challenging questions the Althusserian theory evokes in my study of 
the Althusserian concept of the subject of ideology. The model that ideology requires its 
subjects to cope with, that is the Subject, is never materially realised by the subject. I 
have elaborated on the gap that exists between the subject and the Subject according to 
Hegel’s idea of the subject-other non-identity. Suggesting that the Subject is itself based 
on lack in that it is never materialized, my analysis provides further investigations into 
the constitution of ideology by lack. Althusser’s attempt to remove Hegel from his 
version of Marxism led to ignoring the lack that always exists between the subject and 
the Subject. A Hegelian-Lacanian reading of this model is illuminating in removing its 
shortcomings in that such reading investigates into the character of this lack and the 
reasons for its permanent existence and ongoing function.  
    Highly critical of the Cartesian subject and influenced by Hegelian treatment of the 
subject-other identity, the Lacanian perception of the identity of the subject as 
constructed by the other was in congruity with Hegel’s understanding of the significant 
role played by ‘the other’ in the rise of the self-consciousness of the subject. The thesis 
demonstrated that the Lacanian discussion of the mother/ infant non-identity in the 
mirror stage is reminiscent of the subject-other non-identity in Hegel.  
    Language, in Lacan’s concept of the subject of language, determines not only the 
formation of the unconscious but also the structure of the Symbolic. It also negates the 
lack it includes. The unconscious is thus based on lack. Demonstrating that the Other, 
desire and the unconscious all are based on lack, the thesis examined how lack is both 
created and negated by language. Whereas Lacan talked of the phallus as the most 
important signifier in the unconscious, there are other signifiers in language that the 
subject seeks to identify him/herself with. Therefore, language acquisition process 
exposes a number of what I called in the thesis ‘ideological signifiers’ to the subject that 
determine his/her identity. The alienation of the subject through the ideological 
signifiers thus provides the subject with ideological desires that are distinguishable from 
the sexual desires.  
    After critically studying Althusserian and Lacanian theories of the subject, the thesis 
investigated the major theoretical problems and premises of any critical attempt that 
applies both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject to the same work of art. 
The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic can be also conceived of as the convergence of lack 
 208
and material in that these two theories deal with two essentially different objects of 
study: language as based on lack and ideology as having a material existence. However, 
as demonstrated throughout the thesis, ideology is also constituted by lack. The 
constitution of both ideology and language on lack is not only represented in the 
development of the unconscious but also appears to be vital for the permanent 
functioning of the desire of the subject.  
    Furthermore, the close affinity of the Lacanian perception of alienation to the 
Althusserian concept of interpellation has been studied in the present thesis. I 
demonstrated how the subject’s alienation with ideological signifiers in the language 
acquisition process can be regarded as a dramatic mode of interpellation. Likewise, I 
elaborated on the alienation that results in the subject’s identity after being interpellated 
both directly and dramatically in his/her mature years.    
   Although the subject seeks to remain completely identical to the ideological signifiers, 
there is always a gap between him/her and what the ideological desires depict as the 
objects of desire. I argued that the mechanism through which both language and 
ideology alienate and interpellate the subject never permits the subject enjoying a state 
of full identity between him/her and the signifiers. The Lacanian and Althusserian 
subjects are then two sides of the same coin: while in Lacan the subject becomes the 
subject to the Other’s desire, in Althusser it becomes the subject of/to ideology; whereas 
in Lacan the Symbolic exists before the entry of the child into it, in Althusser, too, 
ideology exists before the entry of the individual into it; the result of both entries is the 
birth of the subject. Both concepts of interpellation and alienation contribute to this 
view that the subject is not the cause and the creator; s/he is, however, the effect and the 
created. The subject is the effect of both the language and ideology into which s/he is 
born. Consequently, they are both anti-humanistic theories of the subject. Both ideology 
and language are pre-existing structures to which the individual is exposed. Also, it is 
significant to note the parallel made between the unconscious and ideology: Both are 
open-ended, having no beginning and end except as they relate to the human existence.  
    I sought to demonstrate that the Lacanian subject and the Althusserian subject play a 
supplementary role to each other in that each one of them focuses on a particular aspect 
of the subject’s identity; whereas the Lacanian subject tended to consider the subject as 
the subject of language, the Althusserian subject considered it as the subject of 
ideology. Also, whereas the Lacanian theory is concerned with identity construction 
through imaginary and linguistic alienation in the infantile phase, the Althusserian 
theory is involved in the ideological interpellation of the subject in its mature years. I 
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also referred to the Lacanian concept of desire and considered it, in an Althusserian 
sense, ideological. Then, I demonstrated how there is the impossibility of a complete 
identity between the subject and the lost desire in Lacan and between the subject and 
what ideology requires it to be in Althusser.  
    The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus provides a more comprehensive critical 
perspective for the analysis of the subject. However, if simplistically developed — I 
referred to a number of examples in Chapter One — the similarities of both accounts 
will result in misunderstanding and misclassification. Moreover, the Lacanian-
Althusserian dialectic will suffer from certain theoretical weak points if applied without 
a critical investigation into the incongruity between the two theories.     
    The theoretical premises of my critical approach include the following: first, 
considering the concept of identity as an umbrella term that brings together different 
subjectivities within the realm of the same subject, this critical approach focuses on the 
‘inter-subjective dialectic’ in the identity of the subject and considers it as having 
constructive and deconstructive modes. Identity always functions through and because 
of the inter-subjective dialectic and intra-subjective lack within it. Identity is never fully 
constituted and has an ‘incomplete’ character. The ‘incompleteness’ of identity does not 
merely go back to the inter-subjective dialectics inside it. It is essential to the function 
of identity in that there is always an antagonism at wok motivated by intra-subjective 
lack. 
    Secondly, the ideological constitution of the subject that happens through language 
gives an ideological character to the Symbolic. Approaching the Symbolic as 
ideological, we are explicitly providing the Lacanian concept with an Althusserian 
signification. Subjectivity first exists in the Symbolic, and then becomes part of the 
identity of the subject. Based on its sameness to that which has created it, subjectivity 
can be considered as identical with the ideology that has produced it. Therefore, the 
ideological subjectivities of the Symbolic are manifested in the identity of the subject. 
    Thirdly, the identity of the subject is represented in the language exposed to and 
reproduced by the subject. ‘Ideological language’ thus becomes a key concept in my 
analysis of the identity of the subject. Investigation into the ideological language is a 
complicated process because each ideological aspect of language has been itself 
influenced by a vast number of ideologies in the same language. However, this 
ideological language is not responsible for the subject’s whole identity. It represents 
only a particular subjectivity that is itself permanently changing because of the intra-
subjective lack and its inevitable dialectic with other subjectivities. 
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    This critical methodology concentrates on the individual and the social as well as the 
particular and the universal in that it deals not only with the language as coming from 
the Other but also with the language as acquired by the subject. Although the language 
acquired by the subject comes from the Other and is reproduced by him/her, there can 
also be instances of the subject’s re-signification of the signifiers. As I explained in the 
thesis by referring to linguistic determinist and constructivist theories, there is a pale 
constructivism at work for the subject’s attempt of reconstructing his/her identity. The 
examples of identity reconstruction of the subject are rare and they involve a long 
complicated process of internal conflicts between subjectivities.   
    In order to demonstrate a practical analysis of the theoretical premises of  the 
Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic the present thesis has applied this critical approach to 
reading James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young man. In my study of the 
subject formation in Joyce’s novel I focused on dramatic and direct modes of 
ideological interpellation and their consequent linguistic alienation. Elaborating on the 
identity construction of the subject, I explored the relation of language to the Symbolic 
through exploring the moments in which ideology transits into language.  Considering 
the self-consciousness of the subject not as a fixed state but as an ongoing process that 
always remains incomplete, the thesis dealt with the role of language in the re-
construction of identity through investigating the inter-subjective dialectics between 
ideological subjectivities.  
    I also referred to the ideological subjectivities of ‘the Other’ to which the protagonist 
is exposed to. I have studied the subject formation by explaining how language, 
including ideological signifiers designated by the ISAs, alienate and interpellate the 
protagonist of the novel. Then, the inter-subjective dialectic between religious faith and 
nationalistic aspirations were explored.  ‘Otherness’ in this reading was studied within 
the realm the language creates for the subject. Subjectivity plays the role of the other for 
the other subjectivities. As demonstrated, the inter-subjective dialectic within the 
identity of the subject is not constructive of a new subjectivity for some characters 
including Dante and Mr Casey.       
    A complicated and ongoing process, the reconstruction of identity of the protagonist 
is manifested in forming a new subjectivity that begins with disillusionment, goes 
through an experience of the materialization of epiphany, and ends with inventiveness. 
Epiphany is materialized in the novel not only because it has been experienced by the 
protagonist but also because it gives a material existence to that which causes it. The 
revealed truth here does not come from a divine source; it is the body of a girl. 
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Materialization of epiphany by the protagonist is in parallel to the materialization of 
ideology in Althusser because in both cases a set of beliefs are materialized.    
   Whereas the novel first begins with the process of subjectivity formation of the 
protagonist, it ends with a call for an artistic creation that goes beyond the ‘nets’ 
surrounding the protagonist. The process of the reconstruction of identity through a 
move from ideological to non-ideological subjectivity happened for Stephen Dedalus 
through artistic inventiveness. My analysis is here dependent on the Althusserian view 
of art as not ranked among ideologies. The exploration of the aesthetics of language as 
represented in the novel is instrumental in the analysis of the representation of 
Stephen’s artistic subjectivity in that the artistic language of the novel is itself based on 
and constituted by a criticism of ideological languages of the novel. Thus, even in its 
reconstructed form, identity is still constituted by ideological subjectivities. 
    The internal inter-subjective dialectic is, however, constructive for Stephen in that it 
creates a new subjectivity. This new subjectivity is based on the aesthetic theory 
Stephen has developed in the novel and it is to replace the already constituted 
ideological subjectivities of his identity. The dialectic within Stephen’s identity first 
occurs between the existing ideological subjectivities and the newly formed artistic 
subjectivity. But what is notable is that even this new artistic subjectivity, as a result of 
its antagonism, is in a permanent dialectic with other artistic languages available to 
Stephen. That is why there are frequent references to Yeats and his mode of art towards 
the end of the novel. The result of this dialectic can be observed in the style of language 
used by Stephen in the last pages of the novel.    
    The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus provides a critical perspective for the 
analysis of subjectivity construction and identity re-construction that can be applicable 
to different phases in the development of the subject including both the infantile and 
mature years. In positioning the subject between both language and ideology it 
investigates the relation of the subject to both the individual and the social and, 
correspondingly, focuses on the particular and the universal in language as the realm 
where they meet. This critical approach is concerned with exploring ideological 
languages in a given text and how they represent ideological subjectivities. Examining 
the way an ideological subjectivity is formed, reproduced, and represented, this 
approach demonstrates how linguistic inventiveness plays an instrumental role in the re-
construction of the subject’s identity, which remains, even in its synthesized form, 
incomplete and undergoes an ongoing inter-subjective dialectical process.  
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